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Abstract
The main argument of this thesis is that the future-oriented vision that characterizes 
modernity has, in recent years, become inverted into an obsession with the past, an 
obsession that is played out using the discourses of “ownership”. The argument is 
developed by drawing a parallel between the question of time and place as it has been 
addressed in social theoretical discourses and (increasing) public concerns with 
owning the past -  a past that is accessed and (more importantly) appropriated by 
means of claims to the ownership of ancient objects. The argument looks at two 
specific cases in which ownership of objects is translated into claims for ownership of 
the past: the Parthenon Marbles case and the Kennewick Man case. First, the 
argument engages in legal analysis of the property claims set out in these cases. 
Second, it analyses these legal claims by reference to the theories of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Frantz Fanon (among others) in order to question the 
meaning of these legal conflicts. What light do current social-theoretical discussions 
shed on the proliferation of cultural property and cultural heritage? Arguably, claims 
that turn on ownership of these sorts of objects themselves express a deep discomfort 
with the present understanding of modem society’s location in time. The thesis 
concludes by suggesting that this obsession with the past is a reaction to the 
modernist obsession with the future, and that the lack of “place” that is so 
characteristic of modernity is also experienced as a lack of “time” for human 
flourishing. The proliferation of cultural property and cultural heritage cases and 
issues in law, and the increasing number of new museums, can be traced to these 
interconnecting absences, which discourses of ownership attempt to overcome.
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Chapter One Introduction
Introduction: The horizon-line of modernity
When Hannah Arendt wrote in 1958 of Sputnik’s ascent, she contemplated a 
world in which human eyes were turned to the future.1 The emotion Arendt identified 
was “relief’, as if in slipping the moorings of the earth, humankind finally had the 
capability to make a place for itself that would suit it in every particular. Looking 
upwards, the reaches of space were also the reaches of future time, and in 1958, 
Arendt noted that humankind saw all the pleasures of technology and freedom 
combining in a triumphant first step away from the earth and its discontents.
Certainly, by 1958 there had been beginning after beginning: the story of 
modernity is a story of infinite and recurrent beginnings. Yet, almost fifty years later, 
our eyes are turned to the past. We are fascinated by objects that seem to come from 
unimaginably distant pasts rather than approaching futures. The media reports the 
discovery of ancient artifacts more prominently than the latest flight to the stars, and 
the appeal of ancient cultures and monuments underwrites an increasing number of 
books, films and fantasy adventures.
Modems are horizon people, defined by a passionate attachment to what 
happens next. How then to explain this seemingly radical shift in attention from 
future to past?
In 1958, Arendt identified some of the dangers that could be found in the 
newly actualized and long-awaited movement towards the horizon. Chief among 
these were a diremption between human political rationality and technological 
capability, and a problematic relationship between the human organism and its
1 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,
1958).
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environment. She conceived the human condition, or the condition of our humanity 
itself, as having two characteristics: habitation on Earth and the capacity to speak 
intelligibly amongst ourselves about our own actions. Arendt feared that the effect of 
our passionate attention to the future would be a flight away from the earth and its 
myriad physical and political constraints. The future might be a time in which we 
might slip our moorings in more than physical space. Her fear was that “we, who are 
earth-bound creatures and have begun to act as though we were dwellers of the 
universe, will forever be unable to understand, that is, to think and speak about the 
things which nevertheless we are able to do”. Regardless of where we lived, then, 
we would cease to inhabit the human condition.
This would lead us to some kind of crisis in our relationship with time, with 
speech and rationality, and with the earth. It might well lead to a loss of “humanity” 
itself, as, divorced from the conditions that create humanity, “What will become of 
humankind, of society? What living conditions will ‘future generations’ face -  
provided that a comparable humanity even exists, and not some gene-manipulated, 
normed humanoids who are differentiated according to program?”3 Furthermore, we 
would not necessarily be aware of the texture, or the problems, of this crisis. The loss 
of speech, like the loss of the earth itself, might create a race of apolitical, silenced 
entities who had only their domestic, appetitive, or “individual” lives to fall back on. 
We might be enslaved by the demands of producing and abiding by technology rather 
than be liberated by the freedom that it was supposed to bring. We might finally 
reach the edge of the future and find nothing there at all that could serve as a place 
for human flourishing, a flourishing necessarily defined by acting and thinking 
against, or through, a common ground. This image expresses a world in which even 
Max Weber’s image of the “iron cage” would be a relief. For the lack of security, the 
need for reassurance in the face of an ever-expanding horizon might in fact be harder 
for human beings to bear than confinement.
2 Ibid. p. 3.
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It is this vision that the following work addresses. Studying the issues that 
arise in legal, political, and philosophical disputes regarding cultural property leads to 
the conclusion that the increasing interest in cultural property and heritage expresses 
the desire to establish a groundfor human flourishing. This ground must be created 
in contradistinction specifically to the anxiety generated by the particular temporality 
of modernity, and those results of our investment in that future that Arendt so 
succinctly and elegantly foretold in 1958. Cultural property and heritage studies are 
discourses that express modernity’s relationship with time and with the earth itself. 
This has the effect of placing cultural property and heritage studies among the 
discourses of modernity, and of placing these discourses on the membrane or 
contested line between modernity and postmodemity.
The relationship with time
The real problem o f modernity lies in the time dimension4
Niki as Luhmann
Certainly, we have not turned to the past because we have managed to exhaust 
the themes that Arendt identified as accompanying “the future”. The relationship 
with time in modernity is fluid and unstable. Like all epochs, modernity is defined by 
conceptions (and conceptualizations) of time. Yet, time itself in modernity has 
substantive and not merely formal characteristics. The work of Jurgen Habermas and 
Niklas Luhmann covers the breadth of the field of sociotheoretical understandings of 
time in modernity, although of course there are many other notable scholars in this 
area.
The “relief’ at escaping the earth that Arendt identified in 1958 was not long- 
lived. As Luhmann puts it, “Today we must live with extremely insecure 
perspectives of the future.. .”5 Why is the habitation of the future so very insecure? In 
part it is because the future is always a moment of “not-yet”. Luhmann and
3 Niklas Luhmann, Observations on Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 67. 
(Translated by William Whobrey)
4 Ibid. p. 69.
5 Ibid. p. 63.
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Habermas, from their very different perspectives, agree that the future is a time of 
confirmation of the project of modernity, and as such, either anarchic or utopian or 
both. It is the always-out-of-reach locus of the displacement of the successes that do 
not exist in the present. As a repository of our not-yet successes, it creates certain 
negative effects. First, it may no longer be a source of human complexity or richness. 
Jurgen Habermas joins Luhmann in highlighting this possible result. According to 
Habermas, when the traditional experiences of previous generations are replaced by 
the experience of progress that gives a “new” horizon, the future shuts itself off from 
humanity as a source of genuine disruption, defined as hope or growth. The utopian 
overlay paradoxically weakens the desire to move forward, to find habitation through 
an active engagement with future time or capacities.6
Second, as a result of this, the future is possibly necessarily mis-defined. “But 
is this Modem, is Habermas’s Modem, still our Modem? Is the society that employs 
the embarrassment of its self-description as a projection of a future, still our society? 
Can we -  and it could certainly be asked: must we -  hold such a view of the future 
because we could not otherwise know who we are and where we stand?”7 The web of 
meaning in epistemology and the acceptance of authority in the social dimension have
o
both been lost. The effect of this is to dislodge certainties of human action as well as 
thought. We have to learn to manage risk rather than knowledge; put differently, the 
probabilities of the future and those of the present may be at any moment coupled or 
uncoupled. As the present and the future may not, in fact, be logically dependent 
upon each other, the attempt to live oriented towards the future is deeply unsettling.9
Although the telling of the story of modernity has only recently become 
problematically dual (on the one hand a tale of progress, and on the other, a tale of 
anxiety that produces a need for reassurance), the forward leap and the backward
6 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), 
p. 12. (Translated by Frederick Lawrence)
7 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 66.
8 Ibid. pp. 68-9.
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glance have always been part of the same motion. Writing about Hegel as the first 
philosopher of modernity itself, Habermas states that “the secular concept of 
modernity expresses the conviction that the future has already begun: It is the epoch 
that lives for the future, that opens itself up to the novelty of the future. In this way, 
the caesura defined by the new beginning has been shifted into the past, precisely to 
the start of modem times”.10 The question then becomes, in the essential 
differentiation from the past that defines “modernity”, what is created by the 
inscription and re-inscription of this “caesura”?
The concepts of rationality and time are essentially linked, with the “new” 
rationality of the Enlightenment also signifying a “new” historical epoch, and vice- 
versa. In this sense, the idea of “the new”, the new idea of the new, created the idea 
of “the old”, the new idea of the old. “The past” now means the moment before the 
beginning of modem times. Yet, this newly created past is no more solid than the 
suddenly available future. This moment that continues to define modernity is one of 
opening, unguarded (or unprepared philosophically) to a (or some unknown), future, 
in contrast to some suddenly unreliable, because constantly expanding, past. Our 
love affair with the future has the paradoxical effect of foregrounding the past, as the 
result of being modem is, in each instant of modernity, to generate endless amounts 
of “past”.
Because the new, the modem world is distinguished from the old by the fact 
that it opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered 
constant with each moment that gives birth to the new. A present that 
understands itself from the horizon of the modem age as the actuality of the 
most recent period has to recapitulate the break brought about from the past as 
a continuous renewal.n
9 “There exists, therefore, only a ‘provisional’ foresight, and its value lies not in the certainty that it 
provides but in the quick and specific adjustment to a reality that comes to be other than what was 
expected”. Ibid. p. 70.
10 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity, p. 5.
"ibid. pp. 6-7.
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The continuous renewal of the new is also the continuous production of the old, a 
voracious machine that runs on the ingestion of time itself. Caught on the event- 
horizon of the future, history becomes all-consuming whereas time becomes scarce.12
The past, therefore, lay coiled in the very beginning of the modem age. The
separation from “the past” gave modernity its primary identity. However, the
distinction between past and “future” is not benign. The effect of this distinction is
the “constant creation of otherness”, without criteria for comprehending or
assimilating this otherness. Lacking the “natural understanding of the tradition”, we
“fall back on humanity or reason.. .in a weakened sense of values that allows us to 
1 ^condemn the other”. This is our situation in the present. The present, defined as 
this moment, is essentially inhospitable. The lack of oxygen or ground at the junction 
of past and future remains at the core of most struggles for reconciliation in disputes 
that may be considered “cultural”. Thinking about these issues, Homi Bhabha calls 
the space of modernity “unhomely”; in an echo of Arendt, he writes of “the 
‘unhomely’ condition of the modem world”.14 In the arguments made in this thesis, 
the first source of the “unhomeliness” of the world can be traced back to the fact that 
“[a] s never before, the continuity from past to future is broken in our time”.15 We 
are humans without ground, as the present is a precarious moment between a past and 
a future that mirror and reject each other.
We must ask, therefore, if there is a modem conception of time that can 
ground human flourishing. Habermas suggests that when Walter Benjamin wrote the 
Theses on the Philosophy o f History, “now time” was an attempt to re-radicalize the 
“effective-historical consciousness” that balanced past, present and future. Benjamin
I2“The ‘new age’ lent the whole o f the past a world-historical quality....Diagnosis o f the new age and 
analysis o f the past ages corresponded to each other”. The new experience o f an advancing and 
accelerating of historical events corresponds to this, as does the insight into the chronological 
simultaneity of historically nonsynchronous developments”. Ibid. p. 6, quoting Reinhart Koselleck, 
“Neuzeit” in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Cambridge, MA, 1985), pp. 231-66, 
p. 241.
13 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 3.
14 Homi Bhabha, The Location o f Culture (London and New York: Routledge) pp. 9-18.
15 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 67.
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distrusted both tradition and the future horizon as guides to the consciousness of the 
present:16
Hence Benjamin proposes a drastic reversal of horizon of expectation and 
space of experience. To all past epochs he ascribes a horizon of unfulfilled 
expectations, and the future-oriented present he assigns the task of 
experiencing a corresponding task through remembering, in such a way that 
we can fulfill its expectations with our weak messianic power. In accordance 
with this reversal, two ideas can be interwoven: the conviction that the 
continuity of the context of tradition can be established by barbarism as well 
as by culture, and the idea that each respective generation bears the 
responsibility not only for the fate of future generations but also for the
17innocently suffered fate of past generations.
This is the final step in the problematic and paradoxical reversal of future- 
orientation into past-orientation: justice in modernity requires a particular 
relationship with what went before, not with what happens next, although law, by 
contrast, can only and always enact its blunt approximation of justice in (and into) the 
future.18 The angel of history flies backwards into the future. This requirement 
haunts us. We are left, over and over, with memory in modernity as the functional 
equivalent of reason in the Enlightenment. Therefore, the role of memory in 
constructions of narratives of law must be discussed further, and will be addressed in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.
16 “[I]t is clear from his text that he distrusts both...the treasure o f transmitted cultural goods that are 
supposed to pass into the possession of the present, and the asymmetric relationship between the 
appropriating activities of a present oriented to the future and the objects of the past that are made 
one’s own”. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 14.
17 Idem.
18 “What Benjamin has in mind is the supremely profane insight that ethical universalism also has to 
take seriously the injustice that has already happened and that is seemingly irreversible; that there 
exists a solidarity of those bom later with those who have preceded them, with all those whose bodily 
or personal integrity has been violated at the hands of other human beings; and that this solidarity can 
only be engendered and made effective by remembering. Here the liberating power o f memory is 
supposed not to foster a dissolution of the power of the past over the present, as it was from Hegel 
down to Freud, but to contribute to the dissolution of a guilt on the part o f the present with regard to 
the past” Ibid. pp. 14-15.
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For now, however, it is worth noting that memory in this sense — as 
constructed, a tool of “justice”, as possibly false but nonetheless necessary -  is the 
currency of cultural property. Narratives of memory, as this thesis argues, constitute 
one of the axes that define all disputes that can be considered “cases” regarding the 
ownership of ancient objects. To reach justice in these cases, (possibly false) 
memory must manipulate law and history both. What went “before” must be made to 
come “next”, and vice-versa.
The relationship with speech and rationality
If in part the “unhomeliness” of inhabiting the present has to do with the 
problem with time (as we fiiture-people are in fact necessarily past-obsessed), in great 
part it also has to do with the second issue that Arendt identifies, the diremption 
between speech and understanding -  or rather, the problem with “rationality”. The 
argument usually proposed is that different factions in modernity lack a common 
(normative) ground for discourse. Although true, this springs from the underlying 
problem, which is less one of “common ground” than one of specifically modem 
ground:
In the twentieth century.. .the process of modernization achieves spectacular 
triumphs in art and thought. On the other hand, as the modem public expands, 
it shatters into a multitude of fragments, speaking incommensurable private 
languages; the idea of modernity, conceived in numerous fragmentary ways, 
loses much of its vividness, resonance and depth, and loses its capacity to 
organize and give meaning to people’s lives. As a result of all this, we find 
ourselves today in the midst of a modem age that has lost touch with the roots 
o f its own modernity}9
There are two aspects to this problem. The first is the continuous and 
continuously increasing lack of guaranteed congruence between perception and “the
19 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 17. 
(emphasis added)
13
world”, or between the tools of perception and the material to be perceived.20 This 
affects personal experiences, cultural languages, and educational methodologies as 
much (or as well) as it does the problem of speaking publicly and intelligibly about 
technology. As a result, the position of the observer becomes key, as “the world” 
depends upon observation. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the concept of 
“postmodemity” can be understood as the semantic and philosophical acceptance of 
the primacy of observation as the core value of rationality itself. The second aspect is 
the problem of generating and founding normativity in this modernity. These two 
aspects are obviously intertwined. The sheer number of possibilities that erupt in a 
world created by each individual observer -  the replacement of the Eye of God with 
one’s own eyes -  are met and balanced by the lack of moral obligations.21 If the 
modem human being is the Creator, where can mandatory ethical rules be based?
To address the first aspect (via Arendt’s theme of technology, briefly) we turn
to Luhmann again. Luhmann argues that as a result of the condition of modernity,
00there is a loss of authority in both the rational and the social dimensions. The 
binary code of “truth” is dislodged from its “moorings in preconstmctivist certainties, 
be they assumptions about nature or about the nature of humankind (ideas) or be they
O'!
successive linguistic, rationalistic, or consensualistic theories”. Luhmann proposes 
two sorts of solutions to this problem. The first is to add another layer of binary 
coding to the system that he has already established.24 The second is more radical,
20 “The history of European rationality can be described as the history o f the dissolution o f a rationality 
continuum that had connected the observer in the world with the world”. Luhmann, Observations on 
Modernity, p. 23.
21 Discussing the commonalities of Marx and Nietzsche as wellsprings of modem (self-)knowledge and 
o f modem philosophy, Marshall Berman writes: “For Nietzsche, as for Marx, the currents o f modem 
history were ironic and dialectical: thus Christian ideals of the soul’s integrity and the will to truth had 
come to explode Christianity itself. The results were the traumatic events that Nietzsche called “the 
death o f God” and “the advent o f nihilism”. Modem mankind found itself in the midst of a great 
absence and emptiness o f values and yet, at the same time, a remarkable abundance of possibilities”. 
Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, p. 21.
22 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 69.
23 Ibid. p. 13.
24 Luhmann argues for the acceptance of a second set of distinctions to describe modernity, in addition 
to the binary coding he has proposed so far. He proposes that the distinction between self-reference 
and external reference of any system be considered in tandem with the systems code already in place, 
i.e., positive code value and negative code value. These two sets of distinctions are related 
“orthogonally”, that is, they are logically independent of each other. “[B]oth sides o f the reference
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and more interesting in the context of cultural property analysis. Rather than 
accepting a “lazy” formulation of difference or “otherness” that accepts the 
incommensurability and value-neutrality of each political or philosophical
9 cperspective, Luhmann fundamentally questions the distinction rational/non-rational. 
He sets himself the task of understanding the underlying notion of “rationality” that 
imbues “Western rationality” and the work of Weber, Habermas et al.26
This opens entirely new vistas. Instead of excavating the diremptions that 
define rationality in modernity, Luhmann suggests that we consider the “other side of 
rationality”, a side that is usually excluded by the rationalized and technologized 
world of modernity:
The constructivist multicontextual concept of rationality must be the moment of a 
distinction.. ..It is normal to place this distinction in a historical context, that is, in 
comparison to Old Europe or to other cultures of the ancient world. This leaves 
everything open for the self-concept of modernity, with which we are concerned, 
and leads to a term that is by now worn out: “postmodern”. But maybe we can 
gain a more precise understanding of the “other side of rationality”, one that could 
be characterized by the semantics of paradox, imaginary space, the blind spot of 
all observations, the self-parasitizing parasite, chance or chaos, reentry or 
necessity, externalizing toward an “unmarked state”. These are ideas that would 
gain their contours exclusively from precision, fixed by rationality, and that 
would finally lead to an indirect self-characterization of the rational. But it works 
the other way too: the comprehensibility of the world becomes incomprehensible,
97and the awe of technology grows the more we know how it functions.
distinction are accessible for both code values”. Luhmann argues that this is the best we can do in 
coming up with a way o f creatively imagining modernity and its future(s). “Society must be satisfied 
with this possibility and with the combinatorial latitude it provides. It can no longer refer to a final 
thought, to a reference-capable unity, to a metanarrative (J.-F. Lyotard) that prescribes form and 
measure”. Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 11.
25 “Another possibility, the laziest o f all compromises, is to agree on ‘pluralism.’” Ibid. p. 27.
26 Ibid. p. 25.
27 Ibid. pp. 41-2.
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The point here is that information fails us. The link between knowledge and “data”, 
or between information and accuracy, is increasingly tenuous. Paying close attention 
to technology may as well result in magical thinking as in logic; the abyss between 
science and alchemy is vanishing after centuries of functioning as a well-policed 
divide.
The second aspect is the problem of normativity. Habermas locates the 
problem of normativity in the rise of the principle of subjectivity. He sees the 
certainties produced in the cultural and social rationalization of the early modem 
period as folding into this principle: “In modernity...religious life, state, and society 
as well as science, morality, and art are transformed into just so many embodiments 
of the principle of subjectivity”.28 Subjectivity in this sense is absolutely dependent 
upon the correspondences between the subject as the source of reliable (rational) 
observation, and the subject as the object observed. This is a philosophical structure, 
“the structure of a self-relating, knowing subject, which bends back upon itself as
9Qobject, in order to grasp itself as in a mirror image”. It requires a philosophical 
solution for the “differentiations within reason, the formal divisions within culture, 
and.. .the need for unification that emerges with the separations evoked by the 
principle of subjectivity”.30 The philosophical solution must consist of a new basis of 
normativity, as the “exemplary past” is now missing. One formulation of a solution is 
Benjamin’s: we must look always backwards, or at any rate, outwards: we can 
ground our normativity in our responsibility towards (if not for) the injustices 
suffered by previous generations.
This answer does not reconcile the problem of sources, however. Therefore, 
as this thesis must interrogate the question of memory in cultural property analysis, it 
must also interrogate the question of ground or origin. “Modernity sees itself cast
I
back upon itself without any possibility of escape”. Put differently, the values that
28 Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, p. 18.
29 Ibid. p. 18.
30 Ibid. p. 19.
31 Ibid. p. 7.
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modernity produces can only be “formulated in the modal form of contingency”.32 
This means that as the two forces of technology and subjectivity act on “reason”, 
truly “all that is solid melts into air”. Yet, Luhmann and Habermas both propose 
structures that recast or bridge the diremptions that we are concerned with here. They 
are agreed, “[t] he emphasis on the tandem of technology and individuality, with 
which we proceed into the fog of the future, need not remain the sole description of 
modernity”. What they propose, however, are different techniques of reasoning. 
Both systems theory and communicative action are simultaneously descriptive and 
prescriptive answers to the question of the sphere of human political action in 
modernity. They presuppose that the task of reasoning remains conciliatory, that 
reason itself (reason in some sense including its opposite) can shore up the “world” as 
we know it. Reasoning, acting, communicating -  as we know these human faculties -  
can still provide a ground for the future.
By contrast, in looking for a discourse that may reanimate the spirit of 
modernity, Berman looks to Marx and Nietzsche to contemplate something much 
simpler, and possibly less tenable, yet interesting nonetheless. Berman argues that 
Marx and Nietzsche imagine “newfangled-men”,34 the “man of tomorrow and the day 
after tomorrow”,35 who can reconcile technology and normativity within themselves, 
and thus solve these diremptions. Once again, therefore, we return to Arendt’s 
contemplation of the human condition. The human being created by modernity, will, 
in an evolutionary motion (or spasm) survive modernity. He or she will turn 
modernity into “ground” in his or her own flesh. The rest of us will fall away (or, in 
Arendt’s image, be left behind). This is not necessarily an apocalyptic vision, but in 
recent times, it has been approached with caution.36 The question of which theory (or 
what kind of theory) will reinvigorate modernity is fundamentally linked with the
32 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 20.
33 Ibid. p. 7.
34 Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, p. 20.
35 Ibid. p. 23.
36 Two sources o f theories of the effects of modernity on human beings are Donna Harraway Modest 
Witness @  Second Millenium FemaleMan meets Onco Mouse: Feminism and Technoscience (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1997), generally; and Jeremy Rifkin The Age o f Access: How the Shift 
from Ownership to Access is Transforming Modern Life (New York: Penguin Books, 2000).
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“project” of many modem commentators, who look to Marx, Nietzsche, Hegel and 
others in order to recapture the energy needed to be a “future person” . The focus, 
however, should remain on the notion of personhood itself. Luhmann sums up the 
end result of the modem spirit as follows: “An individual in the modem sense is 
someone who can observe his or her own observing”.37 The links between 
knowledge, identity, and the human condition have not resolved since Arendt 
sketched them out in her Prologue. They have become ever more complicated.
As information itself -  “data” -  becomes unreliable, the operation of human 
reason ceases to be (either ontologically or instrumentally) satisfactory. It ceases to 
give either pleasure or answers. The combination of future time and modem 
discourse leaves human beings, as Luhmann points out, without a source of authority 
to rely on in their struggles. This is not cured by “postmodemity”, although in 
contrast to the future-oriented reliance on the “not yet”, “[t] he discourse on 
postmodemity is a discourse without a future”.38 Rather, the problem becomes 
explicit:
If we understand “postmodern” to mean the lack of unified cosmography, a 
universally applicable rationality, or even just a collective attitude toward the 
world and society, then this results from the structural conditions to which 
contemporary society delivers itself. It cannot abide a final word, and 
therefore it cannot abide authority. It knows no positions from which society 
could be adequately described for others from within society. What is 
important here is not the emancipation o f reason but emancipation from  
reason. This emancipation need not be anticipated; it has already happened.39
The argument in this thesis is that the proliferation of cultural property cases, 
disputes, institutions, organizations and heritage-sites demonstrates and responds to 
this condition. The emancipation from reason was diagnosed in modernity and has 
come to (in part) define postmodemity, and for “proof’ of this, we can look to the
37 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, p. 7.
38 Ibid. p. 2.
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complex of arguments regarding individual identity, institutional purpose, and 
impossible informational certainty that go into most disputes regarding the ownership 
of cultural property. Rather than creating a new man, we seem to be creating and 
recreating the same canon of very old things.
The debate about the validity of “knowledge” in the sense discussed above, 
which regards not only the information that knowledge consists of, but also the 
conditions that make such information possible, has the effect that “knowledge” is 
always on the cusp of disappearing.40 The losses that may accompany this kind of 
slippage are incalculable. They include not only “information” as we may think of it, 
but a certain commitment to the values that are touted as the (new) bedrock of 
modernity.41 The argument of this thesis, that cultural property is a resolution of the 
problem with ground -  ground as knowledge and certainty in modernity -  requires 
that we negotiate the various modalities in which “knowledge” appears in this realm. 
We have to be careful to distinguish between “history”, “myth” and “heritage”, with 
the differing degrees of accuracy and appropriation that these terms express.42 The
39 Ibid. p. 18. (emphasis added)
40 For an example of this, see the debate regarding the “Afrocentric” teaching o f Ancient Greek 
history. Writing about the irrelevance of “historical evidence” in the academy, Mary Lefkowitz notes 
that “The trouble was that some o f my colleagues [at Wellesley College] seemed to doubt that there 
was such a thing as historical evidence, or that even if  evidence existed, it did not matter much one 
way or the other, at least in comparison with what they judged to be the pressing issues and social 
goals of our own time. When I went to the then dean of the college to explain that there was no factual 
evidence behind some Afrocentric claims about ancient history, she replied that each of us had a 
different but equally valid view o f history”. Mary Lefkowitz, Not out o f Africa: how Afrocentrism 
became an excuse to teach myth as history (New York: BasicBooks, 1996), p. 4. Lefkowitz’s book is 
in response to Martin Bernal’s Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots o f Classical Civilization (Vols.I 
and II, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987, 1991). Bernal has since responded in 
turn in David Chioni Moore, ed. Black Athena Writes Back: Martin Bernal Responds to his Critics 
(Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2001).
41 For an example of this, see the description of the cynicism with which the American Jewish elites 
are accused o f manipulating not only knowledge regarding the Nazi holocaust, but also the monetary 
claims of the (few remaining) survivors. In fact, Norman G. Finkelstein makes the point that when the 
Jewish organizations recast the numbers o f survivors in order to extract compensation from Swiss and 
German banks, the effect is a strange and frightening paradox: “...if, as the Holocaust industry 
suggests, many hundreds of thousands o f Jews survived, the Final Solution couldn’t have been so 
efficient after all. It must have been a haphazard affair -  exactly what Holocaust deniers argue. Les 
extremes se touchent”. Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry (London and New York: 
Verso, 2000), p. 128. Earlier, he puts the same point more graphically, recalling that his mother, a 
holocaust survivor, used to say “If everyone who claims to be a survivor actually is one. ..who did 
Hitler kill?” Ibid. p. 81.
42 Gregory Ashworth et al., Dissonant Heritage, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995), p. 6.
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possibility, and impossibility, of finding solid “ground” in the forms of rationality and 
knowledge that inhere in modernity is discussed in Chapter Five.
For the moment, it is important to consider the problems that arise in 
attempting to theorize the past from such shaky foundations. The danger of not 
properly distinguishing between history, myth and heritage is summed up by Mary 
Lefkowitz vis-a-vis the teaching of Ancient Greek history. First, it leads to “history” 
that is clearly inaccurate or untrue.43 Second, the reason that the distinctions become 
muddied is that the concepts of “history” or “accuracy” themselves are, in modernity, 
subject to certain kind of professional slippage. Lefkowitz describes the shift from 
factual accuracy as the touchstone of academic contributions, to an emphasis on 
“cultural motives”. It is worth quoting Lefkowitz at length on this subject:
Instructors in universities now place less emphasis on the acquisition of 
factual information than they did a generation ago. They are suspicious of the 
value of facts.. .they think that facts are meaningless because they can be 
manipulated and reinterpreted. [Recently, many historians] insist that history 
is always composed in conformity or response to the values of the society in 
which it is produced, and for that reason can be regarded as a cultural 
projection of the values of that society, whether individual writers are aware 
of it or not.
Such beliefs, i f  carried to their logical extreme, make it possible to say 
that all history is by definition fiction. If history is fiction, it is natural to deny 
or to minimize all historical data (since it can be manipulated). Instead, these 
writers concentrate on cultural motives. Historians, in their view, write what 
they are. The quality of a discussion now depends on whether the participants 
of the discussion have good or beneficial motivations, as judged by 
themselves: if they believe that a person’s motivations are good, then what 
they say will be right44
43 Lefkowitz, Not out o f Africa, generally.
44 Ibid. p. 49 (emphasis added)
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Lefkowitz thus describes the slippage from attributable historical information, 
conceptualized as “warranted evidence”, to “acceptable claims”, claims for which no 
evidence exists, positive or negative. Once this distinction is collapsed, the argument 
made on the basis of acceptable claims is then judged successful if it is “culturally 
plausible”.45
This is precisely a process that any lawyer, legal academic or cultural theorist 
can (and arguably must) use to make cultural property claims. The problems that 
arise are similar to those Lefkowitz identifies, but they are heightened by the very 
authority of “the law” accessed by the participants in these disputes. Using the 
creative imagination to magic “history” into “heritage” results in claims of ownership 
that are almost inchoate in their very foundations. Partially, and as is discussed at 
greater length in Chapter Five, this would be a result of any attempt to ground 
knowledge in modernity. Given the need for legal and cultural certainty that cultural 
property discourses require, the claims made in this area must constantly veer 
towards, or into, the fictional. Generally, this thesis argues that “inheritors of the 
Ancient Greeks” or “Native American” are phrases that are stories or arguments more 
than they can ever be neutral descriptions. Partially, however, it is a useful technique 
of appropriation. When, as Lefkowitz writes, “in cultural history the quality of the 
argument depends upon its cultural merit”,46 and when we know that “cultural merit” 
is a standard that shifts twice or three times in each generation, then the legality of 
attaching any ancient objects to any modem peoples on the basis of cultural 
continuity47 must be both interesting to any legal scholar and (in itself) deeply 
suspect.
Yet, to take the process seriously as a symptom of and expression of 
modernity, we see that the underlying need to make history into the present (or vice- 
versa) is real, even as it is acknowledged to be a source of inaccuracies.
45 Ibid. p. 51 (emphasis in original)
46 Ibid. p. 50.
47 This is the standard underlying most legislative instruments in this field.
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The past, in the sense of the past of human societies, remote in time, may 
never be revisited nor apprehended as reality...It is perhaps, as Collingwood 
said, “wholly unknowable; it is the past as residually preserved in the present 
that alone is knowable”. We explore the past through our present perceptions 
of the evidence for its existence. This perceived past may bear little relation to 
the vanished reality, and that relationship may be barely amenable to the 
testing processes applied to scientific hypotheses.. .48
The analysis therefore returns to where it began. If accuracy is not important, 
certainty remains so. The uneasy linkages between what we “know” and what we are 
willing to claim open the question of our presumed ownership of a web of 
genealogical certainties that have never been “true”.
The relationship with earth
Finally, the result and the expression of the foregoing, the final aspect of 
‘Tinhomeliness” or “unfamiliarity” has to do with our present relationship to the earth 
itself. Once again, it is Arendt who most succinctly and elegantly asks the question: 
Should the emancipation and secularization of the modem age, which began 
with a tuming-away, not necessarily from God, but from a god who was the 
Father of men in heaven, end with an even more fateful repudiation of an 
Earth who was the Mother of all living creatures under the sky?49
Although there is no answer to this question -  or rather, no answer that 
presents itself entire, wholly present to our vision -  when we look around at the 
cultural products that are provided to us, we see apocalyptic visions of flight. Films, 
novels, television programs all express a deep unease with the environment, or 
“earth”, of the future. Humankind has either moved to a dystopia among the stars or 
is being infected and suppressed here on Earth. Humankind fights off or is the
48 R. G. Collingwood cited in Richard Handler, “Who Owns the Past? History, Cultural Property and 
the Logic of Possessive Individualism” in Brett Williams, ed. The Politics o f Culture (Washington 
D.C.: Prentice-Hall, 1991) pp. 63-74, p. 65 (references omitted).
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subject of medical experiments performed by aliens. The frightening monsters of 
childhood (and adulthood) are now aliens that come from the authorized, valorized 
worlds of medicine and science50, hybrids, cyborgs, uncanny or unnatural in their 
source, rather than the creatures (equally frightening) of earlier fairy tales or myths.51
One of the questions that (thus) run through this thesis is the question of the 
conceptualization of our relationship with the earth, and with authority.
Governmental and academic authority, whether it is portrayed by the fictional 
authority figures in popular culture, or remembered as the governments that 
undertook and maintained the systematic separation of indigenous peoples from their 
land (as will be discussed in Chapter Six), is involved in a process o f “unrooting”. In 
the final analysis, each person, family, or tribe is weighted with the task of re-rooting 
himself or herself. There are two immediate consequences of this. First, there is the 
lamentable and politically disastrous rise of “identity politics”. Second, there is the 
need for a form of roots that cannot be detached from the earth. This is shown by the 
current emphasis on “the past”: the path of the museum or the necropolis, that of 
myth as history, the claim (or the attachment to the fiction) of autochthonous identity. 
We cannot be separated from the Earth because we spring from it, and we claim it 
much like we claim the moral right to return “home”.
Conclusion: The argument and structure of the thesis
This thesis argues that the obsession with the past, the desire for ancient 
objects, the sheer insecurity generated by modernity, explains, more than anything, 
the current direction of our cultural vision. As the desire to be free of the earth 
doubles back on itself to produce claims of autochthony, so the human capacity to 
sustain the demands made by consciousness must extend to equal flexibility and 
tolerance of change. The result (for most of us) is a retreat to the comforts of
49 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 2.
50 Worlds that are, in the public imaginary, already colonized by the “Government”.
51 Marina Warner, No Go the Bogeyman. Scaring, Lulling, and Making Mock (London : Chatto & 
Windus, 1998).
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(historical) fiction. As modernity produces the flight to the past, it also produces the 
avoidance of the reasoning that animates the present.
The purpose of this thesis is to theorize the emerging field of “cultural 
property” analysis in law and social theory. The main argument is that cultural 
property, as a set of discourses (legal, historical, and sociotheoretical), and cultural 
property as a set of objects and practices (things, landscapes and knowledge), arise 
from human unease on the horizon-line of modernity, and help to produce this shift in 
attention from future to past. The law in this area is concerned with thematizing and 
allocating ownership along this temporal spectrum, and indeed, takes on the problem 
of assigning ownership over the terrain of this spectrum in modernity. Cultural 
property (discourses and objects both) is one of the means by which we mediate our 
increasingly-problematized relationship with time, and produce the ground that serves 
as our “present”. On this argument, the project of theorizing cultural property 
requires looking at how the theoretically significant notion of the present is produced, 
what this notion consists of, and, as importantly, why it is increasingly necessary to 
have a means of producing the present.
In Chapter One, Introduction, I have set out the issues that organize the thesis 
as a whole. These consist of the ways in which the discourses of cultural property 
disputation reflect and respond to the problematics of modernity, and of human 
beings attempting to claim an uncontestable ground for human flourishing. These 
issues are amplified in succeeding Chapters. In Chapter Two, Case Studies, I set out 
the basic legal arguments surrounding the two controversies that serve as the case 
studies for this thesis: the Parthenon (formerly “Elgin”) Marbles, and Bonnichsen v. 
United States52 (“Kennewick Man”). The following Chapters will draw on the legal 
and moral issues that arise in these cases, and will re-state and expand upon relevant 
facts and arguments as necessary. Chapter Three, Cultural Property Defined, and 
Redefined as Nietzschean Aphorism, proposes a new means of defining cultural 
property, in which the problems of definition are resolved by recourse to Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of modernity. In Chapters Four and Five, I amplify the lines
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of argumentation (summarized as “Narratives of Attachment” and ‘'Narratives of 
Origin”) that are suggested by the foregoing analysis. Looking at the most traditional 
of cultural property cases, that of the Parthenon Marbles, I demonstrate that cultural 
property (as objects and discourses) produces and is produced by the terrain at the 
intersection of these two lines of argument. In Chapter Six, I consider whether the 
foregoing structures and concerns apply equally well to Kennewick Man, in which 
ownership of a 9,000-year-old skeleton turns on the meaning of “indigenous” within a 
recently-enacted statute.
Finally, the Conclusion draws together the arguments made throughout and 
argues that the proposed theorization of cultural property in this thesis is supported by 
my research and supports the hypothesis presented in the Introduction. Cultural 
property represents (and furthers) the discourses of modernity itself. However, what 
animates these discourses? Obviously, this question can never be answered in full.
In part, however, the following work attempts to add a few suggestions to the many 
approaches to the questions that Arendt asked in 1958.
52 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. Feb. 19,1997); 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. June 27,1997).
25
Chapter Two Case Studies: The Parthenon Marbles and 
Kennewick Man
The purpose of Chapter Two is to consider the specific arguments that arise in 
disputes regarding cultural property, and to consider, briefly, the special issues that 
arise in cases where the objects in dispute are very ancient. Disputes regarding very 
ancient objects show, more clearly than others, the importance of expert discourses, 
the mutability of legal rights in accordance with social and political changes in power, 
and the potential paradox of combining both “cultural” and “property” in this field. 
Against this backdrop, knowledge and culture cannot be separated, no more than can 
ownership and acquisition. Therefore, this is an area of law in which emerging 
arguments and schemes of ownership are very visible. Chapter Two seeks to provide 
the groundwork for the further consideration of these concerns.
Introduction: Why choose these two case studies?
This thesis concerns itself with the ownership or allocation of very ancient 
objects as a means of examining the issues (and the possible resolutions) that exist in 
the field of cultural property. Looking at the cases that address ancient objects, it 
becomes clear that “ownership” is in some sense impossible, as the claimants look to 
own history or identity as much as (or more than) the “things themselves”. This 
means that the legal structures that order cultural property disputes are themselves 
disordered. The structures are unsteady and mutable; they are imploding, exploding, 
shifting, uncomfortable, failing. In this refractory and unstable condition, we see 
again the reality that cultural property discourse reflects a set of profoundly modem 
functions and considerations. For example, legal theorists are beginning to 
undermine the distinctions between “cultural nationalism” and “cultural 
internationalism”; as well as the distinctions between “indigenous” and “Western”.
As the questions about the ownership of various parts and kinds of culture enter the 
public (and legal) consciousness, patterns of ownership are seen in a fluid state. Most
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importantly, questions regarding the ownership of very ancient objects don’t go away. 
Each year, new books, articles, symposia and conferences are announced about these 
cases.53 Studying these cases leads to the conclusion that the legal issues are 
somehow tangential to the conflicts that are meant to be resolved. This point will be 
addressed further in the conclusion to the Chapter.
These cases unfold against the background of cultural property law and theory 
more generally. First, there are at least two major strands in cultural property 
analyses. The first, represented by the international conventions for the preservation 
of cultural property during war, is administered by the United Nations, and is 
expressed in the work of traditional legal scholars and historians. From this 
perspective, which encompasses both the cultural nationalism54 and cultural 
internationalism55 (“the cultural property of all mankind”), the legal and legislative 
efforts regarding the return of cultural property are concerned with managing 
primarily physical objects, which are locatable at the intersection of the realms of 
national and international politics, and are cross-referenced against certain points in 
the realm of “culture”. Culture in this schema is a quasi-normative organizing 
concept that can be loosely considered as underwriting the value of preserving certain 
kinds of objects in a form that acknowledges the concerns of (artistic) integrity and
53 As a caveat, although this Chapter attempts to provide comprehensive references to the works 
addressing the disputes, the sheer volume of the publications, draft papers and governmental materials 
available prevents full listing.
54 “Cultural nationalism” is the position taken in the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property. It 
is based in the idea that “particular peoples have particular interest in particular properties, regardless 
o f  their current location and ownership”. Rosemary J. Coombe, “The Properties o f Culture and the 
Possession of Identity: Postcolonial Struggle and the Legal Imagination” in Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. 
Rao eds, Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1997), p. 83. This idea encompasses the belief that an object belongs, and thus should remain in 
the place it was created. As such, it includes arguments regarding artistic or aesthetic integrity, 
arguments regarding the merit(s) o f context, and arguments o f “the marbles are Greek and therefore 
belong in Greece variety”. As a position, it underlies many o f the policies and documents generated by 
the United Nations, UNESCO and the Council of Europe.
55 “Cultural internationalism” is the position taken in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and also, possibly because it depends on domestic 
action, the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. In 
this view, the cultural property of any people is considered to be the common cultural heritage of all 
mankind. This principle appears in the preamble to The Hague Convention: “Being convinced that
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(territorial) allocation, and remains as close to the “original” form as possible. As 
such, the efforts of more traditional cultural property legislation and political activism 
are directed towards the work of reconstruction, restitution, retention, “repatriation” 
of the objects at issue. The claims regarding the disposition of the Parthenon Marbles 
(generally) exist in this area of cultural property law.
The second strand or school of cultural property analysis is represented by the 
field of critical cultural property analyses that are based in the disciplines of social 
theory, anthropology, heritage studies and the laws and policies being currently 
created around and for indigenous peoples. In these realms of legal and cultural 
theory, the emergent field of cultural property analysis focuses on multiculturalism, 
the effects of colonialism, and the rights of certain groups to pieces of their 
“identity”.56 The arguments often turn on the distinctions between East-West, North- 
South, and “indigenous” and “Western” or “technocratic” economic and social 
structures. In situations where an “indigenous”/“Westem” split is visible, there is a 
different privileging of the term “culture” as used in “cultural property”. “Culture” 
becomes a substantive rather than formal category, one that can anchor property 
claims without the concomitant operation of traditional notions of “law” or 
“proprietary rights”. In this form of analysis, the past itself is understood as fluid, or 
as requiring reconstruction. This sort of theoretical project is supported by the work 
of traditional and non-traditional historians, anthropologists, cultural theorists and 
legal academics, and engages with the questions that are seen to define modernity 
more generally. The claims regarding the disposition of Kennewick Man (generally) 
exist in this area of cultural property law.
Many commentators attempt to balance these two approaches, or at least to 
consider alternative distinctions and strategies in deciding the difficult questions in 
the realm of cultural property law: repatriation, the competing claims of restitution
damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage 
of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world...”.
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and preservation, and the claims of museums.57 In addition, there is a growing body 
of scholarship that looks to emphasize the commonalities among the various 
approaches (and even among extremely different “cultures”) in regard to initiatives to
co
protect cultural heritage. Finally, between these two forms of analysis, there is an 
emerging attempt to instantiate the values of the latter approach within the more 
traditional legal landscape of the former. To this end, legal academics and theorists 
are proposing new uses of property law concepts within the legal framework of 
cultural property disputes,59 or are proposing new legal bodies and tribunals to 
provide a forum for resolving these sorts of problems.60
The Parthenon Marbles: “The grandfather of cultural property
n61cases...”
The question of whether the “Elgin” (now “Parthenon”) Marbles should be 
returned to Athens is one of the oldest questions in cultural property law, and has 
been extensively addressed by law professors, legal and cultural theorists, historians 
and politicians from 1816 until the present day. Beyond the realms of academia and
56 This is a rapidly growing field of commentary. See, generally, Ziff and Rao, Borrowed Power: 
Essays on Cultural Appropriation. Much of the work on museums and “heritage studies” also 
incorporates this approach.
57 See, for example, David Rudenstine, “Cultural Property: the Hard Question of Repatriation” 19 
Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 69 (2001); Sarah Eagen, “Preserving Cultural Property: 
Our Public Duty”, 13 Pace International Law Review 407 (2001); Roger W. Mastalir, “A Proposal for 
Protecting the ‘Cultural’ and ‘Property’ Aspects o f Cultural Property under International Law”, 16 
Fordham International Law Journal 1033 (1992/3).
58 Sarah Harding, “Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage”, 31 Arizona State LawJoumal 291 
(1999).
59 John Moustakas, “Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability”, 74 Cornell 
Law Review 1179 (1989).
60 Ann P. Prunty, “Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the Settlement o f Cultural 
Property Disputes: How to Keep Greece from Losing its Marbles”, 72 Georgetown Law Journal 1155 
(1985).
61 Derek Gillman, “Legal Conventions and the Construction of Heritage”, 6:3 Art Antiquity and Law 
239 (2001).
62 For the legal arguments and history in this case, see David Rudenstine, “A Tale o f Three 
Documents: Lord Elgin and Missing Historic 1801 Document”, 22 Cardozo Law Review 1853 (2001); 
Rudenstine “The Legality of Elgin’s Taking: A Review Essay o f Four Books on the Parthenon 
Marbles”, 8 International Journal o f  Cultural Property 356 (1999); William St. Clair, “The Elgin 
Marbles: Questions o f Stewardship and Accountability”, 8 International Journal o f Cultural Property 
(1999); St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles: the controversial history o f the Parthenon sculptures 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); John Henry Merryman, “Thinking About the
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politics, the debate continues in the news media and on the Internet.63 The Marbles 
are pieces of the Parthenon frieze removed from the Parthenon in Athens, with 
Ottoman permission, and shipped to England by Lord Elgin in the early part of the 
nineteenth century. In 1816, the British Parliament bought them for the British 
people, and they have been exhibited in or near the British Museum more or less ever 
since.64 The Greek government has made numerous requests and demands for their 
return, all of which, despite strong public sentiment to the contrary, and some 
appearance of relenting during times of political crisis, the British government has 
steadfastly refused. Claims for their retention have been made on behalf of the 
British, and currently, both sides are arguing for the integrity of the Parthenon itself. 
The bases of the claims for retention or restitution now turn as much on principles of 
cultural internationalism as on cultural nationalism. Questions of stewardship and 
accountability also currently loom as large as the more traditional arguments based in 
standard principles of contract and property law.
The Greek government currently claims the Parthenon Marbles on the basis 
that they are fragments of the Parthenon, and that the Parthenon, as a symbol of the 
cultural heritage of the whole world, should be as complete as possible.65 This claim 
carefully balances the “cultural internationalist” and “cultural nationalist” views of 
the Parthenon, accepts as a given the territorial basis for Greek ownership of the
Elgin Marbles”, 83 Michigan Law Review 1880 (1985); Merryman, 'The Public Interest in Cultural 
Property”, California Law Review (1989); Jeannette Greenfield, The Return o f Cultural Treasures, 2d  
ed., (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Christopher Hitchens, The Elgin 
Marbles (London: Chatto & Windus,1987).
63 See: The Hellenic Ministry of Culture, http://www.culture.gr; The Guardian, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elgin; as well as the website of the Melina Mercouri Foundation 
http://lofstrom.com/mercouri and other private fora for this debate.
64 For a witty and erudite description of the Marbles and discussion o f their provenance, removal, 
travels, sale, and display, see Mary Beard, The Parthenon (London: Profile Books, 2002), pp. 155-81.
65 Because the monument to which they belong, namely the Parthenon, is in Athens.
Because in Athens the Marbles will be exhibited close to the Parthenon and within sight o f it, and the 
visitor can form a complete picture of the temple in its entirety.
Because they form an inseparable part o f the monument -  the symbol of Greek Classical civilization at 
its apogee. The restitution o f the Marbles will restore the unity of the decoration and the architectural 
cohesion of the monument.
Because the British have an obligation, not to Greece but to the cultural heritage of the whole world, to 
restore its symbol, the Parthenon, which is also the emblem of UNESCO.
The Hellenic Ministry o f Culture, http://www.culture.gr
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Parthenon, and glosses over the reality that the sculptures would be placed in a 
museum rather than on the monument. In the latest bulletin from the Hellenic 
Ministry of Culture, there is no mention of the legal claims that have dominated the 
debate so far. Rather than arguing about the legality or validity of the “firman” 
allegedly giving Elgin’s agents the right to remove pieces of the Parthenon, or the 
legality of the Ottoman action in disposing of Greek cultural history, the Ministry 
now focuses on arguments of aesthetic integrity and careful stewardship. This change 
in position may be an attempt to accommodate the perspective of the European 
Union, and reflects the difficulty of supporting legal claims regarding the ownership 
of ancient objects, rather than indicating a change of heart. However, the Greek 
government is attempting to shame the British government into returning the 
sculptures by leaving a large open space for them in the new museum that is being 
built on the Acropolis.
The British government firmly refuses to yield them. The first act of the new 
Labour government in 1997 was to reassure the nation that the Elgin Marbles would 
stay in the British Museum. This reassurance was given again in 2001. As a political 
act, the refusal to return the Marbles differentiated “new” from “old” Labour more 
effectively than almost any other act.66 The Marbles have played a part in British 
identity and political life since Lord Elgin sold them to the nation in 1816. Although 
the basic claim for retention is that the Marbles were legally acquired, the British also 
claim that Lord Elgin saved the Marbles by removing them from the Acropolis, and 
that in the years since their removal they have become part of the British cultural 
heritage. The British claim of good stewardship and art historical accountability was 
shaken by William St. Clair’s devastating proof of damage to the Marbles as a result 
of cleaning undertaken at Lord Duveen’s request. However, far from settling the 
question of location once and for all, the St. Clair findings have been hotly debated
66The “New”, or politically centrist Labour Party in the UK disavowed the campaign promise o f “Old” 
or politically left Labour that the Marbles would be returned to Greece. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/elgin
67 St. Clair, “The Elgin Marbles: Questions o f Stewardship and Accountability”.
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since their publication in The International Journal o f Cultural Property. This debate 
will be summarized below.
John Henry Merryman in “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles” exemplifies 
the traditional legal argumentation concerning the debate over the Marbles.68 In this 
Chapter, Professor Merryman’s arguments will be amplified by or contrasted with 
other approaches, in particular the political/historical approach as set out by 
Christopher Hitchens in The Elgin Marbles: Should they be returned to Greecel and 
William St. Clair’s Lord Elgin and the Marbles. As Merryman has been the leading 
scholar in the legal debate on the Parthenon Marbles, the analysis here proceeds by 
summarizing Merryman’s legal arguments (and the factual bases he cites thereof), 
and where applicable, contrasting or confirming them by reference to the different 
sort of arguments and different reading of historical information in other sources.
Law
Merryman locates two basic points of contention in the Parthenon Marbles 
debate: “One is that the Marbles were wrongly taken by Elgin and have never 
belonged, legally or morally, to the British. The other is that, even if the Marbles 
became British property, they ought now to be returned to Greece”.69 In order to 
resolve the first point, Merryman uses standard principles of contract and property 
law. As “a purchaser in full knowledge of the facts”, the British government’s title to 
the Marbles can be no better than Elgin’s. How good was Elgin’s title? Elgin’s 
authority to send a team to the Acropolis was granted by a “firman” or order from the 
Sublime Porte, the main administrative center of the Ottoman Empire at 
Constantinople, which requested that “no one meddle with their [Elgin’s team of 
artists and workmen] scaffolding or implements nor hinder them from taking away
7 A
any pieces of stone with inscriptions or figures”. This document only survives in
68 Merryman, “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles”.
69 Ibid. p. 1896.
70 Ibid. p. 1898. Merryman writes in n. 58: “I have seen a photocopy o f the Italian version and agree 
that the English translation here set out renders it faithfully”. For a slightly more skeptical view of the
32
Italian translation, as the original, in Turkish, was kept by the Ottoman officials in 
Athens and lost. In great part, this depends upon whether Elgin in fact exceeded the 
(legal) authority given to him by the Ottoman government to remove pieces of the 
Acropolis.71
Most commentators, Merryman included, conclude that Elgin exceeded the 
authority conferred by the firman. However, Merryman finds that there is a strong 
argument that the Ottoman government subsequently ratified Elgin’s actions. For 
Hitchens, the fact that Elgin exceeded his authority under the firman granted by the
77Ottoman government does not raise the legal question of later ratification. The 
legality and morality of the document, both important questions for Hitchens, devolve 
into the need to examine both the Ottoman officials’ and Elgin’s actions and 
motivations at that time. Without the legal framework of the fiction of ratification, 
Hitchens finds that the “actual force [animating the document, and thus the rationality 
of the acquisition] was one of realpolitik orforce majeure or raison d ’etat or what 
you will”.73 The firman functioned as an expression of political relations between 
nations rather than a (primarily) legal document. As such, the document does not 
remove any responsibility from Elgin (or from later actors in the debate) for the 
legality of the removals; its only effect is to necessitate a deeper examination of 
Elgin’s actions and motives in order to discover the degree of his complicity in the 
putative illegality inherent in any actions based on force majeure. Nonetheless, 
Merryman argues that the Ottoman authorities ruling Greece in 1801 could legally 
transfer ownership of the Marbles, although other commentators disagree.74
firman, see Greenfield, The Return o f Cultural Treasures in “The Elgin Marbles Debate”, p. 55. 
Greenfield writes: “A copy, in Italian, o f the firman is now said to exist to show that Lord Elgin had 
permission to take the marbles in 1801. ..It is the only known document supporting Lord Elgin’s claim 
that he was entitled to bring the sculptures back to Britain. It is said to be in the possession o f Mr. 
William St. Clair, joint chairman of the Byron Society in London.”
71 David Rudenstine, “Lord Elgin and the Ottomans: The Question o f Permission”, 23 Cardozo Law 
Review 449 (2001); Rudenstine, “A Tale of Three Documents: Lord Elgin and the Missing, Historic 
1801 Document”, 22 Cardozo Law Review 1853 (2001).
72 Hitchens in The Elgin Marbles refers extensively to Turkey’s gratitude toward England after the 
defeat o f Napoleon and Greece’s status as a subjugated nation.
73 Ibid. p. 42.
74 Merryman writes that “Under the international law o f that time, the acts o f Ottoman officials with 
respect to persons and property under their authority were presumptively valid. Even though their
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Today, the conflicting arguments about this ratification and the continuing 
possession of the Marbles by the British Museum are found in legal arguments 
regarding the authority of museums to transfer objects that are now considered 
“cultural property”. As regards the Parthenon Marbles in particular, David 
Rudenstine writes:
Well-endowed, western museums collected disputed cultural patrimony 
mainly during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the power of 
northern Europe was dominant. Although there are spirited disputes over 
whether those takings were proper in light of legal or ethical norms at the time 
of the takings, there is little doubt that most of those takings would be 
improper under contemporary legal and ethical standards. Although it is 
strongly asserted that the application of contemporary legal and ethical 
considerations to these past events is improper, museums in democratic 
societies are increasingly pressured to reconsider the provenance of their 
collections in light of contemporary standards. There are many reasons for 
this trend, including the fact that museums, because they occupy important 
positions of public trust in a democracy, are increasingly being asked to 
reexamine their holdings in light of values most prized by democratic 
societies, the most obvious relevant one being the consent of the people whose 
patrimony was removed. Although the resistance to assessing the taking of 
cultural patrimony in light of contemporary values is strong, the trend seems 
to be in that direction and the pressure from varying sources on museums to
n c
engage in such a retrospective appraisal is likely to mount.
actions might seem regrettable, unsound, or unfeeling, one would not question their legality, except in 
the most unusual circumstances. In this instance the Ottomans had a solid claim to legal authority over 
the Parthenon because it was public property, which the successor nation acquires on a change of 
sovereignty”. Merryman, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1897 (n. 55 omitted).
75 Rudenstine, “Cultural Property: the Hard Question of Repatriation” in Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainment Law Journal 69 (2001), pp. 70-71.
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Indeed, this pressure has mounted. Norman Palmer makes the same points as 
Rudenstine, while also pointing to the need for a general policy review regarding the 
powers of dispersal that are legislatively allotted to museums.76
Merryman goes on to argue, “If the removal was so ratified, then as a matter 
of international law the removal was legal”.77 This point as well is hotly contested. 
The fact that Greece was under Ottoman rule at the time that the removals were 
authorized raises the question of whether the Ottomans had any moral right to dispose 
of the Marbles. Merryman discusses the morality of the acquisition in a different 
place in his analysis, but other theorists or advocates of return do not make the same
7Rseparation between “legal” and “moral”. Particularly noticeably, in Hitchens’ 
analysis, legality and morality merge and cannot be separated.79 Nonetheless, for 
Merryman it is dispositive of the question that, under present international law, 
different principles would apply, but “[I]n international law...the rule is that the legal 
effects of a transaction depend on the law in force at the time”.80 Furthermore, 
Merryman finds that Greece might have lost its legal claim to the Marbles because “it 
all happened long ago”, and Greece failed to make any official requests prior to 1983 
for return of the Marbles. “Greece has.. .been in a position to sue for the Marbles 
since 1828 and has never done so”.81 The statute of limitations has run. This point is
76 Norman Palmer, “Sending Them Home: Some Observations on the Relocation o f Cultural Objects 
from UK Museum Collections” in 5:4 Art, Antiquity and Law 343 (2000). Palmer adds “To a lawyer 
these cases are interesting because they occupy the interface between legal power and moral 
obligation. A museum cannot voluntarily dispose of its property, however compelling the moral 
demand, unless the dispersal is lawful. In the United Kingdom, museum powers of disposal are often 
ill-defined and ill-adapted to modem demands”. Ibid. p. 347.
77 Merryman, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1899.
78 For a particularly interesting interweaving o f the legal and the moral, see Michael J. Reppas II, “The 
Deflowering Of The Parthenon: A Legal And Moral Analysis On Why The “Elgin Marbles” Must Be 
Returned To Greece”, 9 Fordham Intellectual. Property Media and Entertainment Law Journal 911 
(1999).
79 For example, see Hitchens’ argument: “By Elgin’s own account, and by all other certifiable 
histories, the Turks cared little or nothing for the temples under their control and even desecrated them 
to make mortar. What, then, is the moral force of a Turkish document which gives to foreigners the 
right to make themselves free o f the Parthenon?” Hitchens, The Elgin Marbles, p. 42. Here, the 
violence o f law does not take precedence over the violence of cupidity or politics.
80 Merryman, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1900 (n. 65 omitted).
81 Ibid. p. 1901. (n. 70 omitted).
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also extensively refuted in other accounts of the events leading up to the present.82 
Finally, Merryman states that bribery of Ottoman officials or Elgin’s use of his 
position as Ambassador in order to acquire the Marbles is not legally relevant to the
83determination of title. Thus, Merryman disposes of the legal arguments in favour of 
restoring the Marbles to Greece.
Morality
Merryman then turns his attention to the moral argument. He begins by 
refuting Byron’s “romantic misrepresentation and distortion of values” that “lies at 
the base of widely accepted attitudes toward cultural property”.84 He contrasts 
Byron’s portrayal of the events surrounding the removal of the Marbles with the 
“more complex and interesting picture” provided by “history”.85 Merryman mentions 
that the French were in pursuit of the Marbles themselves, that in the absence of 
another collector the Marbles would have been exposed to yet worse hazards (the 
Ottomans, the War of Independence against the Ottomans, lightning and pollution), 
and that Elgin’s motives, though clearly mixed, did include reverence for the 
Marbles.86 Other writers also perceive the danger of the “collecting classes”. 87
The seventeenth century marked the start of a growing interest in Greece and 
its monuments ...The first travelers had as their main motive not knowledge of 
the country itself but the hope of discovering tresors with which to enrich 
their private collections at home. The British formed significant, impressive
82 See Greenfield, The Return o f Cultural Treasures, “The Elgin Marbles Debate” pp. 63-64; see also 
Hitchens, The Elgin Marbles, pp. 69-84.
83 “At a time and in a culture in which officials routinely had to be bribed to perform their legal duties 
(as is still true today in much of the world), the fact that bribes occurred was hardly a significant legal 
consideration. As for the ambiguity o f Elgin’s position, there is a clear, if  subtle, distinction between a 
gift o f the Marbles to Elgin., .and a gift to the Crown in the person of its emissary Elgin”. Merryman, 
“Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1902 (nn. 75, 76 omitted).
84 Merryman, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1905.
85 Idem.
86 Ibid. pp. 1905-8.
87 Hitchens, The Elgin Marbles, p. 45, see also Beard, The Parthenon, “Open Season”, pp. 83-7. In 
passing, Beard recounts how “One of the pieces of the frieze now in the British Museum.. .did not 
come via Lord Elgin at all, but was dug up in 1902, in a garden rockery at an Essex mansion.... What 
furious bout of spring-cleaning, distaste for family heirlooms or ‘uncivilized ignorance’ then consigned
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collections in the first decades of the seventeenth century... Folio wing their 
example, over the next two centuries, other European travelers, mainly 
French, focused on collecting Greek art ...These travelers affected Greece both 
positively and negatively -  the former because they led to systematic research 
and the study of culture: the latter because those travelers, being fanatic 
collectors of antiquities, were responsible for damaging and removing some of
oo
the most important monuments in the history of art.
It is well known that at the time Elgin’s team arrived in Athens, the Parthenon 
had already “succumbed to the passion of collectors”.89
Merryman acknowledges that certainly, Elgin was motivated by nationalism 
and hoped to advance his career in some way by acquiring the Marbles. As, however, 
his career declined after his return to England, and the acquisition was financially 
ruinous for him, Merryman is inclined to find that it would not be at all unreasonable 
to come down on Elgin’s side as rescuer of the Marbles.
In judging the morality of his actions, that is a very weighty and perhaps 
determinative consideration. One who, at great personal cost, is responsible 
for the preservation of a great national treasure has performed a great moral 
act.90
Indeed, Elgin spoke movingly in his own defence at the parliamentary 
hearings on the sale of the Marbles, both about the “value” of his “Collection” and 
about his motives:
I beg once more to repeat, that I do not offer this view of my expenses 
[£74,240] as a criterion of the intrinsic value of my Collection. I have ever 
been persuaded that, injustice to the Public, that should be calculated on other
a notable fragment of the Parthenon frieze into the bedding of an English rock garden, we have simply 
no idea”. Beard, The Parthenon, p. 87
88 Flora E. S. Kaplan ed., Museums and the Making o f “Ourselves The Role o f Objects in National 
Identity, Ch. 8, “The First Greek Museums and National Identity”, (London and New York: Leicester 
University Press, 1994), p. 251 (references omitted) .
89 Greenfield, The Return o f Cultural Treasures, p. 43.
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grounds. But it is, I trust, sufficient to prove, that in amassing these remains of 
antiquity for the benefit of my Country, and in rescuing them from the 
imminent and unavoidable destruction with which they were threatened, had 
they been left many years longer the prey of mischievous Turks, who 
mutilated them for wanton amusement, or for the purpose of selling them 
piecemeal to occasional travellers; I have been actuated by no motives of 
private emolument; nor deterred from doing what I felt to be a substantial 
good, by considerations of personal risk, or the fear of calumnious 
representations.91
In the complex of factors that determine the morality, if not the legality, of 
Elgin’s actions, the question then becomes, “Are intentions enough?” Further, is 
every action of “preservation” a moral act?
The notion of Elgin as the “rescuer” of the Marbles is inconceivable to other 
writers. It is an important element of Hitchens’s argument that Elgin made no 
mention of “rescue” or “preservation” until he was in the process of negotiating their 
sale to the British government. The “preservation” argument seems retrospective to 
many writers. It is an equally important element of Hitchens’s (and others’) 
arguments that pieces of the Marbles were broken, damaged, dropped, made thinner 
(easier to remove and cany), lost, and sunk during Elgin’s tenure as “preserver” of 
the Marbles. The Parthenon was hacked, sawed at and “excavated” with impunity.92 
Nevertheless, even on an uncharitable reading of his intentions, Elgin’s 
acquisitiveness was entirely in keeping with the time in which he lived:
In the past, the collection and public display of objects and symbols of wealth 
and power have proclaimed the glories of autocracies, theocracies, kingdoms 
and empires. Aside from an innate acquisitive “instinct” often attributed to 
human beings, collections and displays...usually [consisted of]...items
90 Merryman, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1909.
91 Select Committee Report, p. xvii, quoted in St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, p. 247.
92 Greenfield, The Return o f  Cultural Treasures, p. 63.
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acquired by long-distance trade and conquest, monopolized and controlled by 
those in power, or by those seeking influence and power.93
These functions of “collecting” are still very much in evidence today. Yet, 
although Merryman quotes a well-known fragment from a letter from Giovanni 
Battista Lusieri to Elgin, in which Lusieri admits, “I have even been obliged to be a 
little barbarous”,94 he finds that Elgin saved more than he destroyed. This is an 
argument that Merryman discusses in various points in his analysis, and which also 
serves to polarize commentators on this debate.95
Was the removal, despite everything, a good thing because at least the 
Marbles still exist? Put differently, had they been left alone, would even fewer pieces 
of the frieze or other sculptures have survived? Obviously, once again “retentionists” 
and “restitutionists” come to different conclusions. There is evidence that before and 
during the War of Independence against the Ottomans, the Greeks both felt strongly 
about, and took steps to ensure, the preservation of the Parthenon.96 Assuming that 
the Marbles survived the War of Independence against the Ottomans, as the pieces 
not taken by Elgin did, there seems to be at least a reasonable argument for the 
restitutionist position.97 Although Merryman goes on to consider the consequences
Qftfor someone who damages a great national treasure (the Parthenon), he finds that
93 Kaplan ed., Museums and the Making of "Ourselves ”, p. 2.
94 Merryman, “Thinking about the Elgin Marbles”, p. 1884.
95 For a supporting assessment, see Greenfield, The Return o f Cultural Treasures, pp. 58-9, quoting 
“The Report on The Elgin Marbles” by the Parliamentary Committee convened to consider the 
purchase of the marbles in 1816. See also Ibid. p. 63, quoting “a German archaeologist, Adolf 
Michaelis, [who] said of the Elgin Marbles [in 1882], that...taking the prevailing conditions at that 
time into account...’Only blind passion could doubt that Lord Elgin’s act was an act o f preservation.’” 
(n. 4 omitted)
96 Hitchens, The Elgin Marbles, pp. 65-7.
97 “Following the proclamation of independence from Turkey, scholars in Athens worked tirelessly to 
widen, explore, and reaffirm the history of Greece. A collective undertaking, the government launched 
a program of consolidation, restoration, and protection; and established historical zones, expropriated 
sites, and implemented both long-range excavation projects and emergency rescue operations”. “The 
First Greek Museums and National Identity” in Kaplan ed., Museums and the Making of  "Ourselves ”, 
p. 246. See also Handler, "Who Owns the Past?” in Williams, ed., The Politics o f Culture, p. 68.
98 “The metopes and frieze were integral parts of the Parthenon’s structure. In removing them, 
substantial portions of the adjoining masonry were damaged. Like the removals themselves, the 
resulting damage to the structure of the Parthenon has to be considered in judging the legality and 
morality o f Elgin’s actions”. Merryman, “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles”, p. 1884.
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Elgin’s actions in this area were more than compensated for by the facts as stated 
above." As a result, the moral question lacks any “persuasively incisive answer.. .the 
opposing considerations are too much in balance”.100 As a result, Merryman applies 
the balancing test that yields results: “I conclude that the legality of the removal of 
the Marbles is clearly established and that its immorality has not been 
demonstrated”.101
Cultural nationalism or cultural internationalism?
In light of this conclusion, Merryman considers the guidelines or standards 
for the allocation of cultural property. In order to address this question, he imagines 
“our own hypothetical supranational tribunal, one charged with making informed, 
principled decisions concerning the proper allocation of disputed cultural
1 ft?property...[H] ow should it decide?” As briefly noted earlier in the Chapter, the
case for cultural nationalism is made on the basis of preserving cultural identity 
(“particular peoples have particular interest in particular properties, regardless of their 
current location and ownership”103), yet:
“Cultural nationalism,” however pluralistic in intent, employs a European 
logic of possessive individualism when it claims objects as essential to 
identities and elements of authentic traditions. Possessive 
individualism... increasingly dominates the language and logic of political 
claims to cultural autonomy. The modem individual is...defined by the 
property she possesses. Modernity has extended these qualities to nation-states 
and ethnic groups, who are imagined on the world stage and in political arenas 
as “collective individuals”. ...Within cultural nationalism, a group’s survival,
99 Merryman, “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles”, pp. 1909-10.
100 Ibid. p. 1910.
,01 Idem.
102 Ibid. p. 1911.
103 Coombe, “The Properties o f Culture” in Ziff and Rao, Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural 
Appropriation, p. 3.
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its identity or objective oneness over time, depends upon the secure 
possession of a culture embedded in objects of property.104
One immediate critique of this argument, therefore, is that it imposes a set of 
interconnecting European legal and proprietary structures on any non-European group 
or nation for which it may be deployed.
The deeper critique of cultural internationalism (at least as Merryman 
positions it within the Parthenon Marbles debate) arises from Merryman’s underlying 
economic arguments. From the perspective of his imaginary fictional supranational 
tribunal, Merryman begins by affirming the distinction between property and identity, 
even when “cultural” modifies these concepts.
In its truest and best sense, cultural nationalism is based on the relation 
between cultural property and cultural definition. For a full life and a secure 
identity, people need exposure to their history, much of which is represented 
or illustrated by objects. .. .The difficulty comes in relating the notion of 
cultural deprivation to the physical location of the Marbles.105
If the British openly and respectfully acknowledge that the “identity” of the 
Marbles is Greek, then it is not clear what role “possession” should play in 
determining their location. At least as far as “enjoyment of cultural value” is 
concerned, location is important only because it makes the authentic objects, rather 
than reproductions, available in Greece. Oddly, however, given Merryman’s 
reverence for the Parthenon as a work of art, in his analysis of cultural value, the 
value of authentic objects can only be shown economically. The “authentic” Marbles 
have to be shown to have greater value for Greeks than for anyone else, measured by 
whether, i f  the Marbles were for sale, Greeks would pay a higher price for them than
104 Ibid. p. 84.
105 Merryman, “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles”, pp. 1912-13.
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non-Greeks: “There must be some magic inherent in the authentic object, and not in 
an accurate reproduction, that speaks only to Greeks, or the argument fails”.106
Economic value can therefore legitimately found apparently cultural 
principles of international law, where cultural values fail. Merryman analogizes the 
Greek attitude to The Elgin Marbles to other cases where a people believed that 
“[rjetum of the object was essential to the well-being of the group, perhaps even to its 
survival. There is an analogous mystical element in the attitude of some Greeks 
toward the Marbles: something essential is missing; there is a cultural wound.”107 He 
concludes that these beliefs cannot serve as a basis for allocating cultural property 
unless they are supported by the willingness to pay more for the object. This implicit 
economic argument is then reinforced by an explicit economic assessment of the 
relative values of repatriation or retention. An explicit economic argument for return 
would rely on the possible economic goods that possession would confer on the 
Greeks. Therefore, the possibility of selling the Marbles, or the increased level of 
tourism to Greece, would constitute an economic advantage. This analysis 
establishes an underlying economic rationale for cultural internationalism. However, 
it is a rationale that supports rather than overturns conservative legal interests. As 
such, the certain benefit to the Greeks of the Marbles’ return merely re-argues the 
question of the Marbles as property, and the Greeks’ ownership of them. As 
Merryman has already determined that the Greeks have an identity right in the 
Marbles but not a property right, he disregards the economics of the situation.
Against this background, he states that the principle that everyone, in every country, 
has an interest in the preservation and disposition of cultural property “is clearly 
accepted”. From this, he concludes that “[t]he marbles are ‘the cultural heritage of all 
mankind’.” 108
Yet, before concluding this, Merryman pauses to assess the values of the 
cultural nationalism perspective as well. On the basis of his assessment, it would not
106 Ibid. p. 1913 (n. 107 omitted)
107 Ibid. p. 1914.
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succeed in any case, not merely in the case of the Parthenon Marbles.109 In front of 
Merryman’s supranational tribunal, the validity of nationalism per se must be 
assessed separately from any (other) meaning attaching to objects that also serve as 
expressions of national pride. Not surprisingly, nationalism can be an unsavoury 
concept.110 Furthermore, even if the tribunal accepted the general proposition that 
“works of importance to a culture belong at that culture’s site”,111 it doesn’t follow 
that the Marbles should be returned to Greece:
[The Marbles] have been in England for more than a century and a half and in 
that time have become part of the British cultural heritage. The Elgin Marbles 
and other works in the British Museum have entered British culture, help 
define the British to themselves, inspire British arts, give Britons identity and 
community, civilize and enrich British life, and stimulate British 
scholarship.112
As one could argue that the Greek claim is either more or less powerful in 
these terms, Merryman finds the two positions roughly equivalent. In essence, his 
argument seems to be that the British can make the same kinds of political, cultural, 
and thus nationalistic arguments as the Greeks, and therefore both “sides” are 
equivalent. It is interesting that despite his faith in the law’s ability to resolve other 
property issues, he does not seek to use any legal argumentation regarding these 
competing claims. Once the property issues are resolved to his satisfaction, then in a 
sense, the law becomes even more of an abstraction: a tool that either side could use, 
but not a tool that can be used to distinguish between them. In his role as judge, 
Merryman rules on extra-legal grounds: the case from cultural nationalism “fails 
because it expresses values not clearly entitled to respect (political nationalism),
108 Ibid. p. 1916.
109 Merryman concludes that “its assertion before our supranational tribunal does not argue clearly, or 
perhaps at all, for the return of the Marbles to Greece”. Ibid. p. 1915.
110 Idem
111 Idem
1,2 Idem
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because it is founded on sentiment and mysticism rather than reason, and because it is 
a two-edged argument that is equally available to the British”.113
Questions of preservation, integrity and distribution
Under the umbrella of cultural internationalism, in this case as in others, 
Merryman attempts to balance the considerations that arise against those that he has 
already examined in his preceding analyses. When the legal, moral and nationalistic 
arguments are evenly balanced or inconclusive, the considerations that should prevail 
are, in order of decreasing importance, preservation, integrity, and distribution.114 
Merryman looks at each of these considerations in regard to the Marbles. In each 
case, he finds that the Marbles are better off staying where they are. First, both 
retrospectively and in a reasonable assessment of the future, the Marbles are safer in 
the British Museum than they would be in Athens. He comments that:
Indeed, if one compares the record of care for works on the Acropolis and in 
the British Museum since 1816, it is clear [that]... [t]he sculptural reliefs 
remaining on the Parthenon and the Caryatids on the Erechtheion have all 
been badly eroded by exposure to a variety of hazards, including the smog of 
Athens. Even if.. .placed in a museum.. .rather than reinstalled on the 
Parthenon, what reason would there be to expose them to the danger involved 
in removal and transport? What reason would there be to expect that they 
would be safer in Athens, over the next 170 years, than they have been in 
London, over the past 170 years? If the time should come when they would 
be safer in Greece, then the preservation interest would argue for their return. 
Under present conditions, the preservation concern favors leaving the Marbles 
in the British Museum.115
113 Ibid. p. 1916.
114 Ibid. p. 1917. For a full exposition of these considerations against the backdrop of the cultural 
nationalism/cultural internationalism debate, please see Sarah Eagen, “Preserving Cultural Property: 
Our Public Duty”, 13 Pace International Law Review 414-17.
115 Merryman, “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles”, p. 1917.
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For other commentators “the preservation interest” already argues for their 
return. William St. Clair116 makes a powerful argument that in the 1930s the British 
Museum implicitly or explicitly permitted work crews hired by Lord Duveen, a noted 
art dealer who donated the “Duveen Gallery” to the British Museum to house the 
Marbles, to “clean” the Marbles in order to make them conform more closely to the 
then-prevalent notion of “Classical art”. The cleaning, with copper brushes and 
strong lye soap, removed the precious original patina of the sculptures and possibly 
did other damage to the detail. This claim has seriously eroded the British Museum’s 
previously unassailable claim to possession of the Marbles based on good 
stewardship and preservation, and has given ammunition to the calls for the return of 
the Marbles to Greece. The British Museum is in the process of minimizing the 
effects of these revelations. There have been two articles in the International Journal 
o f Cultural Property disputing the gravity of St. Clair’s claims, the second written by 
Ian Jenkins, the Assistant Keeper with responsibility for Greek sculpture at the British 
Museum.117 Jenkins specifically refutes aspects of St. Clair’s claims at some
1 I Q
length. The British Museum organized a conference on the preservation of the 
Parthenon Marbles in the wake of St. Clair’s revelations,119 but has yet to publish the 
forthcoming conference proceedings.
116 William St. Clair makes his arguments in (1998) Lord Elgin and the Marbles, pp. 281-313, and 
repeats and expands on them in “The Elgin Marbles: Questions o f Stewardship and Accountability”. 
The claims are reviewed as well in Beard, The Parthenon, pp. 168-81. See also Hitchens, The Elgin 
Marbles, pp. 89-93 for previous claims of damage to the Marbles while under British stewardship.
117 J. Boardman, “The Elgin Marbles: matters o f fact and opinion”, 9 International Journal o f  Cultural 
Property 233-262 (2000); I. Jenkins, “The Elgin Marbles: Questions of Accuracy and Reliability”, 10 
International Journal o f Cultural Property 55-69 (2001).
118 It is not worth summarizing the article here. Suffice to say that Jenkins highlights exaggerations, 
inaccuracies, and omissions on St. Clair’s part. Most interesting, however, is the tone o f his response. 
He writes “That the 1930s cleaning was, as the vernacular has it, a ‘cock-up’, there is no doubt. The 
museum paid the price for it at the time with a major press scandal, and it has been talked of as an 
embarrassment ever since. Sixty years on and with all the principal players dead, what seemed most 
needed was a reasoned assessment of actual events in the 1930s and their implications for the 
sculptures themselves. Instead, St. Clair’s attack, with its frequent misreading o f documents and gross 
exaggeration of the consequences for the sculpture, generated another press scandal, further muddying 
the waters”. I. Jenkins, “The Elgin Marbles: Questions o f Accuracy and Reliability”, 10 International 
Journal o f Cultural Property 55, 56 (2001). The assumption that St. Clair should somehow fulfill the 
agenda of the British Museum is extraordinary, and indicative of the closed world of museum studies, 
curators, and scholars in this field.
119 1 December 1999.
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Second, he examines the integrity consideration. This is concern “for 
restoration of the parts of ‘dismembered masterpieces’”.120 In the case of the 
Marbles, this means considering whether they can be replaced on the Parthenon. If 
they can, the integrity consideration argument comes out in favour of the Greeks.
Note that at this point, Merryman reaffirms that his focus is on the Parthenon as the 
total work of art, rather than on the frieze as a separate object. This is in some tension 
with his approach to the Marbles at earlier points in the argument. The fragmented 
frieze can satisfy all the preceding functions regarding art and culture as it exists 
today; however, in terms of “integrity”, the thing to look to is the Parthenon. Once he 
establishes this point, it is an obvious step to point out that in fact the Marbles would 
not be returned to the Parthenon, but rather to a museum next to the Parthenon. This 
small distance voids any benefit that might accrue to the Parthenon. Obviously, this 
is an artistic as well as a “cultural property” determination, and of course, opinions 
differ. The “rememberment” argument is hampered by the reality, obvious in every 
major museum, that artworks are often literally in pieces and might be apportioned 
among two or three locations.
Finally, Merryman considers the distributional issues that arise within 
the international interest in cultural property. These issues arise from the tendency of 
nations to fall into “importer” and “exporter” classes, defined not only by surplus 
“art” or “culture”, but also again by economic concerns.
There is a tendency for works of art to flow from the poor to the wealthy 
nations, and one can imagine the unpleasant extreme of a Third World 
denuded of cultural property in order to stock the museums and the private 
collections of a few wealthy nations.121
Looking at how this consideration affects the debate over the Marbles, 
Merryman finds that Greece is not impoverished in cultural artifacts. Rather, Greece
120 Merryman, “Thinking About The Elgin Marbles”, p. 1918.
121 Ibid. p. 1919.
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199faces the problem of protecting and exhibiting its possessions. In addition, a second 
aspect of the distribution consideration regards accessibility rather than retention. 
Focusing on considerations of accessibility, it is not clear to Merryman that the 
Marbles would be more accessible in Athens than they presently are in London. 
Merryman notes that “[c]riteria for an appropriate international distribution of the
1 9*1
artifacts of a culture do not yet exist,” but once again, Merryman uses inconclusive 
results on the legal scale to argue for stasis.
The life of objects
After the forgoing analysis, Merryman decides that the fictional supranational 
tribunal should leave the Marbles where they are. This is not a surprising result. Is it 
surprising that Merryman seems disappointed? He finds it “dispiriting...[that] a 
reasoned conclusion...conflicts with a congenial sentiment”.124 Yet, he began by 
setting sentiment and reason against each other. He proposes, and for the most part 
maintains, an explicitly legal approach as the most valid means of determining 
ownership. Along with the legal arguments, he does determine to consider the 
cultural, political, and moral aspects to the problem -  but to do so only as these 
aspects are focused or resolved through the lens of “law”: most notably, property law, 
contract law and international law, “based at least in part on reasoned, principled 
grounds”.125 Throughout this highly influential article, Merryman is speaking to the 
legal subject, in a confidential tone: among us, emotion does not play a valid role in 
assessing disputes. Reasonable people will agree or will agree to disagree, which 
comes to much the same thing.
Yet, there is something that reasonable people may feel passionately about, 
and would be correct to feel passionately about, which is the preservation of cultural
122 Ibid. p. 1920.
123 Ibid. p. 1921.
124 Idem
125 Ibid. p. 1883.
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objects. Merryman reserves his passion for the injustice of privileging sovereignty 
over preservation, for the miserable life of unloved or unseen objects:
objects that would be well-housed and preserved abroad are allowed to 
deteriorate in warehouses or inadequately maintained and staffed museums or, 
often worse, at unprotected and unexcavated sites at home.126
In Merryman’s view, only the deep pockets of collectors can protect these 
objects, and only the English can keep the Marbles safe from the Ottomans, the 
Greeks, war, and nature. The life (preservation) of objects, translated into visibility 
(culture), founds his adoption of (or his reliance upon) the “ought” question, the 
“judge” position. The life o f objects, not the authority o f the law, is what Merryman 
defends when he deploys the array of modem Anglo-American legal principles 
against the “sentimental” position that ownership should in some sense, for some 
objects, track origin. The same passion informs Hitchens’s argument. Finally, his 
plea is fo r  the Marbles, not for the Greeks. The ownership interest of the Greeks is 
the vehicle that Hitchens adopts to achieve his goal: reunification of all the fragments. 
It is impossible to read Hitchens’s book without coming away aware of and awed by 
the power that the Marbles as objects in themselves exert in his analysis. The act of 
return, in Hitchens’s estimation should be “freely offered as a homage to the 
indivisibility of art and.. .of justice too”.127
As one concluding note to this section of the Chapter, what of the Greek 
approach to the Marbles? Do most Greeks really care where the Marbles are?
Despite the rhetoric of the Ministry of Culture, it’s a difficult question to answer, but 
perhaps a few impressions will suffice. The history of modem Greek identity 
expresses a tension between Neoclassicism (or a creative return to the values of the
1 951ancient past) and the authority of the Orthodox Church (or the importance of 
medieval Byzantine Hellenism). After the imposition of a Bavarian monarchy and
126 Ibid. p. 1889.
127 Hitchens, The Elgin Marbles, p. 105.
128 Kaplan ed., Museums and the Making of "Ourselves ”, p. 250.
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court on Greece in 1833, the Greeks once again turned to their history, but not in 
search of inspiration, rather as
a sterile form of ancestor worship... Imitation... became an obsession. The 
effort to prove all “unbroken continuity of the nation”, the main ideological 
tenet of the time, was used in the service of nineteenth-century “historicism”. 
History and evidence from the past were to solve practical, “national” 
problems.129
This tension still exists in Greece today. Modem Greeks acknowledge there 
are other far more important issues for the Greek government to address than the 
disposition of the Parthenon Marbles. However, the appeal of the “past” that the 
Marbles represent cannot be denied. Whether they became important as a matter of 
propaganda, political power, or brainwashing, the Marbles are now important the 
Greeks.
As a second concluding note, both the cultural nationalist and the cultural 
internationalist positions are vulnerable to the same critiques. Political agendas, 
commodification by art dealers and museum curators (among others), as well as 
Eurocentric bias, are equally apparent in both conceptualizations of cultural property. 
The conception of cultural property as “the cultural heritage o f all mankind” makes: 
[cjultural internationalists easy to criticize from a cultural studies perspective. 
Their notions of value and rationality are decidedly Eurocentric; it seems to be 
beyond their comprehension that there are alternative modes of attachment to 
objects which do not involve their commodification, objectification, and 
reification for purposes of collection, observation, and display.130
Similarly, the conception of cultural property as the particular property of a 
given people implicates, even more deeply than Merryman’s concern with 
“nationalism”, the valorization of the property relation itself. The recurrent theme in
129 Idem (references omitted).
130 Coombe, “The Properties of Culture”, p. 83.
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analyses of the cultural heritage claims of indigenous peoples is one in which 
“property” remains a clumsy, Westernized term for “attachment”. In both 
conceptualizations, the relentless objectification of the Marbles is the keynote of the 
analyses. Obviously, the Marbles are objects, but their value does not lie in their 
objecthood. This is true of most “cultural property”, and possibly true of all 
“property”.131 This point will be addressed further in the next section of the Chapter.
Kennewick Man: “A white guy with a stone point in him.... ”132
In July 1996, a skeleton was discovered on the bank of the Columbia River by 
two college students. They notified the police, who then called in the County 
coroner. The coroner asked an area anthropologist, James Chatters, to investigate.133 
Chatters’s findings were summarized as follows in Archaeology:
The shape of the pelvis indicated that the skeleton was a man’s .. .five feet nine 
or ten inches tall. Observation of the pelvis, teeth, and skull sutures suggested 
he had been between 40 and 55 years old at death. He had a long, narrow 
skull, a projecting nose, receding cheekbones, a high chin, and a square 
mandible. The lower bones of the arms and legs were relatively long 
compared to the upper bones. These traits are not characteristic of modem 
American Indians in the area, though many of them are common among 
caucasoid peoples, and for this reason Chatters initially thought the skeleton 
was Caucasian.134
Chatters ’s early observations regarding the age of the skeleton, derived from 
examining the skull, led him to think that the skeleton was that of an early pioneer or
131 See, generally, John Gray, “The Idea of Property in Land” in Susan Bright and John Dewar eds, 
Land Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998; and Simon Roberts and Tim 
Murphy “The Idea of Property”, in W. T. Murphy and S. Roberts, Understanding Property Law, 2nd 
ed. (London: Fontana, 1994).
132 Andrew L. Slayman, “A Battle over Bones”, Archaeology, p. 16
133 Distinguishing recent remains from those in Indian burial sites was a familiar problem in that area 
of Washington. Robert W. Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human Remains”. 22 
Harvard. Environmental Law Review 369 (1998).
134 Slayman, “A Battle over Bones”, p. 16.
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fur trapper. However, as he examined the pelvis, he discovered an object that after 
an X-ray and CAT scan would prove to be an astonishingly early stone spear point:
To his surprise, the scan revealed the object to be part of a willow-leaf-shaped 
spear point.. .It strongly resembled a Cascade projectile point -  an Archaic 
Indian style in wide use from around nine thousand to forty-five hundred 
years ago.136
The age and race of the skeleton were immediately at issue in America. The 
skeleton became the center of a controversy regarding the meanings of “native”, 
“Native”, “indigenous” and “American”. The definitions of “Caucasoid” and 
“Caucasian” do not dovetail exactly: “Caucasian” is a “culturally defined racial
1 7 7category”, whereas “Caucasoid” is “a term of art that characterizes the descendants 
and early inhabitants of a broad set of regions, including both Europe and parts of 
South Asia. American Indians have features more in common with Mongoloid 
peoples descended from North Asia”.138 The usage between the terms and traits of 
Caucasoid/Caucasian is sufficiently elided for Chatters “[a]t that point, [to be] quoted 
as saying in The New York Times, ‘I’ve got a white guy with a stone point in
1 7Qhim... .That’s pretty exciting. I thought we had a pioneer.’” The effect of this was 
to reopen the question of “true” or “original” ownership of the land of North 
America. Among other issues, ownership of the skeletal remains metonymically 
stood for ownership of the moral high ground regarding the Native American claims 
of settler land-theft.
The Federal statute that controls disposition of these bones is the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which became law in 
1990.140 The Act controls the ownership and disposal of Native American human
135 Douglas Preston, “The Lost Man”, The New Yorker, 16 July 1997 ( January/February 1997), p. 70. 
“The crowns of the teeth were worn flat, a common characteristic of prehistoric Indian skulls, and the 
color o f the bone indicated that it was fairly old”.
136 Idem
137 Idem
138 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 374.
139 Slayman, “A Battle over Bones”, p. 16.
140 25 U.S.C. sections 3001-13.
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remains141 presently in federally-funded museums, or found on Indian or federal land. 
Although the Act will be discussed in some depth below, broadly, when such remains 
are found, the federal land managers must notify the Indian tribes or indigenous 
groups in the area, and arrange for repatriation of the remains if the tribe(s) or 
group(s) so request, and the requirements of cultural affiliation et al. in the Act are 
fulfilled. As a result, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Walla Walla District, the 
federal land managers in the area, were responsible for determining the race, age, and 
general provenance of the skeleton and notifying the relevant tribe(s). The U.S.
Army Corps, cognizant of their duties under NAGPRA, requested that Chatters 
determine the “race” of the skeleton.142 Chatters verified his findings regarding the 
racial type of the bones by taking the skeleton to another anthropologist one hundred 
miles away who ran a forensic consulting agency. She confirmed his opinion: “I 
examined the bones, and I said ‘Male, Caucasian.’”143 The second anthropologist 
stuck by her opinion even when Chatters showed her the pelvis with the ancient point 
in it.
The next step in identifying, and dating, the skeleton was to send a small bone 
to a radiocarbon laboratory at the University of California at Riverside. The lab 
confirmed that the bone was the same age as the stone point, between ninety-three 
hundred and ninety-six hundred years old. This data guaranteed that Chatters had a 
tremendous archaeological find before him.144 Finally, Chatters consulted a third 
physical anthropologist, a professor at Washington State University. His findings 
neatly summarize many of the issues or problems that are tied up in this case:
His report noted some characteristics common to both Europeans and Plains 
Indians but concluded that “this skeleton cannot be racially or culturally 
associated with any existing American Indian group.” He also wrote, “The
141 and sacred or cultural objects
142 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 70.
143 Idem
144 Ibid. p. 72.
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Native Repatriation Act has no more applicability to this skeleton than it 
would if an early Chinese expedition had left one of its members here.”145
As soon as the radiocarbon dating confirmed the age of the remains, “legal wrangling 
over access to them began. Scientists want to study and test the remains; Native 
American tribes want to rebury the remains; and the federal government wants to 
ensure that the remains are treated in accordance with NAGPRA.”146
In a different, earlier world, Chatters’s opinion would have disposed of the 
issue. Anthropological evidence and the dictates of science, in conjunction with 
received “history”, would have determined not only the origins but also the identity 
of Kennewick Man. However, neither the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers nor the 
coalition of five regional Indian tribes claiming ownership or control of Kennewick 
Man were prepared to allow such a resolution. On the Corps’ reading of the statute, 
the location as well as the age of the skeleton, regardless of its Caucasoid features, 
triggered the provisions of NAGPRA. The Corps demanded that all scientific testing 
be stopped until the questions regarding ownership and control of the bones under 
NAGPRA were resolved. In addition, they “had the skeleton placed in a climate- 
controlled vault at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, in Richland, 
Washington, where it remains today”.147 The Corps then published notice of their 
intent to repatriate the skeleton.
Concurrently, the coalition of Indian tribes, unofficially led by the Umatilla 
Tribe, also continued to claim the skeleton under NAGPRA. Remaining 
unconvinced by the Caucasoid/Caucasian “identity” of the skeleton and the possible 
benefits to history and science that might come from further study, the coalition 
insisted on its right to rebury the skeleton immediately in a secret location. It would 
allow no further testing. This outraged the forensic anthropologists and other
146 Maura A. Flood, “’Kennewick Man’ or ‘Ancient One’? -  A Matter o f Interpretation”, 63 Montana 
Law Review 39, 40 (2002).
147 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 377.
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scientists working on theories of the “peopling” of America. In order to preserve the 
skeleton as an object of study, this community claimed that the Caucasoid features 
and the remarkable age of the skeleton were reasons for not applying NAGPRA in 
this case. “On October 16, 1996... a group of eight anthropologists filed a 
complaint against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Oregon”.148 The plaintiffs in this case, Bonnichsen v. United States,149 
include two Smithsonian Institution anthropologists and six prominent professors of 
anthropology. Robson Bonnichsen is the director of the Center for the Study of First 
Americans at Oregon State University.150 The complaint alleged that Kennewick 
Man was a rare discovery of international as well as national importance. Study of 
the skeleton would yield invaluable information regarding the “peopling of the 
Americas and human evolution in general”.151 As a result, repatriation would result 
in “irreparable harm” to science.152
The background, proceedings, and status of the case are complicated.153 As 
of April 1998, the District Court issued two orders in the case. The first, in February 
1997, held that the Court has jurisdiction to review the Corps’ decision that the 
remains found were Native American and thus came within die ambit of NAGPRA. 
In the second, issued June 1997, the Court denied a summary judgment motion by 
the Corps and simultaneously denied a motion by the scientists for permission to 
study the remains. In addition, it held that all the parties in the case have standing to 
bring actions under NAGPRA.154 Most importantly, U.S. Magistrate John Jelderks 
“asked lawyers for both sides to prepare arguments as to the meaning of 
‘indigenous’ under NAGPRA”.155 In January 2000, the United States Department of
148 Ibid. p. 379.
149 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. Feb. 19,1997); 969 F. Supp. 628 (D. Or. June 27, 1997).
150 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 73.
151 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 379.
152 Idem
153 For further information, see the summary in Flood, “’Kennewick Man’ or ‘Ancient One’?”, 63 
Montana. Law Review 44-53.
154 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 381.
155 Douglas W. Ackerman, “Kennewick Man: The Meaning o f ‘Cultural Affiliation’ and ‘Major 
Scientific Benefit’ in the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act” 33 Tulsa Law 
Journal 359, 364 (1997).
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the Interior (DOI) concluded that the remains are “Native American” within the 
meaning of the statute. In September 2000, after considering approximately 25,000 
pages of evidence, and indeed conducting further tests on the remains, the DOI 
concluded that a preponderance of the evidence shows that the Kennewick remains 
are culturally affiliated with the present-day Indian claimants. On the basis of that 
determination, the Secretary directed repatriation. The plaintiffs in Bonnichsen v. 
United States then filed an amended complaint, and moved to have the DOI’s 
disposition decision vacated. On June 19 and 20, Judge Jelderks heard arguments 
for and against that motion. At the hearing, counsel for each amicus presented 
arguments, and the president of the Society for American Archaeology also made a 
statement concerning his organization’s position on the issues raised in this case. As 
of August 2002, Judge Jelderks has yet to issue his opinion.
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
Under NAGPRA, “Native American” means “of, or relating to a tribe, people 
or culture that is indigenous to the United States”.156 The Act’s scheme creates an 
“ownership or control” interest in Native American human remains, associated and 
unassociated funerary objects, and other cultural items. NAGPRA applies to Native 
American human remains and objects in federally-funded museums as well as those
1 57discovered on tribal or federal land after 16 November 1990. The Act has two 
closely-linked objectives. The first is to create and enforce a process by which 
Federal agencies and museums inventory their holdings of Native American human 
remains and associated and unassociated funerary objects, as well as requiring these 
agencies and museums to work with the appropriate tribes to reach agreement on 
disposition of the holdings. The second objective of the Act is to protect burial sites
1 5fton “Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands”. The Act also includes a criminal 
provision under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which allows fines and imprisonment for 
any person who sells, buys, uses for profit, or transports for sale and/or profit “the
156 25 U.S.C. 3001(9)
157 25 U.S.C. 3002,3003.
158 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 396.
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/
human remains of a Native American without the right of possession to those remains 
as provided in [NAGPRA]”.159
The statute assigns “ownership or control” according to a hierarchical 
classification of persons or entities seeking control. First in line are lineal 
descendants of the Native American whose remains and associated funerary objects 
have been unearthed.160 Then, “in any case in which such lineal descendants cannot 
be ascertained, and in the case of unassociated funerary objects, sacred objects, and 
objects of cultural patrimony”, the scheme is as follows: first the Indian tribe or 
Native Hawaiian organization on whose tribal land the objects or remains were 
discovered are granted ownership or control of the remains or objects. Second, the 
tribe with the “closest cultural affiliation” with the remains or objects, and which, 
“upon notice, states a claim for such remains or objects” is granted ownership or 
control. Third,
if the cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be reasonably ascertained and if 
the objects were discovered on Federal land that is recognized by a final 
judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or the United States Court of 
Claims as the aboriginal land of some Indian tribe.. .(1) in the Indian tribe that 
is recognized as aboriginally occupying the area in which the objects were 
discovered,.. .or (2) if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
a different tribe has a stronger cultural relationship with the remains.. .in the 
Indian tribe that has the strongest demonstrated relationship... .161
NAGPRA applies the same scheme to Native American human remains and 
objects discovered inadvertently after 16 November 1990. The Act requires that 
anyone who knows or has reason to know that Native American human remains or 
other cultural items have been discovered on Federal or tribal lands must notify, in 
writing, the Secretary of the DOI or the head of any other agency or instrumentality
159 Idem. However, note that buying and selling is still permissible.
160 25 U.S.C. 3002(a)(1).
161 25 U.S.C. 3002(a)(2)(C).
162 25 U.S.C. 3002(d).
56
of the United States having primary management authority with respect to Federal 
lands. The appropriate Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organizations must also be 
notified in writing. However, the Act does not resolve the question of which 
person or entity gets ownership or control of human remains
that (1) have no ascertainable “cultural affiliation” with any existing Native 
American tribe or organization and (2) have been discovered on federal land 
that has never been declared by the Court of Claims or the Indian Claims 
Commission to be the aboriginal land of any particular tribe.164
Therefore, Section (1) was the basis of the arguments before Judge Jelderks in 
Bonnichsen v. U.S. The plaintiffs were claiming that, due either to the specific 
genetic makeup of the remains, or the passage of time, the remains could have no 
ascertainable cultural affiliation with the tribes claiming them. This is a case of first 
impression, but also a case where the statutory language has yet to be clarified. When 
NAGPRA became law in 1990, the Secretary of the Interior, in conjunction with the 
NAGPRA Review Committee, was charged with promulgating the rules to enact the 
statute as well as regulations to cover this situation. In 1995, the Department of the 
Interior published final rules under NAGPRA.165 However, the issue of unclaimed or 
unidentifiable objects was left unresolved. An empty subsection has been reserved 
for future regulations on this issue, which is still empty and reserved as of August 
2002. The Review Committee has released two draft recommendations to Interior 
Dept, “regarding the disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains”.166 As 
of the last scheduled meeting, the Review Committee had received about two hundred
i fncomments on the draft of the proposed regulations.
Thus, Kennewick Man presents the ideal test case for (at least one of) the 
major weaknesses of NAGPRA. How does one determine the “lineal descendants”,
163 25 U.S.C. 3002(d)(1).
164 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 398-9.
165 43 C.F.R. pt. 10 (1996); 60 Fed. Reg. 62,134 (1995).
166 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits” p. 399.
167 The last scheduled meeting of the Review Committee was on 25-7 June 1998, notice in 63 F.R. 
18,441 (1998), Ibid. p. 400.
57
“tribal land”, “closest cultural affiliation”, or “aboriginally occupied” land of a nine- 
thousand-year-old skeleton? Even more importantly, as NAGPRA’s scheme is one of 
“ownership and control”, how does one go about making and proving links between 
an “ancient” or “prehistoric” skeleton and any modern-day Indian tribe or other 
indigenous group? These questions are of course sharpened by the “Caucasoid” traits 
of the skeleton, which raise interesting reactions regarding “ownership” and “origin” 
in America, and which will be discussed further below. For the moment, however, 
the question of the Act’s interpretation remains. The interpretative questions are 
relevant to the sorts of issues that are faced by other “indigenous” claimants and the 
legislation enacted to protect them. NAGPRA is typical of the emerging statutory 
instruments meant to repatriate objects and reinstate rights based on cultural 
claims.168
There are at least three questions of statutory interpretation raised by 
Bonnichsen v. United States. As clearly and elegantly stated by Robert Lannan, these 
issues are:
[Fjirst.. .whether NAGPRA applies at all to the remains at issue in this case. 
This question turns on whether this.. .skeleton is <£Native American”, as that 
term is defined by the Act. If the remains are “Native American” and 
NAGPRA does apply, then Bonnichsen will raise a second issue, of how much 
evidence of “cultural affiliation” there must be for claimaint tribes to be given 
“ownership or control” of them... [A] final issue that Bonnichsen could 
present is whether NAGPRA would allow the federal government to permit 
scientific studies of the remains before making this transfer.169
Thus, the statutory scheme requires determining the meaning of “Native American” 
as well as “indigenous” and “cultural affiliation”. This occurs in the context of 
“ownership and control”, and therefore of property.
168 For example, the same standards are used in the Australian Native Title Act.
169 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 400.
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The definition of “Native American” in NAGPRA “concerns not ...[an] 
individual’s origin, but whether his 1 tribe, people, or culture’ was itself‘indigenous’ 
to the United States”.170 The collective must be “indigenous”. As “indigenous” is not
171defined by the Act, it takes its common meaning. Thus, “the question of 
NAGPRA’s applicability to the remains...turns on whether this individual’s ‘tribe, 
people or culture’ appeared ‘naturally’ here and was ‘not introduced’.”172 The 
archaeological and anthropological theories of the “peopling” of America173 suppose 
that the first inhabitants of the continent came from elsewhere. The question then 
becomes:
If either event did take place 12,000 or more years ago, must some period of 
time have passed before descendants of these people became “indigenous”, 
within the intended meaning of that term in NAGPRA?174
Lannan looks to the legislative history of NAGPRA to conclude ancient remains of 
any provenance are included under NAGPRA:
Congress did presume that some of the remains controlled under the Act 
would be from prehistoric times. ..[T]he Act would apply to remains from 
throughout the 12,000 years that people are presumed to have inhabited North 
America.175
Obviously, the claimants in this case make the opposing argument.
The skeleton is too old to be linked to lineal descendants, was not discovered 
on tribal land, and the federal land on which it was discovered had not been 
recognized by a final judgment of the Indian Claims Commission or a United States 
Court of Federal Claims as the aboriginal land of any tribe. Thus, the question
170 Ibid. p. 401.
171 Basic rule of statutory interpretation, cited by Lannan, p. 401, n. 208: 2A Sutherland Stat. 
Construction section 47.28 (ed. Norman J. Singer, 5th ed. 1992). See also Flood, “’Kennwick Man’ or 
‘Ancient One’?”, generally.
172 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 402.
173 Idem. The “Bering Land Bridge theory...[and] the recent North Pacific Rim ‘ice-shelf hypothesis”.
174 Idem
175 Ibid. pp. 430-1.
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regarding “ownership and control” must be determined under the subparagraph that 
specifically gives ownership or control to the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization with the “closest cultural affiliation with [the] remains”.176 Given that 
the regulations defining the meaning of this term are yet to be promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Interior, lawyers and legal theorists must take on the task of defining 
“cultural affiliation”. As defined in the statute, it means “a relationship of shared 
group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically between 
a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier
1 77group”. The regulations promulgated under this section set out the procedures by 
which this relationship can be traced or established. They define a three-pronged test, 
which must be met in full in order to satisfy the requirements. Summarized, the 
elements of the test are:
(1) Existence of an identifiable present day Indian tribe ...with standing under 
these regulations and the Act; and (2) Evidence of the existence of an 
identifiable earlier group...; and (3) Evidence of the existence of a shared 
group identity that can be reasonably traced between the present-day Indian 
tribe.. .and the earlier group. Evidence to support this requirement must 
establish that a present-day Indian tribe.. .has been identified from prehistoric
17Ror historic times to the present as descending from an earlier group.
Evidence that establishes an identifiable earlier group includes evidence of 
group identity and cultural characteristics, distinct patterns of material culture
170manufacture and distribution methods, and a biologically distinct population. These 
factors are in keeping with basic archaeological/anthropological methods. The 
evidentiary standard for establishing shared group identity is that the link must be 
“reasonably” traceable. As such, the DOI rejected a “permissive interpretation”, 
which would have allowed an evidentiary standard of establishing the “closest”
176 Ibid. pp. 402-3, citing 25 U.S.C. 3002(a)(2)(B).
177 25 U.S.C. 3001(2).
178 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 403, quoting 43 C.F.R. sec. 10.14(a) et seq. (1996).
179 43 C.F.R. 10.14(c).
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cultural affiliation in favour of requiring the above standard of minimum evidence.180 
Overall, the standard of proof necessary to support a claim under NAGPRA based on 
cultural affiliation is by a “preponderance of the evidence”. The statute does not 
require “scientific certainty”; once again, evidence can include “[geographical, 
kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropological, linguistic, folklore, oral tradition,
1 9 1historical, [or] other relevant information or expert opinion”. Again looking to the 
legislative history of the statute, Lannan concludes that the tribal coalition in 
Bonnichsen v. U.S. meets these regulatory requirements only in part. The tribal 
coalition meets the first prong of the test, the fit with the second prong is uncertain, 
and is yet more uncertain as regards the third.182 Overall, there is an evidentiary 
problem or blind spot in this statutory scheme. The statute requires evidence that 
must, by definition, be either extremely scarce or nonexistent. As such, “[i]f 
NAGPRA does apply to prehistoric remains, and Congress did anticipate that some of 
these remains could be claimed by Native American groups based on “cultural 
affiliation”, exactly how much of the different types of evidence identified in the 
regulations will be necessary to meet the above standard and be consistent with 
Congress’s intent?183 Again, this is a problem that applies to any statute that looks to 
repatriate ancient cultural property on the basis of ancient communities and 
bloodlines.
As regards the third question of statutory interpretation, whether scientific 
testing on the skeleton may be carried out before the bones are repatriated, the 
consensus among legal commentators seems to be that it may not. Certainly, the 
skeleton does not come under the provision allowing “completion of [specific] 
ongoing scientific studies prior to the transfer of remains to a qualified claimant”. 
Indeed, the Act clearly states that it is not meant to be an authorization for initiating
180 Ibid. p. 403, n. 223.
181 Ibid. p. 404, quoting 43 C.F.R. 10.14(e).
182 Ibid. p. 404.
183 Ibid. p. 405.
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new scientific studies on remains or funerary objects.184 Therefore, the Act forbids 
new studies on remains already in federal custody as of November 16, 1990, a 
prohibition that also extends to new discoveries. As will be seen below, all sorts of 
questions and conflicts arise around the determination of what would constitute 
“major benefit to the United States” in this context. Whether using scientific studies 
to determine cultural affiliation results in a major scientific benefit to the United 
States is an open question. Commentators argue that under the terms of the statute, 
again the answer seems to be “no”.185
As regards scientific testing, the legislative history of the statute raises more 
questions as to Congress’s intent than answers to the question. The issue is important 
for two reasons. First, it is raised by the coalition of Indian tribes that are requesting 
the return of the remains. Indeed, these tribes feel that testing the remains is an 
impermissible intrusion on the bones of one of their ancestors. More generally, the 
question of Western science is often placed in opposition to the indigenous worldview 
in analyses of cultural property cases. In this case, it is clear that the definition of 
“cultural affiliation” in NAGPRA was reached only after long negotiations between 
the various members of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and the 
Native American, museum, and scientific communities. Among the key points of 
compromise regarding repatriation were the definition of “cultural affiliation”, 
permissible delay for completion of important scientific studies, and the shifting of 
the burden of proof in proving identity on to the Native American claimants.186 In the 
event, however, the remains were tested invasively (bone was crushed and subjected 
to DNA and other tests) and exhaustively before the U.S. Department of the Interior 
made its findings.187
184 chapter shall not be construed to be an authorization for.. .the initiation o f new scientific 
studies o f such remains and associated funerary objects or other means of acquiring or preserving 
additional scientific information from such remains and objects”. 25 U.S.C. 3003(b)(2).
185 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 367, quoting (and adding emphasis to) 25 U.S.C. 3004(a).
186 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 420.
187 Flood, “’Kennwick Man’ or ‘Ancient One’?”, p. 39.
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As regards “cultural affiliation”, the various committees engaged in framing 
the Act and the regulations considered the question of controversy over ancient 
Native American remains that potentially cannot be affiliated with any modem tribe 
at length. In part, the question was framed in “caretaker” language, which arguably 
references the (imperialist) “trustee” rhetoric prevalent in the U.S. Bureau of Indian
1RRAffairs. In other part, the Society for American Archaeology stuck to the standard 
anthropological language, arguing that if unidentified remains are returned to the 
wrong tribe, it deprives the “rightful” group of their remains, as well as everyone else 
of the opportunity to leam from those remains.189 The Society for American 
Archaeology would have required “a reasonably established ‘continuity of group 
identity from [an] earlier to [a] present day group’.”190 Finally, this requirement was 
rejected in favour of the looser “preponderance of the evidence” standard for cultural 
affiliation given above. The extensive debate regarding the issue of unidentified or 
unaffiliated cultural remains, and the value of scientific study more generally, 
nevertheless merely deferred the conflict presented by Kennewick Man. Ackerman 
comments that
Although almost every person or entity on the record noted balancing as 
necessary between the rights of Native Americans and scientists, the 
legislative history comes no closer than the statute to deciding the meaning of 
“cultural affiliation”. Inexplicably, no effort, by example or otherwise, was 
made at further defining when a scientific study is of major benefit to the 
United States.191
Bonnichsen v. U.S. and the loopholes in NAGPRA demonstrate that the case 
of Kennewick Man arises in a landscape that is already occupied by (visible and 
invisible) grids of power (money, politics, “rights”, “collecting”, “science”, etc) and 
emotion. It comes to the public eye and to the legal sphere as a question of
188 “[Regarding the Native Americans whose tribes are extinct.. .the Government may be, if that’s a 
desire.. .the caretaker o f peoples who are extinct.’” Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 
417, quoting Senator Daniel Akaka (D-Haw.) in a statement to the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs.
189 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 417, quoting Keith Kintigh.
190 Ibid. p. 419-20.
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“ownership and control”, which may indeed signify power in its purest sense in a 
capitalist country at this time. NAGPRA represents at least a notional shift in the 
configuration of power in this realm:
Non-Native Americans, including the scientific community, are given no 
ownership rights to Native American human remains or objects discovered 
after November 16,1990, determined to be culturally affiliated under 
NAGPRA unless no tribe claims the remains or objects.192
As excavation on reservation lands can only be with the tribe’s consent, there 
is a change in the power dynamic not only as regards ownership but as regards 
discovery. The legislative history and the language of the Act reflect an inevitable 
challenge to the standardized professional ideas of what “must” be known, what it is 
“useful” or “necessary” to know in the context of all sorts of studies that have relied 
on Native American artifacts and human remains. In this particular case, as well as in 
many others,193 the power flux occurs in the context of the meaning and valuation of 
“indigenous” identity and scientific studies. If one question ultimately asked by the 
statute is “who has the power to grant permission to study the skeleton?” a different 
question ultimately asked by the case as a whole is “what does the conflict regarding 
“indigenous” and “science” mean? Or, how is it being used in this landscape?” 
Certainly, these questions can only be answered in part. For purposes of this section 
of the discussion, the legislative history of the Act is the primary source of any 
possible answers. Entwined with the legislative history of NAGPRA are the history 
of the United States and the history of the professions of anthropology, archaeology, 
and art dealing and collecting in America.194
191 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 369.
192 Ibid. p. 366.
193 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 72. See also: Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, pp. 384-5, 
n. 103.
1941See, for example, the analysis o f the art/culture complex and “primitive” art, in Shelly Errington, 
The Death ofAuthentic Primitive Art and Other Tales o f Progress (Berkeley, Los Angeles and 
London: University of California Press, 1998).
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Legislative history
The anthropological profession, museums, science, and law have intersected 
in a number of ways in the years leading up to the passage of NAGPRA. The 
interactions of these disciplines form a kind of knot. Any attempt to separate the 
various strands must begin with the acknowledgment that they can only be separated 
artificially -  each action and area of discipline implicates the next. With that caveat, 
the events leading up to the passage of NAGPRA can be addressed as a series of 
legal, institutional and political developments, the results of which are not yet known. 
Again, the considerations that follow are the same as, or are easily translatable into, 
the considerations that apply to the emerging field of cultural property legislation 
regarding protecting the heritage of indigenous peoples.
The legislative history of NAGPRA, in its broadest sense, includes case law, 
governmental policies, and the history of the National Museum of the American 
Indian Act (NMAIA)195 and political initiatives both in Washington D.C. and among 
grass-roots activists in Native American communities. Members of the 
anthropological profession also joined in the struggle for reform regarding burial 
rights and policies. In the realm of law, the two statutes addressing the problem of 
repatriating Native American human remains are NMAIA and NAGPRA. These 
were discussed and ultimately passed in two legislative efforts spanning the years 
1987 to 1990. NMAIA concerns the new complex of museums and institutions that 
arose from the political effort to force repatriation of Native American human 
remains in the Smithsonian Institute’s collection. The ways in which the Smithsonian 
Institution intersects with Native American organizations, studies, and legal 
initiatives are extremely complex. For the moment, these interconnections will be 
discussed briefly in the context of the NMAIA. NMAIA sets out the beginnings of 
national196 legislative efforts to address the issues that are also addressed in
195 20 United States Code 80q (1989), amended in 1996.
196 Many states had already enacted Native American burial and sacred site protection laws. There is 
also a history of case law addressing the question of standing in bringing actions regarding 
disinterment, grave-robbing, etc. “Native Americans generally believe they are connected spiritually
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NAGPRA, and thus the principles and values that underlie (at least in part) the debate 
regarding Kennewick Man. The history of NMAIA expresses a great deal of conflict 
between museums and Native American interest groups.197 It is a museum created 
out of the Smithsonian’s collection of Native American art, artifacts and human 
remains. Thus, the Smithsonian is also germane to the analysis.
The Smithsonian Institution opened in Washington, DC in 1846.198 It has been 
involved with the collecting and study of Native American human remains since its 
inception. It is at the core of the American historical project of national identity, an 
identity which (as will be seen below) turned in part on the subjugation if not outright 
negation of American Indians. Founded by the legacy of an Englishman, James 
Smithson,199 who had never visited America, the Smithsonian today
is made up of an aggregation of bureaus and near bureaus — museums, art 
galleries, and research offices and departments.... Some of them are totally 
governmental, some quasi-govemmental, and some nongovernmental in 
status. ... it is .. .the world’s largest complex of museums and art galleries, 
with holdings in every area of human interest totaling more than 75 million 
objects and specimens.” Of this incredible amount, “only about 1 percent of
and familially with their ancestral Native Americans and that this connection is sufficient for standing. 
Courts, however, generally require a more direct and substantial interest”. June Camille Bush Raines, 
“One is Missing: Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: An Overview and 
Analysis” 17 American. Indian. Law R.eview 639, 646 (1992).
197 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 407.
198 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 643. “At its opening, the Smithsonian Institution was funded for the 
most part by Englishman James Smithson. He left a half million dollars to the United States to create 
an entity which would ‘increase and diffusfe]...knowledge among men’... It has since become 
federally funded”. Ibid. n. 29, quoting Gordon R. Willey and Jeremy A. Sabloff, A History o f  
American Archaeology 48,41 (1974).
199 “I bequeath the whole of my property...to the United States of America, to found at Washington, 
under the name of the Smithsonian Institution, an Establishment for the increase and diffusion of 
knowledge among men”. Leonard Carmichael and J. C. Long, James Smithson and the Smithsonian 
Story (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, with The Smithsonian Institution, 1965) p. 14. The reasons 
for Smithson’s bequest can only be guessed at. Conjecture includes the notion o f America as a utopia, 
prevalent in Romantic thought at the time, and the fact that Smithson was a charter member o f  the 
Royal Institute of London. However, the most widely accepted reason is that Smithson, as the natural 
son of the Duke of Northumberland and a rich widow, was barred from the professions usually 
available to a gentleman, chose science as his life’s work, and was led to this bequest by “his feeling 
that his own country, by denying him his noble birthright and the normal fulfillment of a life in 
England suitable to his talents and inclinations, had let him down”. Paul H. Oehser, The Smithsonian 
Institution (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1983) p. 9.
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its holdings are on display at any one time, the rest being used behind the 
scenes by scholars and scientists.. .for the Smithsonian is also a major center 
of basic and scholarly research.” Other institutional pursuits include research 
exhibitions, educational programs, [and] performing-art activities ... .200
The Native American collection in turn was at the core of the Smithsonian. 
Working with the federal government, research into ethnology and information about 
American Indian tribes were among the first projects undertaken by the Institution.201 
The Smithsonian inaugurated the first systematic investigation of the 
American Indians.... The volume of studies became so vast that in 1879 the 
Federal Government consolidated its surveys as the United States Geological 
Survey. The anthropological work thereof was placed under the direction of 
the Smithsonian Institution as the Bureau of American Ethnology.
Certainly, the attack on the Smithsonian’s collection of Native American 
human remains and artifacts by Native American interest groups was a frontal attack 
on the museum/anthropological/govemment complex at the heart of the American 
establishment, and was met as such in the discussions leading up to the passage of 
NMAIA.
The Smithsonian originally refused to participate in the government-organized 
“task force to examine and make recommendations regarding the display and 
treatment of sacred objects and remains” set up in 1986.203 There was great concern 
in the museum and anthropological communities that such “looting” of the 
Smithsonian, and the repatriation of the remains, would essentially destroy the 
practice of physical anthropology:
Archaeologists at the Smithsonian fear that returning any of the bones would 
be to “forever alter, if not to end, the science of physical anthropology”. The
200 Ibid. p. 58.
201 Carmichael and Long, James Smithson and the Smithsonian Story, p. 163.
202 Ibid. p. 165.
203 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 644.
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chairman of the physical anthropology department.. .stated that.. .the loss to 
science would be irreversible. Proponents for Native Americans responded 
quickly by saying.. .that, “[S]ociety has decided that when human remains and 
science collide, science has to take a back seat.”204
Negotiation of these issues finally focused on the problem of ancient or otherwise 
unidentifiable human remains.205 It was clear that some compromise was going to 
have to be reached.206 Finally, the Smithsonian “capitulated” in August 1989. 
“Meeting...with tribal representatives, Smithsonian officials agreed to return all 
‘reasonable identifiable’ physical remains and burial objects to tribal descendants 
upon request.”207
NMAIA authorizes a new museum under the Smithsonian umbrella 
specifically dedicated to the culture and history of Native Americans.208 This 
museum will occupy the last free space on the Mall in Washington D.C. It will also 
include the collection of Native American arts and artifacts at the George Gustav 
Heye Center at the Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House in New York City. The 
Act provides a process to inventory the Smithsonian’s collection of human remains 
and Native American funerary objects, as well as to return remains and objects to the 
family or tribe when the family or tribe can be determined. The hope is that the 
National Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) will generate research and 
educational programs no doubt similar to the Smithsonian’s, but (at least arguably) 
from a different perspective. The Smithsonian and the NMAI will continue to work
204 Ibid. p. 645.
205 “Much of the discussion recorded in the legislative history o f the National Museum o f the American 
Indian Act documents a controversy over the disposition of prehistoric remains in the Smithsonian 
Institution’s collections, most o f which were too ancient to be identified with any contemporary Indian 
tribe”. Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, pp. 408-9.
206 “During the 1980s, federal organizations began to show signs of becoming cognizant o f the fact that 
Indian burial sites and physical remains represent human life and culture, rather than scientific data”. 
James Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality: A Historical Overview of Imperial Archaeology and 
American Indians”, 24 Arizona State Law Journal, 11,31(1992).
207 Idem
208 “The NMAIA, a great improvement from the boxes of stored remains, applies only to the 
Smithsonian and serves as a ‘living memorial to Native Americans’”. Raines, “One is Missing”, 
p. 651.
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together on meeting the legislative mandates set out in the Act. In the Preface to the 
book published in conjunction with the first exhibition of the NMAI at the Heye 
Center (printed by the Smithsonian Institution), there is the following summary:
All Roads Are Good: Native Voices on Life and Culture represents die 
important first effort of the [NMAI] to...bring the essential voices of native 
peoples themselves to the interpretation of our cultures and the things we have 
made.
For much of our recent history, non-native scholars and others have been the 
principal interpreters of our lives and lifeways. ...
The contents of this book, however, mark the public beginning of the 
museum’s determination to include in a systematic way our own voices in this 
body of cultural representation.209
Despite the rhetoric, however, there is some question as to the efficacy of the 
Act as a reburial device. After the Smithsonian inventories its collection, it “is only 
required to repatriate those remains” that “are identified by a preponderance of the 
evidence as those of a particular individual or as those of an individual culturally 
affiliated with a particular tribe”.210 As the information necessary to make this kind 
of claim is lodged in or with the Smithsonian, “[o]bviously, Native Americans 
seeking repatriation of any items find themselves at the mercy of the National 
Museum of the American Indian”.211 As has been discussed above, the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard was not used in NAGPRA to limit claims 
of cultural affiliation. Rather, in NAGPRA, the House Committee preferred 
“reasonably trace[able]”, which is clearly a lower mark to hit. Nevertheless, the 
same issues and competing considerations underlie NAGPRA as underlie NMAIA.
The most vocal early opponent was the Society for American Archaeology, 
which fought for an age limit on remains that could be repatriated. Arguing that
209 Smithsonian Institution, All Roads Are Good: Native Voices on Life and Culture (Washington: 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994) p. 9.
210 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 411.
211 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 652.
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people’s definition of kinship “legitimately varies” over time and through cultures, 
the Society tried to prevent NAGPRA from applying to the entire “skeletal 
population” of remains. The Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs then 
convened a panel214 of outside experts from the three communities most involved 
with the legislative effort: the Native American community, the museum community, 
and the scientific community. The conflict between Native American religions and 
scientists’ concerns surfaced more frequently during the legislative process leading up 
to NAGPRA than it did during the process leading to NMAIA. Members of the panel 
split six to three on the subject of whether ancient or unidentifiable remains should be 
repatriated. The majority believed
that a respect for Native human rights requires that a process should be 
developed for disposition of these remains in cooperation with, and with the 
permission of, Native nations. Such process should take legitimate scientific 
interests into account in appropriate instances where Native consent is 
secured. ... (1) Scientific study of human remains carries an obligation to 
secure appropriate consent. None of these dead consented to donate 
themselves to science; (2) Present-day Native American nations are most 
closely connected to the dead and have the authority to speak on behalf of the 
unclaimed remains; (3) Native American nations and people strongly believe 
that these human remains are entitled to a decent place of rest. These wishes 
should be respected....216
The scientists on the panel, however, “stressed the need to learn about the 
future from the past”.217 These dissenters agreed that:
museums should act in good faith in response to Indian requests for 
repatriation, and.. .museums should make every effort to respond positively to 
a repatriation request when there is a clear cultural link to the group making
212 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 429.
2.3 Ibid. p. 412.
2.4 The Panel for a National Dialogue on Museum-Native American Relations.
215 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 413.
2,6 Ibid. p. 414.
217 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 368.
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the request. [However,]... While we agree that there are cases in
which.. .claims [to culturally unidentifiable remains] may be seen as human
rights issues, we do not agree that such a determination mandates in all cases
1^0
following the wishes of a nation or group.
This split was resolved in favour of the majority. It is as a result of this kind 
of dialogue and resolution that Bonnichsen v. U.S. is before the court. (These 
considerations also underlie the problems with repatriation of objects in museum 
collections more generally.) Clearly, the conflict regarding repatriation presented by 
Kennewick Man was inevitable. The legislative history of the Act shows that the 
compromises and negotiations on the issue of repatriating ancient remains are not 
made easily. Nor are these compromises necessarily accepted. There are already two 
legislative efforts on the Congressional agenda to amend the Act, one of which 
attempts to undercut the compromises made thus far in favour of scientific study in 
cases like Kennewick Man.
Conclusion: The life of ancient objects
Why are these two cases presented together? First and foremost, because a 
central argument of this thesis is that the distinction between “indigenous” and “non- 
indigenous” or “Western” is highly suspect in cultural property or heritage 
disputes.219 As such, the quintessential “Western” cultural property case and one of 
the quintessential “indigenous” cultural property cases should be examined for their 
similarities. Although analyses exist which make this argument, they are written 
from the perspective of the value(s) of (or inherent in) cultural property, which are 
shared by all peoples who organize themselves into a society. These analyses are 
extremely valuable, in that they examine the philosophical foundations of “value” in
2,8 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 415.
219 This is increasingly true as indigenous peoples turn to Western legal structures to protect their 
cultural heritage.
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this field,220 and raise the issues of the essentializing and totalizing Western gaze.221 
In the present work, however, the perspective is different. In both the Parthenon 
Marbles case and in Kennewick Man, the “objects” at the center of the disputes are 
fundamentally created by expert observers, outside the specific community (or 
communities) that may treasure or seek to acquire the objects. In both cases, the legal 
structures used to address the issues are dependent upon specialized information from 
experts: both the Parthenon Marbles and Kennewick Man derive a great part of their 
identity from the discourses of knowledge and value that are attached to them.
Therefore, it is worth noting the importance of the same classes of people: 
collectors, archaeologists, and other kinds of professional experts that in fact create 
the objects at the center of the dispute. The information that the Parthenon Marbles 
predated Roman sculpture was central to the British Parliament’s decision to buy the 
Marbles for the nation; the evidence of forensic anthropologists that the bones are 
both “Caucasoid” and 9,000 years old not only spurred the dispute about the “true 
owners” of the remains but also showed the strength of NAGPRA in the face of the 
scientific/academic establishment. A sea-change in evidence or attribution, a 
paradigm shift regarding artistic value or historical origin, and the effect would be 
like pointing out that the emperor has no clothes -  if the Marbles are Egyptian, or the 
bones are mongoloid not Caucasoid, the disputes would melt away.
However, without this kind of change in information or evidence, the disputes 
will continue, and indeed do continue, regardless of the operation of “the law”. This 
raises the following question: why are these disputes in the realm of ownership rather 
than art history or scientific analyses? If the value of the objects is so radically 
separate from their ownership, what does this say about “cultural property” or 
“cultural heritage”? This is a thorny question, as it asks to what extent culture 
and ownership are really linked in this realm of law. The conclusion is inescapable
220 Sarah Harding, “Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage”, 31 Arizona State Law Journal 
291(1999); Harding, “Justifying Repatriation of Native American Cultural Property”, 72 Indiana Law 
Journal 723 (1997).
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that these objects are at the center of appropriation debates rather than ownership 
debates. Ownership of the objects does not define the issues at stake as much as the 
struggle for ownership does. This makes the vectors of law, as used in these cases, 
aspirational and creative, transparent to the shifting mass of power struggles and 
acquisitive instincts that might underlie property law more generally. As we think of 
the purposive and systematic creation and maintenance of the value(s) of the objects, 
we must also think of the purposive and systematic creation and maintenance 
legislation and legal argumentation that address them. The law is not “the law” in 
this area. As stated in the Introduction, it fundamentally lacks authority against this 
background. It is the mouthpiece for negotiation and resolution of the dynamic force 
of acquisition across a wide range of philosophical and social concerns.
As such, the structures or rules that are applied to determine “ownership” in 
these cases sit on top of numerous other considerations, which themselves have very 
little to do with law. The debates about the firman in the Parthenon Marbles case and 
the legislative history of NAGPRA in Kennewick Man show that the legal doctrines 
or instruments are themselves porous when dealing with cases that concern extremely 
ancient objects. In both cases, the links between the “original owner” and the present 
possessors are superlatively fragile. These links are as constructed as the objects 
themselves are, as much a matter of conjecture, speculation and politics as the objects 
themselves. Interpretation is more important than text in these cases. The question 
then becomes, “what is this interpretation meant to establish?” Ownership has other 
meanings in this context than possession of the objects themselves, and is only 
instrumental as a means of ensuring these meanings. The issues that arise as a result 
of these (preliminary) conclusions will be addressed at further length in the following 
Chapters.
221 This is the underlying approach in much o f the postcolonialist studies on cultural transmission, as 
well as, arguably, one of the premises o f Rosemary Coombe’s work, referenced above,
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Chapter Three Cultural Property Defined, and Redefined as 
Nietzschean Aphorism
A thing would be defined once all creatures had asked “what is that” and had 
answered their question.
(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power)
Chapter Three, Cultural Property Defined, and Redefined as Nietzschean 
Aphorism, discusses the definition of cultural property, and proposes a new means of 
categorizing what sorts of ancient objects might fall into this category. The values in 
the current definitions are those that inhere in the concepts of “culture” and “life”.
The argument of the Chapter is that “culture” and “life” in these definitions demands 
a particular kind of interpretation. In real terms, the task of defining cultural property 
turns on understanding what sort of interpretation these objects demand. This 
Chapter proposes that the interpretative tools that the law requires in order to define a 
piece of cultural property are found in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The 
argument is that the key to what constitutes cultural property is whether the object 
leads to self-knowledge, as this is the value that underlies both “culture” and “life”. 
Following from the emphasis on self-knowledge, the interpretation at stake must be 
an interrogation of the attachment between “knower” and ‘self-knowledge”, as well 
as being constitutive of the link between the knowing self and the object. As such, the 
interpretation that the law requires in order to define a piece of cultural property is the 
same sort of interpretation that a Nietzschean aphorism requires from its readers. 
When an object demands this sort of contemplation, it is “cultural property”.
Introduction: What is cultural property?
How is a piece of “cultural property” distinguished from other sorts of 
valuable historical or artistic material? This question underlies many of the disputes 
regarding the ownership of cultural property, and is indeed a threshold question that
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often contributes to delays in addressing the substantive proprietary issues.222 At 
present, conflicts are engendered by confusion regarding whether a particular object 
is “cultural property” or not; on a more general level, and in the climate of increasing 
protection for cultural artifacts, the concept of what may be “cultural property” is
• 9 9 1itself in flux. As the field expands, practitioners and academics experience 
increasing difficulty because of the confusion in this area.
This Chapter proposes an underlying organizing schema that may aid in 
identifying the class of objects that make up cultural property. Rather than proposing 
further or expanded description of objects to be listed in the definitions sections of the 
major Conventions and Treaties addressing cultural property, the approach taken here 
is to look at the values224 that these definitions embody, in order to understand the 
difference between “cultural property” and the art works, artifacts, and practices that
9 ^ c
are not protected by these legal instruments. Through this method of analysis, it 
becomes clear that the definitions of cultural property turn on the valorization and 
preservation of life, all sorts of life and all sorts of evidence of life. Therefore, the 
first step of the analysis is to examine the values implicit in the cross-definitions of 
“culture” and “life”.
222 The definition o f “cultural property” determines not only which objects are protected by the 
conventions and treaties that regulate this field, but also who is affected by the prohibitions on 
acquisition, sale, or transport of these objects. The definition is often too broad to be useful. Pierre 
Valentin, “The UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return o f Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects”, 4(2) Art, Antiquity and Law 107 (1999).
223 Marilyn Strathem, Property, Substance and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons and Things 
(London and New Brunswick: The Athlone Press, 1999); Coombe, “The Properties o f Culture”, in Ziff 
and Rao, Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation', Cathryn A. Berryman, “Toward More 
Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property”, 1 Journal o f Intellectual Property Law 293 
(1994).
224 The attempt to derive such values in the realm of cultural property is all the more important in an 
ever-expanding field o f legislation, research and case law, especially to the extent that it is openly 
acknowledged that cultural property disputes often involve cross-cultural claims that cannot be 
addressed solely by reference to values that have traditionally been embedded within the legal 
commentaries on property. See Harding, “Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage”, p. 291.
225 Valuable objects that are not “cultural property” may be protected by other kinds o f legislation, that 
is, statutes or Conventions regulating the art market, museums or collections. For example, see Patrick 
O’Keefe, “Incidental Collections: Protection against Dispersal”, 3 Art, Antiquity and Law 165 (1998).
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When “culture” and “life” are read against each other in this realm, it becomes 
clear that the core of any definition of these objects is that they attract and require a 
particular kind of interpretation. Therefore, the task of defining cultural property 
turns on understanding what sort of “interpretation” these objects demand. This 
Chapter proposes that the interpretative tools that the law requires in order to define a 
piece of cultural property are found in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche,226 as his 
work is meant to provide insight into the values of values. When one considers the 
definitions of cultural property through this lens, it becomes clear that the key to what 
constitutes cultural property is whether the object leads to self-knowledge, as this is 
the value that underlies both “culture” and “life”. Following from the emphasis on 
self-knowledge, the “interpretation” at stake must be an interrogation o f the 
attachment between “knower” and “self-knowledge”, and is constitutive o f  the 
(claimed) link between the knowing self and the (desired) object.227 As such, the 
interpretation that the law requires in order to define a piece of cultural property is the 
same sort of interpretation that a Nietzschean aphorism requires from its readers.
There are two reasons that the Nietzschean aphorism provides both the model 
for definitions of cultural property, and the means for their interpretation. First, 
definitions of cultural property are necessarily compact yet essentially vacant 
structures,228 and as such, the definition of cultural property and the Nietzschean 
aphorism both constitute the same kind of discursive field and (arguably) share the 
same purpose. Second, the aphorism is the essential mechanism for the transfer of 
knowledge in Nietzsche’s philosophy. To some extent, the object itself shares in the 
aphoristic nature of the definition. It too is incomplete, requiring interpretation, and a
226 Keith Ansell-Pearson ed, On the Genealogy o f Morality by Friedrich Nietzsche (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) (Translated by Carol Diethe), p. 3.
227 In this realm, an argument that the attachments at stake are those between the self and knowledge of 
the self raises questions o f the “cultural se lf’, or of “possessive nationalism”, in which the links 
between theories of ownership and theories o f human nature are understood as constitutive o f legal 
definitions of cultural property. These questions have been extensively addressed in the work of 
Handler "Who Owns the Past?" in Williams, ed., The Politics o f Culture, as well as in Coombe, “The 
Properties of Culture” in Ziff and Rao, Borrowed Power: Essays on Cultural Appropriation, and in 
the other articles in these collections.
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carrier of the (possibly false) promise of (self-)knowledge. One could imagine that 
the object is a hard line around a space larger than itself. Thinking about the problem 
of definition(s), one could consider whether the object is the aphorism, and the 
definition is merely its interpretation. Or one could consider whether the reverse is 
also true: the definition is an aphorism, and the object is its interpretation. Although 
this analysis attempts to avoid the slippage between definition and thing, it does not 
always succeed. The concept of the aphorism pulls definition and object both within 
its ambit, as to define “cultural property” and to interpret one of Nietzsche’s 
aphorisms is the same task, requiring the same tools, and being mindful of the same 
landscape. The object itself does not escape.
More generally, a Nietzschean perspective is particularly important as the 
legal instruments may embody an essential if invisible internal contradiction. 
Preservation, which is the purpose of these statutes or Conventions, and “life”, may 
be opposed concepts. The final part of the analysis looks at the effect on culture of 
preserving the “life” that cultural property valorizes. If the values that inhere in legal 
definitions of cultural property are encoded as various formulations of the normative 
and epistemic tripling of life-preservation-loss, then the question becomes whether 
the result of the present definitions of cultural property is to valorize a necropolis of 
culture, a landscape in which “life” is reified without being understood, rather than 
the “life” that animates the ongoing, positive transmission of knowledge that is 
“culture”. A Nietzschean approach to this triad allows for consideration of the 
consequences of finding “cultural property” wherever this triad is visible.
Definitions
Cultural property cannot be defined purely by description. An object that is 
“cultural property” and one that is not may be exactly alike in all particulars of 
workmanship, materials, and provenance. In the foundational twentieth-century
228 As argued below, “cultural property” consists of objects that must be understood as fundamentally 
incomplete or there is no space in the definition or description for the element o f “culturally valuable”. 
That element is imported into the definition or object by each interpreter of the text.
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pieces of cultural property legislation, the 1954 Convention for the Protection of 
Cultural Property (The Hague Convention), and the 1970 UNESCO Convention,229 
cultural property is defined in a straightforward manner. For example, The Hague 
Convention, Article 1, defines cultural property as objects, buildings containing 
objects, and collections of buildings containing objects. However, it does not define 
the heart of the definition: “great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people”.230 Obviously, it is the value of the object in this sense rather than in any 
other that brings it within the ambit of the legislation. Yet the fundamental question 
of what this value consists of is not stated. Rather, that piece of legislation, and more 
recent attempts to define cultural property, assume a common understanding of what 
is valuable. This assumption leaves a problematic231 and inevitable lacuna in the 
middle of any of these definitions. A definition of cultural property cannot escape 
both asking and embodying the answer to the question “why is this thing valuable to 
the cultural heritage of any people, or to ‘all mankind’?”232
In the past fifty years, more recent Conventions and Treaties radically expand 
the definition of cultural property, both as a result of the increased interest in 
“heritage” of all kinds, and partly as an attempt to address this question.233 Within
229 The 1954 Convention for the Protection o f Cultural Property (The Hague Convention); The 1970 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property.
230 “(a) moveable or immoveable property o f great importance to the cultural heritage o f every 
people.. .(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the moveable cultural 
property defined in sub-paragraph (a)... (c) centres containing a large amount o f cultural property as 
defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b)...” (The Hague Convention 1954, Article 1).
231 The difficulty in defining what makes the objects valuable persists, and has serious effects on all 
parties involved with the preservation, identification, sale or movement o f these sorts of artifacts. For 
example, writing about the scope of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of 
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, Pierre Valentin writes: “The definition of cultural object 
is critical because it will determine the scope of the Convention... .The most important implication 
of...such a broad description of “cultural objects” is probably that the Convention will not just affect 
important collectors o f museums who have access to a pool of knowledge when acquiring important 
and/or expensive objects, but it will also affect the general public”. Valentin, “The UNIDROIT 
Convention”, pp. 107-8.
232 Cultural property legislation defines the “owners” of the cultural property either as a specific 
national, indigenous, or cultural group, or “all mankind”.
233 “Cultural property” includes new classes of things almost daily, and new legislation, new museums, 
and new disputes arise constantly. Against this background, any definition of cultural property would 
have to include ‘heritage’, ‘intellectual property’ and intellectual history components. The progression 
towards an increasingly complicated set of definitions is particularly visible within the area o f
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both national and international legislative frameworks, the definitions of cultural 
property become increasingly specific, and as a result longer and more 
complicated.234 For example, paragraph (1) of the European Convention on Offences 
Relating to Cultural Property lists products of archaeological exploration and 
excavation, documents, works of fine and decorative art, tools, archaeological 
artifacts, musical instruments and rare manuscripts 235 In paragraph (2), the European 
Convention goes on to list what may be considered more “modem” cultural property, 
including “property relating to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists and 
artists”,236 property relating to history,237 property relating to events of national
9 ->o
importance, and “rare collections and specimens” of fauna, flora, minerals, 
anatomy, property of paleontological, anthropological, ethnological, philatelic and
239numismatic mterest.
Cultural property definitions have moved from the “objects -  buildings for 
objects -  concentrations of buildings for objects” scheme used in 1954, to lists of 
sources of information regarding human knowledge and culture very broadly.240 For
international (UNESCO and European Union) legislation, although the problem spans all attempts to 
define what constitutes cultural property. “It would be useful if  there were a generally accepted 
definition o f... ‘cultural property’. . . .Unfortunately this is not the case:.. .each Convention or 
Recommendation has a definition drafted for the purposes of that instrument alone; it may not.. .be 
possible to achieve a general definition suitable for use in a variety o f contexts”. Lyndell V. Prott and 
P.J. O’Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage (Abingdon: Professional Books Ltd., 1984), Ch. 1, “The 
Need for Protection”, p. 8.
234 For example, the definitions of what is covered by the UNESCO Convention for the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage; the 1995 UNIDROITConvention on Stolen or Illegally 
Exported Cultural Objects; The Protection of Moveable Cultural Property; the European Union 
Directive on the Return of Cultural Objects; the European Union Regulation on the Export o f Cultural 
Goods (Council Regulation No. 3911/92); the European Convention on Offenses Relating to Cultural 
Property (23 June 1985); Recommendation Concerning the International Exchange of Cultural 
Property; etc. There are initiatives in Russia, Asia, India, Australia, and throughout North and South 
America as well.
235 In the case of the decorative arts, tools, archaeological artifacts, and musical instruments, the 
objects have to be more than one hundred years old to qualify for protection. European Convention on 
Offences Relating to Cultural Property (1985), Appendix II, 1(g).
236 Ibid. Appendix II, 2(f).
237 Ibid. Appendix II, 2(e)
238 Ibid. Appendix II, 2(g)
239 Ibid. Appendix II, 2(h)-(p).
240 This is not true only o f the European Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural Property (1985), 
although it can be seen very clearly in this particular Convention: “(q) all remains and objects, or any 
other traces of human existence, which bear witness to epochs and civilizations for which excavations 
or discoveries are the main source or one o f the main sources o f scientific information;... (s)
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example, “traces of human existence” which are not human remains (including DNA, 
etc.) or artifacts -  in short, which are not necessarily tangible -  must now be 
represented within cultural property law. Anthropological and commercial 
understandings of how objects are constituted and valued are emerging to make the 
claim that certain culturally-specific intangibles may be (or become) cultural 
property.241 Folklore or ritual practices are also defined as “cultural property”.242 In 
keeping with this trend, cultural property need not be a tangible “thing”. This 
heightens the problems of developing adequate definitions. The fluidity and 
(increasing) intangibility of these “objects” not only exposes the breadth of the law’s 
-  and the culture’s -  power to define, but also exploits the lacunae and interstices 
within any/all of the already-existing definitions and makes the project of defining 
“cultural property” more difficult.
How then to come up with a definition for “cultural value” that can both root 
the object solidly within culture, and remain flexible enough to make room for ever- 
novel classes of “things”? Looking at what is common to definitions of cultural 
property, it is clear that each definition retains a space o f orfor the value that makes 
one object cultural property and another merely a beautiful or historically-significant 
artifact or piece o f art. This must be taken seriously. It cannot be mere oversight 
that retains a silence among all the words; rather, it is this gap that the following 
analysis attempts to show ineluctably defines an object as “cultural property” rather 
than mere “art object” or “archaeological artifact”. This Chapter argues that in any 
description of cultural property there is necessarily a missing component, and the 
definition of cultural property is necessarily bound up with the space of this missing 
piece.
archaeological and historic or scientific sites o f importance, structures or other features of important 
historic, scientific, artistic or architectural value, whether religious or secular, including groups of 
traditional structures, historic quarters in urban or rural built-up areas and the ethnological structures of 
previous cultures still existent in valid form”.
241 See supra, the second footnote in the present Chapter, for a list o f the relevent publications.
242 Cathryn A. Berryman, as above; see also Christine Haight Farley, “Protecting Folklore of 
Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property The Answer?” 30 Connecticut Law Review 1 (1997); 
David R. Downes, “How Intellectual Property Could Be A Tool To Protect Traditional Knowledge”,
25 Columbia Journal o f Environmental Law 253 (2000); Srividhya Ragavan, “Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge”, 2 Minnesota Intellectual Property Review 1 (2001).
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Also common to these definitions is that the value of the property is a result of 
the knowledge that these kinds of objects may provide. Human knowledge and the 
objects are somehow equated with each other. The legislation protects objects that 
have the “cultural value” of assisting (or in some cases, guaranteeing) knowledge. In 
general, in cultural property
[i]f “culture” consists “of learned modes of behaviour and its material 
manifestations, socially transmitted from one generation to the next and from 
one society or individual to another.. .then the cultural heritage consists of as 
much of those activities and the objects which give us evidence of them as we 
can perceive.243
This of course opens a great many questions. The two most important are the 
question of what the object of this knowledge is, and the relationship between culture 
and knowledge.
“Life”
To address the first question, the knowledge that the Conventions protect is 
knowledge about life: the definitions represent each and every aspect of life, familiar 
and unfamiliar. Life is what is important, in all its aspects: signs of life, early life, 
modem life, political life, human life, animal life -  any indicia, elements, cast-offs, or 
environments in or through which life is available for study. This lack of 
discrimination, or possibly, this impossibility of discrimination, between the various 
forms, functions, and meanings of life, displays a central problematic of modernity.244 
How to assess the value or the meaning of (the objects in) these definitions?
243 Cf. Prott and O’Keefe, Law and the Cultural Heritage, p. 7.
244 For example, Giorgio Agamben writes: “Almost twenty years before The History o f Sexuality, 
Hannah Arendt had already analyzed the process that brings homo laborans -  and, with it, biological 
life as such -  gradually to occupy the very center of the political scene of modernity”. Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
p. 3. (Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen)
81
Giorgio Agamben245 writes that the “idea of life”246 is ungovemed in 
modernity. The lack of discrimination in definitions of cultural property may show 
these definitions to be one of the dimensions in which
there will be little sense in distinguishing between organic life and animal life 
or even between biological life and contemplative life and between bare life 
and the life of the mind.247
The problem with contemplating “bare life”, or life qua life, unmediated by 
knowledge of anything other than itself, is that thought requires an external correlate 
in order to avoid freeing “itself of all cognition and intentionality”. 248 For Agamben, 
the task then is to think the necessary correlate. There must be a system of thought 
that stands outside of “life” and yet which does not fall into the trap of metaphysics. 
Without such a conceptual or philosophical system, knowledge -  about life or 
anything else -  is meaningless.
In cultural property analysis, the reference for the study of “life” is “culture”, 
while “culture” requires the evidence and artifacts of “life”. The danger is that this 
system leads to a meaningless proliferation of artifacts. If culture cannot stand 
outside life, then Agamben’s concern also applies to the aim of much cultural 
property legislation: why bother to collect this sort of knowledge, as “[w]hat is the 
nature of a knowledge that has as its correlate no longer the opening to a world and to 
truth, but only life and its errancy?”249 In order to consider whether the knowledge 
being sought has an external correlate, the analysis turns to the second question asked 
above. What is the relationship between “culture” and “knowledge”?
245 Agamben’s work cannot be addressed here on its own terms, as it is too vast for the argument made 
in this Chapter. However, the correspondance between “bare life” and the (possibly uncritical) 
valorization of the “life” protected by cultural property legislation is remarkable, and serves to confirm 
that the issues raised in cultural property theory (legal and otherwise) are firmly rooted in the 
problematics of knowledge and reason in modernity more generally.
246 Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), p. 220. (Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen)
247 Ibid. p. 239.
248 Idem
249 Ibid. p. 221.
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Culture/knowledge
The emphasis on knowledge is intimately connected with the definition of 
“culture” in modernity. “Culture” has many meanings, particularly in attempts to 
define “cultural property”. However, a very common definition of “culture” is the 
intended transmission and reception of knowledge. As such, culture is fundamentally 
a relational concept. It inhabits (and defines) interstitial space. Thus in this realm, 
culture is the medium for the transmission of knowledge between people, between 
institutions, between people and institutions, between objects and viewers, between 
knowledge itself and its interpreters. For the purposes of this Chapter, the last pairing 
is the most important. The (space of) culture can be understood (at least in part) as 
the (space defined by the) relationship between “knowledge” and “the self’ as 
knower. The significance of these cross-definitions is to suggest that the space 
opened by the notion of cultural property -  the nexus of culture and property250 -  is a 
space mediated through the self and self-knowledge.
Arguably, at the center of the complex of the will to self/knowledge that 
informs cultural property analysis is the problem that Friedrich Nietzsche places at 
the beginning of On the Genealogy o f Morality:
We are unknown to ourselves, we knowers, we ourselves, to ourselves, and 
there is a good reason for this. ..[0\ur treasure is where the hives of our 
knowledge are. As bom winged-insects and intellectual honey-gatherers we 
are constantly making for them, concerned at heart with only one thing -  to 
“bring something home”. As far as the rest of life is concerned, the so-called 
“experiences”, -  who of us ever has enough seriousness for them? or enough 
time? ... We remain strange to ourselves out of necessity, we do not 
understand ourselves, we must confusedly mistake who we are, the motto
250 The topography of the space of culture/knowledge in cultural property discourse includes an 
essentially propertized or commodified notion of knowledge as a transmissible good within it. 
Although this is not the main thrust o f this Chapter, it is worth emphasizing that “knowledge” is 
“property” within culture. “Knowledge” is also “culture” within property.
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“everyone is furthest from himself’ applies to us for ever, -- we are not 
“knowers” when it comes to ourselves.. .251
Nietzsche argues that modem human nature is to set out to know everything, 
and in particular ourselves. However, the ground(s), the very endeavour, of our 
knowing is flawed. Instead of deriving self-knowledge through experiencing our 
own, individual lives, the space of knowledge is extra-life. Yet this does not mean 
that this space (which is culture, in the present argument) can function as a true 
source for meaningful knowledge about “life”. The “hive” consists of and contains 
the ascetic disciplines, as well as the objects of those disciplines. Although the 
products of asceticism are what we (erroneously) look to when we seek to know 
ourselves, the “hive” is where both the inside and the outside worlds are transformed, 
via “knowledge”, into “honey” for what is inevitably our not-self-knowing. 
Nietzsche’s point mirrors Agamben’s: the rationalistic pursuit of knowledge will not 
lead to understanding “life” any more than the pursuit of “life” can be depended upon 
to generate knowledge.
The question is then, “why not”? Discussing Nietzsche’s [link] between 
human experiences and the transmission of culture, Pierre Klossowski writes that:
Culture (the sum total of knowledge) -  that is, the intention to teach and learn 
-  is the obverse of the soul’s tonality, its intensity, which can be neither taught 
nor leamt. The more culture accumulates, however, the more it becomes 
enslaved to itself -  and the more its obverse, the mute intensity 9f  the tonality
9 S9of the soul, grows.
Culture and “the soul’s tonality” are experientially opposed to each other in 
human life. Entering into the culture/knowledge system has the effect of silencing the 
expression of “the so-called ‘experiences’” which in fact define each human life. In 
this space, the knowledge that is created and privileged by culture -  by transmission
251 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality, p. 3.
252 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle (London: The Athlone Press, 1997) p. xix.
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and intentionality -  is negatively linked to what gives it meaning. Both the 
transmissive, acquisitive act of culture, and the accumulation that results, are part of a 
vicious circle of sorts, through which the “work” of culture and the “intensity” of the 
soul become increasingly separate.
In this construction, embedded in this notion of culture, is a conflict with the 
knowing self. What begins as an act of expression (or engagement with the world) 
becomes an experience of muteness (or distance). The intentionality that permeates 
“culture” results, however unintentionally, in silence. There is resistance to the 
experience of thought,253 as there is a separation between thought and (true) 
experience. The knowledge that arises, therefore, is specious or damaging. “Culture” 
is the transmission of this kind of damaging knowledge. The human (or “life”) 
experience that does not find expression in the culture/knowledge system is silenced, 
even as it gives rise to the intention to transmit knowledge (and thus to the activities 
and “goods” that define this system). Culture implicates knowledge and the self in 
conflicting sources and degrees of intensity.
This problematic link between culture/knowledge and self/knowledge, and the 
inversion of the direction of intentionality in this field (from looking outwards to 
looking inwards) sheds light on the field of cultural property. When thinking about 
how cultural property is defined, or even when thinking about the objects themselves, 
the same complex is visible. “Cultural property” consists of objects and practices or 
traditions that seem to guarantee or underwrite some profound knowledge of (human) 
history and experience. In cultural property disputes, the relationship with the pieces 
of cultural property is invested with the “intensity” that Klossowski finds in (the 
Nietzschean definition of) “culture”. The experience of this intensity, or what 
Klossowski would call the “tonality” or “mood” of the parties, generates perceptions
253 In Klossowski’s description of Nietzsche’s analysis o f knowledge/culture, he is clear that 
Nietzsche’s thought is partially an experience of delirium. This must be acknowledged as informing 
not only his life but, substantively, his work. The concept of the “resistance” to thought exists against 
this background.
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of reality that often exceed rational understandings of time and selfhood.254 Similarly, 
the claims made for/about ownership of the ancient object at issue telescope ideas of 
eternal identity and vast spans of time into present, human existence.255 The result is 
that “culture” is read through “property” -  things or non-things -  to derive an (often 
or necessarily) irrational “knowledge” of the self.
The objects or practices themselves embody this conflict. As expressions of 
the struggle for self-knowledge in an environment that is (paradoxically) hostile to 
expression, they can be defined by looking to the fault-lines they embody. Arguably, 
cultural property analysis depends upon preserving knowledge itself, via preserving 
“things” (tangible or intangible) that are only valuable insofar as they provide 
foundations for knowing the roots of the (cultural) self. From this perspective, 
cultural property is a term that can include almost any sort of thing, including things 
not-yet-known or not-yet-recognized as culturally valuable, and most commentators 
agree that legislation protecting cultural property recognizes this essential fluidity. 
Thus, these definitions turn on a space or gap -  something indescribable or 
indefinable -  and the value of, or protection of human knowledge.
However, the knowledge that is derived via the route of acquiring or studying 
cultural property will never be enough to satisfy its “seekers”. Fundamentally, it 
cannot meet the intensity or ‘‘truth” of the experience that is generated by, or packed 
into, the object or practice. No object can serve as the external point of “truth” that 
must exist in order to anchor the culture/knowledge complex, as no object can 
entirely stand outside of this complex and thus guarantee its accuracy.
Simultaneously, there is an error in the methodology, the ascetic ”bring[ing] 
something home” that Nietzsche discusses. The object/practice at issue cannot 
contain the knowledge sought; it is the space and the direction of the (desired) 
knowing that the cultural property opens up and represents that must be liberated in
254 Cf. Klossowski generally, Ch. 3: “The Experience o f the Eternal Return” in Nietzsche and the 
Vicious Circle.
255 For example, the claims of a modem people to an ancient artifact require establishing continuities of 
identity with the original owners/makers of that artifact.
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order to understand cultural property disputes.256 The para-rational investment in the 
object must be reconciled, within the language of the definition of cultural property, 
with the imperative of modem culture.257
If one looks at the problematics at the core of cultural property (definitions 
and objects) in this manner, it becomes clear that the essential element of anything 
that may be defined as “cultural property” is that it must act as some sort of truth- 
claim or guarantee regarding the origin, existence, or meaning of the knowledge that 
underlies culture. The core of all cultural property (definitions and objects) is the 
valorization and fulfillment of this particular function. Therefore, the interpretation 
that is used to equate object and function is also at the core of all cultural property 
analysis. What sort of interpretation is required?
Aphorisms and interpretations
The link between self and knowledge, or the central figure in the construct of 
self/knowledge, is the piece of cultural property. As such, it must function as an 
aphorism, and furthermore, given the value of “culture” embedded within the concept 
of “cultural property”, it must function as a Nietzschean aphorism. The object of 
cultural property, the definitions of cultural property, and the Nietzschean aphorism 
merge here. As aphorism, the cultural property functions as a puzzle, creating as well 
as accessing a/the place of interpretation, which is an interpretation in itself. The 
interpretive requirements for correctly “decoding” a piece of cultural property and a 
Nietzschean aphorism are the same, and implicate the same themes: the externality 
(asceticism) of “truth” and the aggression of “wisdom”.
256 Certainly, knowledge about “the past” or “history” cannot ever be guaranteed as accurate. The idea 
of conflating artifact and meaning, or object and knowledge, erases, in this context, the necessary act 
of interpretation, and instead attempts to give the impression that the object is somehow enough on its 
own.
257 This imperative is to generalize thought, to create abstract (and selfless) teaching and learning about 
knowledge. As the cultural imperative follows Nietzsche’s ascetic ideal, the discussion o f the split 
between culture/knowledge/self is best understood with reference to the Third Essay in Nietzsche, On 
the Genealogy o f Morality.
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At first impression, aphorisms may appear as wholly irrelevant to cultural 
property. Each definition of cultural property is so riddled with gaps and with 
allusions to past and future, that both the field and the objects within it cannot be 
defined “once and for all”. In contrast, “an aphorism.. .is, an expression or saying 
which absolutely closes its borders to everything inessential and admits only what is
? SRessential”. Unlike definitions of cultural property, aphorisms are essentially 
concise: “(1) A ‘definition’ or concise statement of a principle in any science.... (2) 
Any principle or precept expressed in few words; a short pithy sentence containing a 
truth of general import; a maxim”.
Given the situation of inherent indeterminacy and flux in definitions of 
cultural property, it may seem strange to suggest that the form of interpretation 
required by Nietzschean aphorisms is the same as that embodied in definitions of 
cultural property.
Looking more closely, however, “aphorism” comes from the Ancient Greek, 
aphorismos, where it meant, primarily, to mark off by boundaries rather than to 
categorically define.260 Aphorisms operate to demarcate space. In this sense, 
aphorisms are (very like) cultural property. As already discussed, a piece of cultural 
property is marked off from other things of equal age or origin; it is also a 
relationship, narrative, or practice marked off from other relationships, narratives or 
practices. In the didactic realms (teaching, memory, rhetoric), aphorisms represent 
locations of information. This dual nature (both boundaries and spaces) means that
258 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche (Sydney: HarperCollins Australia, 1990), p. 11. (Vols.I and II) 
(Translated by David Farrell Krell)
259 The Oxford English Dictionary, 1989.
260 Aphorism is the combination of the prefix “op-” (softened into “a p h through its placement) and 
the root “orzzo”, the same root as in “orizontas”, or horizon. Thus “aphorizo " means to mark off by 
boundaries, and uousia aphorismeni" means property marked off by boundary pillars. In this sense, 
aphorizo means either to mark off for oneself or to border on. The second and third meanings are to 
determine or define, as in “chronos aphorismenos ", a determinate time; or to separate, distinguish, or 
exclude, as in “episteme aphorismenF. It also means to bring to an end or to finish, to grant as a 
special gift. Finally, it means to banish. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon (1940). In modem 
Greek (Greek-English Dictionary, Kyriakides, 1909), aphorismos, -ou, means excommunication 
primarily, but also an aphorism or maxim. The use of aphorisms originated with Hippocrates, who 
used them as mnemonic devices to transmit medical information to his students.
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they both create and serve as access to the realm(s) that they demarcate. Again, 
cultural property also serves these functions.
There are two “psychologies” for aphorisms that have relevance to cultural 
property analysis. First, as metaphors, they embody a particular rhetorical space, in 
which the subject and the object of knowledge merge.
The psychology of the metaphorical address... is that the audience will itself 
supply the connection withheld by the metaphor, so that the rhetorician opens 
a kind of gap with intention that the logical energies of his audience will arc it, 
with the consequence that having participated in the progression of the 
argument, that audience convinces itself.261
The entry into the realm of the object is one of the desired effects of cultural 
property discourse, and thus one of the reasons that cultural property legislation 
exists.262 The gap at the center of definitions of cultural property may well serve as a 
locus for the willful appropriation of objects and the knowledge that underwrites their 
value.
Second, both objects and definitions delimit the realm of knowledge to do 
with information about humanity that might otherwise be lost. Therefore, cultural 
property seeks to ensure memory, another function of the Nietzschean aphorism:
261 Arthur C. Danto, “Some Remarks on the Genealogy o f Morals”, in Richard Schacht ed., Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, Morality. Essays on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: 
University of California Press, 1994), pp. 35-48, p. 38.
262 Within the context of cultural property law and disputes, this nexus of life and knowledge provides 
an explanation for the root of the disagreement, encoded within different pieces o f legislation, about 
whether cultural nationalism or cultural internationalism should be the guiding approach to the 
allotment o f cultural property. Knowledge o f “life” continues to be the “object” o f cultural property 
instruments, but it is knowledge already possessed rather than knowledge which is missing or lost that 
is at issue. In cultural nationalism, the underlying relationship to (the value of) knowledge is one of 
having rather than needing. All that is needed is the object that expresses the knowledge. In cultural 
internationalism, the object underwrites knowledge that might otherwise be “lost” or withheld, 
knowledge that is directly relevant to the past/future of “all mankind” or to human beings in an 
evolutionary sense. For example, The Hague Convention takes the position that cultural property 
belongs to “all mankind”, whereas the 1970 UNESCO Convention instead validates specific national 
claims to cultural property. The conflict between general and specific owners has been extensively 
addressed in the commentaries on ownership in this realm, cf. John Henry Merryman, “The Public 
Interest in Cultural Property”, 77 California Law Review 339 (1989).
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There is another but comparable psychology for the aphorism, namely that 
once heard it is unlikely to pass from recollection, so its pointed terseness is a 
means to ensoul the message it carries, and to counteract the predictable 
deteriorations of memory.263 
The constitution of the definition may thus serve as both the constitution of the self- 
knowledge that it seeks to appropriate, and the guarantee of this knowledge. Entering 
into the world of the object, and appropriating that world as an act of memory, is 
perfectly possible (indeed unavoidable) within the aphoristic form.
Therefore, upon further reflection, the gaps and allusions discussed above, the 
pitted surface of the definition (and often of the object) may themselves be the 
essential demarcation of boundaries. If that which marks an object or practice as a 
piece of cultural property is a space, an inadequacy in rational description, then the 
inadequacy of the definition may be “proof’ of the relevance of the aphoristic form. 
Moreover, if within the space of cultural property one finds the topography of the will 
to self/knowledge, than the similarity or usefulness of the Nietzschean aphorism 
becomes even more striking. The meaning of any aphorism requires interpretation, 
and central to the interpretation is a relationship of radical discontinuity between 
outside and inside, culture and self, knowledge and its transmission 264 This form of 
interpretation requires unearthing and/or contributing the long narrative sentences that 
underlie the brief fragments of definitions and objects both. The surface of the piece 
is a lure rather than an answer to the question that it sets. The object presents 
putative or assumed linkages between origin, truth, and wisdom, which are then 
decoded or interpreted by the vast army of commentators, lawyers, and scholars that 
address it.
263 Danto, “Some Remarks on the Genealogy o f Morals”, p. 38.
264 “[The] high Nietzschean tonalities found their immediate expression in the aphoristic form: even 
there, the recourse to the code of everyday signs is presented as an exercise in continually maintaining 
oneself in a discontinuity with respect to everyday continuity”. Klossowski, “The Experience o f the 
Eternal Return” in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 65
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Interpretations and battles: truth and wisdom
What then is truth? ...A mobile army o f metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms, a sum, in short, o f human relationships which, 
rhetorically and poetically intensified, ornamented and transfigured, come to 
be thought of, after long usage by a people, as fixed, binding, and 
canonical}65
(Friedrich Nietzsche)
Objects that are “cultural property” must serve as guarantees for culture, and 
the relationship with culture/knowledge, that the legislative documents encode. As 
such, they must stand outside the life/culture/knowledge complex if they are to 
succeed. The first question is, therefore, how, if at all, can these objects be made to 
function as a source of non-relativistic “truth”? The second question is, what possible 
relationship can there be between the object/definition and the interpreter (the judge, 
lawyer, curator, etc.) such as to guarantee the production of this “truth”.
The truth-claims made in a Nietzschean aphorism -  and in this aphorism in 
particular -  are similar to the truth-claims made by/in a piece of cultural property. 
Truth is “.. .traditionally associated with the adequation of a proposition and a 
thing”. Although lawyers or legislators are not philosophers, the substance of 
cultural property definitions requires them to make assessments of truth-claims in this 
essentially conflictual realm. To base legal categorization of a thing on claims 
made about the truth that it embodies is to contemplate the possible 
correspondences between (the value of) knowledge and (the value of) things. The
265 Nietzsche, quoted in “Genealogies and Subversions” by Alasdair MacIntyre, in Richard Schacht 
ed., Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morality, (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 284-305.
266 Marc Shell (1993), Money, Language, and Thought, Ch. 6 “What Is Truth? Lessing’s Numismatics 
and Heidegger’s Alchemy”, p. 156 (paraphrasing Heidegger).
267 Cultural property instruments arose out of experiences of conflict. War, loss, and theft gave rise to 
the imperative to preserve certain kinds o f things. Yet, as the classes of things to be preserved have 
multiplied, the protective imperative has become generalized to a point where the question arises 
regarding the nature of the danger. At stake seems to be not just physical damage and appropriation, 
but intellectual/cultural damage and appropriation as well.
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value of the object is that it guarantees connection and correspondence with a world 
outside “bare life” or mere proliferation; thus, it provides true knowledge of what 
“we” (human beings or a specific people) are. In this sense, the object itself opens -  
or embodies -  the space of this “truth”.
This space is fundamentally contested. To engage with the law regarding 
cultural property means entering modernity, a realm of forces and strategies that 
center on the acquisition and deployment of the power to know. In order to make this 
argument, and to address the issues that arise, the following analysis relies heavily, if 
not exclusively, on Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of the aphorism above.269 
MacIntyre assesses the truth claims made in this aphorism qua “truth” from a 
methodological perspective. As such, his analysis is very important to the question of 
interpretation raised here. Can aphorisms (and their cognates in this Chapter: objects 
of cultural property and the definitions in cultural property instruments) be interpreted 
so as to guarantee the “truth” that they are being used to represent? MacIntyre’s 
analysis of the claims made by Nietzsche in this aphorism is both an exposition of the 
techniques by which aphorisms can be interpreted, and a substantive examination of 
the “battlefield” on which the “army” fights. The battlefield, says MacIntyre, is that 
of reason. Discussing the nature of the battle and the various positions and strategies 
that may be assumed within it, MacIntyre asks whether, to enter this battle, one has to 
be an encyclopedist or a genealogist? Has Nietzsche evaded the position of the 
nineteenth-century disseminator of knowledge, the “encyclopedist’Tlecturer by 
becoming a genealogist? Is there an object to be known, or does the act of speaking 
knowledge constitute the object and the knower both in a field of (ongoing) conflict?
268 One could say that the truth that a piece of cultural property presents is that o f its origin or of its 
history, but in cultural property law, the emphasis on life means that the claims center on the truth of 
its being as truth.
269 Although MacIntyre is not primarily a Nietzsche scholar, his subject in this essay is also a 
meditation on Nietzsche’s claims regarding truth and (the transmission of) knowledge.
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The question appears, on the surface, to be one of authority, complicated by 
the modem confusion as to genre.270 Can Nietzsche speak about the truth from a valid 
position of authority?271 Nietzsche scholars have extensively theorized the problem 
of interpretation as regards Nietzsche’s truth-claims and the link between the will to 
power and knowledge.272 Certainly, in the contemporary university, neither the 
dissemination nor the reception of knowledge can guarantee “truth”. Indeed, culture 
in modernity (as defined above) must be understood as conflict:
in our situation of radical disagreements a lecture can only be an episode in a 
narrative of conflicts; sometimes it may be a moment of truce or negotiation 
between contending parties, or even a report from the sidelines by a 
necessarily less than innocent bystander, but nonetheless it is always a 
moment of engagement in conflict.273
Given this landscape, can there be any guarantee or evidence of “truth” that 
can serve as the foundation for culture/knowledge?
The importance of this aphorism depends upon the cross-definition or cross- 
reliance of its “truth” and of its “aphoristic nature”. If untrue, it fails as an aphorism, 
and vice-versa. Does this aphorism merely serve as a shifting of the ground for the
270 Tracing the genre of the lecture from the Middle Ages, MacIntyre points out that the medieval 
lecture took the texts as authoritative, rather than the speaker. Truth and rationality were independent 
of each other, and could be cross-referenced for validity. In the late nineteenth century, truth and 
rationality -  lecture and lecturer -  folded into each other. The authority was vested in both, acting as 
one. The lecturer vouched for the truth of the lecture. It is this structure that Nietzsche’s aphorism 
was meant to address. The question remains regarding whether Nietzsche escapes the position of 
authority that he sought to discredit. Although Nietzsche’s aphorism is both a harbinger and a 
definition of the genealogy of knowledge in modernity, the question that Nietzsche scholars ask is 
whether Nietzsche necessarily took on the authority of the nineteenth-century lecturer to make this 
statement, and if  so, what effect that position would (or does) have on the substantive claim being 
made. This question cannot be addressed in this Chapter, but it is important to note that Nietzsche’s 
position (both inside and outside the culture/knowledge system) is an expression of a relationship to 
the culture/knowledge complex that many “experts” must necessarily share.
271 See MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions” pp. 287-9 for MacIntyre’s summary o f the ongoing 
debate regarding the philosophical validity o f Nietzsche’s truth-claims.
272 In whole, this is an enormous field, and is too big a topic to be included per se in this Chapter. 
Please see: Wemer Hamacher, “The Promise o f Interpretation: Reflections on the Hermeneutical 
Imperative in Kant and Nietzsche”, in Laurence A. Rickels ed., Looking After Nietzsche (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1990).
273 MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 285.
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transmission of knowledge, or does it succeed in giving a solid definition of truth?
The statement that Nietzsche makes about the truth -  that there is no truth “as such”, 
thus that all truth is perspectival -  is a statement that seems to make an universal, 
non-perspectival claim.274 The claim is that there is no truth “as such” because there 
is no one world to which the truth “as such” could attach. The corollary of this 
argument, which is also another objection to Nietzsche’s framing of “the truth”, is 
that the very denial that there is “.. .one world, ‘the world’, beyond and sustaining all 
perspectives, may itself perhaps seem to have an ontological, nonperspectival import 
and status”. Is his aphorism substantively false, therefore? More importantly, does 
the aphoristic technique rely on the acceptance of a particular metaphysical or 
ontological set of assumptions, which themselves stand outside of the knowledge (and 
thus the culture) industry? The question is relevant to the issue in this Chapter, as 
cultural property serves as guarantees for this industry. Do the objects themselves 
encode transcendent principles, or do they open up the contested, embattled space that 
Nietzsche and MacIntyre describe?
This problem is exacerbated by Nietzsche’s statements regarding 
interpretation. The relation that any interpreter has to any text is ultimately 
individual, therefore,
it is not just that all interpretation is creative, but also that all commentary is 
interpretation; Nietzsche held of utterances what he held of things: “That 
things possess a constitution in themselves quite apart from interpretation and 
subjectively is a quite idle hypothesis”.276
274 In this sense, it is vulnerable to the same sorts of questions and critiques as the question of
“authority” briefly addressed above. For example, if Nietzsche excepts himself from the position o f a 
contestant for the truth, and instead takes the position of truth-giver, then not only does he challenge 
his position as an “outsider” to the academy o f his time, but he also challenges the statement he is
making about the genealogy of truth, and the definition he gives of his philosophical endeavour more 
generally. As MacIntyre writes, “If this is so, Nietzsche thus understood will have been restored to 
conventional academic philosophy, an apparent radical at one level but not at all so at another”. 
(MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 288)
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Metaphor rules the endeavour of interpretation, and thus of the constitution of
7 7 7things. MacIntyre argues that to attempt to shift metaphors into other conceptual 
modes, especially that of ontology is to make a (possibly deliberate) mistake.278 If 
this attempted shift is deliberate, then it is a strategy, “some more-or-less successful 
attempt to preempt the possibility of rival interpretations”.279 The result is to put 
Nietzsche himself in a problematic position (a professorial or professional position) 
opposite his own utterances. Genres in which truth is found within metaphors lend 
themselves only reluctantly to genres in which authoritative statements are made. In 
addition, Nietzsche’s definition of truth and the subsequent critiques of this 
definition also result in the problematizing of any other commentator’s truth- 
claims, whether these claims are lodged in a text or are about an object, or both.
The solution is to take the aphoristic form seriously, and to look at the 
operation of interpretation in the Nietzschean aphorism. If the academic form of 
utterance is negative, repressed, and repressive:
By contrast the Nietzschean aphorism is active, a place and a play of contrary 
forces, the medium through which a current of energy passes. “An aphorism,” 
Deleuze has said, “is an amalgam of forces that are always held apart from 
each other”. It is in uttering and responding to aphorisms that we outwit the 
reactive, academic mode.281
The marking-off or boundary functions of the aphorism are visible in this definition. 
An aphorism keeps things separate as a means of defining them, rather than because 
they are necessarily different. Thus for MacIntyre (as well as for Danto), aphorisms 
are the medium for speaking anticonsequentialist truth. The relationship between the
277 “For metaphors are the currency of interpretation just as they are o f the texts interpreted”. Idem.
278 Aphorisms are metaphors, but if  Nietzsche’s aphorisms are authoritarian statements o f non­
contingent metaphysical or ontological “reality”, then they are shifted into “other conceptual modes”. 
At this point, the aphorism would be merely a standard didactic technique, and not a way of  
transmitting a genuinely new perspective on/as knowledge.
279 MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 289.
280 From within the philosophical academy, mostly. See, generally, The Philosophical Forum, No. 4, 
December 1999, and The Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, October 1999.
281 MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 290.
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knower and what is known is of prime importance.282 The scholar or commentator 
who relies on non-aphoristic, objective or non-specific perspectives when thinking 
about thinking becomes trapped in dialectical reasoning, which is in turn a short step
283from ressentiment. Reasoning must be an activity in the arena of other activities, 
and not a retreat into the safety of a predetermined authority.
Reasoning requires a reasoning subject, in relation to a text, an object, or
98 4another subject. Is the genealogist (the heir to the Nietzschean approach to 
knowledge) “fixed” in stance or in identity at that moment of (his or her) publication? 
Is the reader? They meet in a “now” which is a shared, and timeless, time.285 This 
relationship anchors the world. As such, it does not escape the metaphysics that the 
genealogist has necessarily rejected, but it remains pegged to immediate, personal, 
shifting experience. The egos of writer and reader are (at least) momentarily fixed, 
and the shared vision, therefore, must also have (at least) a moment of fixity. The 
world exists,286 there is “one world” if only for a moment, for two people, one 
wearing the mask of the “author” and the other also disingenuously and 
strategically287 reading. In this moment, all the distinctions collapse, genealogist 
becomes encyclopedist, viewer becomes maker, writer becomes reader and vice- 
versa.
282 MacIntyre argues that Nietzsche’s aim was to combat the deformation that modem morality caused, 
which made the specific task of the genealogist to trace the development and workings of ressentiment.
283 “For Nietzsche all theorizing, all making o f claims occurs in the context of activity.. ..So it is not by 
reasoning that at a fundamental level anyone moves from one point of view to another. To believe that 
reasoning can be thus effective is to express allegiance to that dialectic of which Socrates was the 
initiator, and in so doing to reaffirm one’s inability to escape from the inhibiting and repressing 
reactive formation which the repressive and reactive habits of activity exhibited in dialectical 
reasoning bind its adherents”. MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 292.
284 As MacIntyre asks, “the genealogist who has put the academic stance in question by writing and 
publishing his or her book is addressing whom?” MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 295
285 “This appeal to impersonal, timeless standards, so often taken for granted in the post-Enlightenment 
world by those who take themselves to have rejected metaphysics, is itself only to be understood 
adequately as a piece o f metaphysics. The possibility of such an appeal is inseparable from the 
possibility of that atemporal “now” at which writer and reader encounter each other, that “now” at 
which both can appeal away from themselves and the particularity of their own claims to what is 
timelessly, logically, ontologically, and evaluatively, and is only thereby and therefore the property of  
neither writer nor reader”. Idem.
286 Here is the sting in MacIntyre’s tail: his careful and thoughtful, indeed approving, analysis o f 
“genealogy” leads to metaphysics.
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The aphorism invites the writer and reader into a world of engagement, in 
which truth can erupt or be agreed upon, not into a world of “truth” per se. The 
object of cultural property, as aphorism, as a set of boundaries, does the same. It 
cannot guarantee the “truth” that its definition as “cultural” property is seeking. The 
drive to know the truth about an object, according to Nietzsche, is “evidence of a 
culture in which lack of self-knowledge has been systematically institutionalized”. 
This comports with the foregoing analysis of the value of “life” in cultural property 
instruments. Basing law on the “truth” of an object, as cultural property instruments 
do, is a business which requires infinite flexibility if it is not to lead to cumulative and 
genuinely harmful ignorance. Any one conception of truth, or conception of the 
rationality that leads to the truth, will land the commentator in the position of the 
nineteenth-century lecturer that MacIntyre discusses, a position that is both personally
7 0 0
and professionally compromised. In nineteenth -century academic scholarship, the 
truth of bad morality would have appeared “both incredible and offensive”.289 In 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic scholarship, when Nietzschean analyses 
and the rise of the genealogist are commonplaces, the truth underlying an object, a 
conflict, an investment or an understanding may still appear “incredible and 
offensive”.290 Certainly, this analysis leaves the commentator who might want to 
think in or through the cultural property complex with difficult questions. If the 
object does not guarantee truth, then why protect it? Alternatively, in order for the 
object to guarantee truth, what moment of meeting must occur between the object and 
its interpreter?
287 Cf. Michel de Certeau, The Practice o f  Everyday Life (Berkeley and London: University of  
California Press, 1984).
288 Bad morality “assumes many different forms, among them those o f nineteenth-century academic 
scholarship” (MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 291). Furthermore, if  one is a member of 
the professoriate, then one is by definition a person deformed by the will to power through the process 
of cultural/knowledge transmission. It is particularly through taking on the authority to speak/know 
that one runs the risk of institutionalizing ignorance, and doing harm thereby. MacIntyre points out 
that Nietzsche removed himself from this position, commenting that it is not possible to live for truth 
in the university. MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 287.
289 MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 292.
290 See, for example, the debate between Martin Bernal and Mary Lefkowitz regarding the roots of 
Greek philosophy, fought out most recently in Lefkowitz, Not out o f  Africa, and Bemal, Black Athena 
Writes Back.
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“Warriors”
Unconcerned, mocking, violent -  thus wisdom wants us: She is a 
woman and always loves only a warrior.
(Friedrich Nietzsche)
The following analysis relies heavily on the work of Arthur Danto’s 
commentary on the above aphorism, as Danto addresses the problem raised in the 
preceding section of the analysis. What does it mean to be a “genealogist”, which is 
the posture of the interpreter or commentator on cultural property? Danto makes the 
claim that the Third Essay of On the Genealogy o f Morals, which is concerned with 
the acquisition and transmission of knowledge, is a gloss on this aphorism regarding 
wisdom.291 Reading the aphorism against this section of the Genealogy, he concludes 
that the aphorism means that the doing of knowing generates the self that knows as 
well as the object that is known. Thus, the doing is all.
What sort of warrior is unconcerned? One.. .for whom the means is an end, 
for whom warmaking is not so much what you do but what you are, so that it 
is not a matter of warring for but as an end. There is, he [Nietzsche] tells us in 
the first essay [of On the Genealogy o f Morality], “no ‘being’ behind 
doing... ’the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed”.292
This is the truth of the warrior beloved by wisdom. The violence and 
mockery required, the unconcern, are “not instrumental but the moral essence of the 
warrior... ”. There is no gap between being and doing, which might mean, under 
different circumstances, that there is no gap for (self-reflexive) thought.
However, the work of the Genealogy is a work about thought and its effects. 
Like MacIntyre, Danto acknowledges that Nietzsche’s use of essay form raises
291 Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 35.
292 Idem
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problematic questions about the substance of Nietzsche’s argument.294 The danger is 
that an essay on (even the effects of) thought automatically leads to the opposite of 
the “warrior”, the ascetic, who is the (always unloved-by-wisdom) purveyor of bad 
conscience. Nietzsche must avoid the danger of occupying the ascetic position at all 
costs, as examining the value of values requires claiming a ground and maintaining a
90Sposture that allow for this kind of examination. This requires, in turn, a position 
both inside and outside the endeavour, which means a position that both uses 
“reason” and retains its genealogy. The ascetic will always fail to recognize the 
foundations of his or her thought(s), precisely because he or she cannot examine their 
own investment in a particular outcome. The instrument of “life” (thought, 
philosophy) becomes turned toward an enactment of life-in-death (withdrawal, 
ressentiment.) By contrast, the warrior has no investment in any particular outcome. 
Thus, the warrior can be both inside and outside the battle for truth; to extend the 
image of the aphorism, the warrior must both desire wisdom and refuse to court 
“her”. Danto argues that in this manner, the Genealogy escapes being a philosophical 
treatise, an ascetic exercise like any other.
Therefore, the aphorism buried at the heart of the Genealogy (and the position 
opposite “knowledge” that gives rise to Nietzsche’s aphorisms generally) saves the 
book from asceticism. The purpose of this, or any Nietzschean aphorism is to effect a 
transformation in the reader.296 The reader is not meant to become a philosopher (the 
ascetic trick), but to become well, to swallow the pill, the flaying-device of the
294 Danto argues that Nietzsche’s position vis-a-vis the writing of the Genealogy is complicated. 
“Someone who uses ascetic practices to kill asceticism is engaged in a very complex communication, 
supposing he is coherent at all, and he would be right that we are missing what is taking place when we 
merely read the words”. Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 39.
295 Nietzsche cannot afford the posture o f “encyclopedist”, cf. MacIntyre, supra.
296 Danto argues that ressentiment is one of the roots of the conditions that the Genealogy is meant to 
cure. When one moralizes suffering, wrongly assigning responsibility within or to oneself (and thus 
making the suffering into deserved punishment), then one is in the realm of ressentiment. If one 
cannot distinguish between consequences and punishments, one makes category mistakes (with 
appalling results, i.e., religion). The two results of this wrong thinking are first, fundamental 
ignorance, and second, further suffering (of the kind that could be avoided). “[I]f there is any single 
moral/metaphysical teaching I would ascribe to him, it would be this: suffering really is meaningless, 
there is no point to it, and the amount o f suffering caused by giving it a meaning chills the blood to 
contemplate”. Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 45.
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aphorism, and then to be healed from “interpretations of suffering which themselves
707generate suffering”. The aphorism is a medication- (if not health-) delivery device. 
The medication it delivers is the removal of meaning from anything other than what
298 r .is. This healing is a painful process, given the mocking, hurtful nature of the 
therapeutic device: “it is as though the entirety of the Genealogy is a cell of inflictions 
and instrument of asectic [sic] transformation and a very rough book”.299 This 
process subverts or undercuts both the traditional transmission and the traditional 
definition of “knowledge”. Knowledge must be se^knowledge, and it can only occur 
through experience, defined and valorized as Klossowski suggests. The aphoristic 
form insists that the reader enter the aphorism, and that the aphorism enter the reader. 
The warrior -  the producer of the aphorism -  is unconcerned with “illness” in all its 
forms: ressentiment, nostalgia, asceticism, and the numerous ills of body and mind 
that that they produce. The end result of the warrior’s battle is the process, the day- 
to-day experience, of health, which is “life”.
The question in the realm of cultural property is whether the interpreters 
that engage in the task of “making” a mere artifact into “cultural property”, do so 
from the (necessary) position of the unconcerned warrior. To be a warrior in this 
realm means to set about decoding the meaning of the object without expectations 
(either of what will be found or of what is there to be found). On the battlefield that 
is “truth”, and that is the necessary referent of the “culture” in “cultural property”, 
reasoning must be an activity without attachment if it is to be part of life. Freedom -  
or rather, infinite mobility -  is the primary requirement for the warrior. In addition, 
can the aphoristic mandate -  life! -  be reconciled with the valorization of “life” in 
cultural property discourse?
297 Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 43.
298 The root of human strength is in not internalizing -  thus not anthropomorphizing -  suffering.
Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 46.
299 Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 39.
300 For example, a legislator or framer o f legislation; a lawyer or advocate; a curator -  all these roles or 
functions are interpretive roles.
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Thus far, the answers to these questions are more negative than positive. The 
“life” at stake in definitions of cultural property is not the “life” that informs 
“culture”. Nor do the framers of the instruments defining cultural property maintain 
the position of “warriors” on the battlefield of “truth”. All too often, these definitions 
are purposive forays rather than the disengaged engagement needed for “wisdom”. 
”As the function of cultural property is to anchor “truth” and “wisdom” for the 
purposes of “culture”” it would be easy to conclude at this point that the endeavour 
fails, as the definitions merely seek to affirm values that have already reified into a set 
of proprietary rights rather than accepting the notion that proprietary rights in this 
realm are essentially fluid. However, this conclusion is not dispositive of the bigger 
questions. Must the law defining cultural property shift, so as to reflect a set of 
positive answers to the questions above? Must the values of “life” and “culture” in 
“cultural property” shift from those that inform asceticism (descriptive, prescriptive, 
purpose-oriented) to those that inform the interpretation of aphorisms?
The necropolis
The purpose of each and every Convention or Treaty regulating cultural 
property is twofold: definition and preservation. How can or do we understand the 
increasing interest in or need for protection of each element or strand of “culture”? 
What is meant or made by the privileging of preservation over other means of 
assigning value to the object? As the work of the law in this area is to formulate 
objects to which notions of “cultural property” can attach, the fundamental conceptual 
structure on which this work relies is that which can sustain the reflexive, cyclical 
privileging of preservation per se. The movement of the legislative definitions of 
cultural property is from “objects” to “life”, and from “knowledge” to preservation, 
reification, and security. There are two ways in which we can understand this. First, 
the attempt to define cultural property requires addressing the concept of 
“preservation”. To question the meaning of “preservation” within this schema is to 
consider what the law protects against. It attempts to protect -  paradoxically, as this 
is a hallmark of life -  permeability. Second, preservation is the hallmark of the kind
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of “culture” that reifies “life”. It is the opposite of the aphoristic endeavour, and the 
opposite of the values that “cultural property” is meant to ensure.
Permeability or erasure is the third part of the life-preservation structure. The 
attempt to define cultural property, and to address the values that inhere within 
cultural property issues, requires thinking in terms of life-preservation-loss. The 
struggle to define “cultural property” and to determine appropriate protection for it in 
the twentieth century has arises from and is entwined with looting and theft of 
(primarily art) objects during war.301 The value-laden approach to defining cultural 
property is thus not surprising. The space in which things are/can be valuable after 
the Second World War still begs definition. The extremes are the ineffable and the 
acquirable; the return to (“indigenous”?) notions of spiritual origin and the acceptance 
of a dollar-driven status identity. Legislation protecting cultural property continues to 
respond to the potential dangers to objects that arise during armed conflict. The most 
solid of objects are porous and permeable, in the view of this kind of legislation. The 
dangers are forces that can corrode or erase these objects as solid things: natural 
disasters, war, vandalism, and looting. Recent attempts to expand the definition of 
cultural property are attempts to extend the legal protections already in place for 
tangible objects in wartime to tangible and intangible objects threatened in other 
contexts and other types of conflict. Losses due to natural disaster or to theft during 
archaeological excavations, disappearance into the collections of private individuals, 
bad conservation or misidentification of provenance are all forms of erasure. The 
object is permeable to commerce and to forgetfulness regardless of whether it is a 
totem or a myth of origin, a sacred scroll or a language. Commentators disagree 
regarding which ending results in the most permanent loss -  sale into a private 
collection, sale at all,302 or decay. In the attempt to allot or determine “ownership” in 
this field, commentators fall back on the core self-justifying belief or principle in
301 Cf. Generally, Ch. 1, “Plunder, Reparations and Destruction” in John Henry Merryman and Albert 
E. Elsen, eds, Law, Ethics and the Visual Arts, 3rd ed. (London, The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law 
International, 1998).
302 Even to a museum, as “sale” means “loss” to the rituals or living meanings of the culture from 
which the object came.
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Western thought that the true owners of a culture are the people that preserve it.303 In 
a landscape of assured loss, loss easily inverted into willing destruction, the highest 
expression of ownership rights now requires that the true owner desire the culture’s 
(or object’s) preservation above all.
The question of permeability again references the question of values, but the 
answer to that question is predetermined. If the value is preservation, or rather, if 
preservation defines the ground upon which all other conflicts may be played out, 
then to make a claim regarding cultural property, and to do so using the law, is 
already to exist in a state of bad consciousness. Arguably, a member of a living 
culture is less concerned with decay or destruction than the laws protecting cultural 
property and cultural heritage can allow. Arguably, also, the increasing cultural- 
propertization of so many objects and practices labels the present as a necropolis of 
culture. In Nietzschean terms, if the warrior can get lost in the battle -  cease to exist 
— the ascetic, by way of contrast, usually gets lost in the necropolis. Outsiders value a 
culture in stasis; participants value something else. Thought that is not aphoristic 
belongs to the ascetic and characterizes the necropolis, because over time it enshrines 
or maintains dead things. By contrast, thought that retains its violence is the response 
to the kind of reason that leads to half-life, or to the particular death that is found in 
preservation. The warrior does not become an ascetic if thinking remains a form of 
making life, of waging war, in short, if the aphoristic form is used.
[I]f one’s writings are to be mocking and violent, hence meant to hurt, the 
aphorism is a natural, obvious form to use; for, piercing like a dart the 
defenses of reason, it lodges inextricably in the mind’s flesh, where it sticks as 
a perpetual invasion: like a barbed arrow, it cannot be extricated without 
tearing its host.304
303 It may be worth noting that ownership may begin in “blood” or “history”, but arguably it ends in 
appropriation. Indeed, one of the largest and most covert arguments in cultural property analysis is 
between passive and active ownership, that is, between ownership earned by identity and ownership 
earning identity, de Certeau, The Practice o f Everyday Life on strategies and tactics is interesting here.
304 Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 36.
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The writer of the aphorism is the warrior; the reader is being attacked. The reader, 
and in this analysis, the viewer or curator of cultural property, colludes in the assault. 
Thought itself becomes necessarily painful, both in its generation and in its exercise; 
the warrior mocks those he holds up for admiration.305
Yet, the warrior would not hold up the “preservers” for admiration. The 
objects meant by definitions of cultural property are usually both things and 
attachments, both objects and the stories told about them. How do we know when we 
are in the realm of the necropolis? How can we tell the difference in value or 
attachment -  assuming there is such a difference -  between the action of excavating 
an artifact and that of storing it in a museum, from bringing a piece of knowledge 
“back to life” and then “preserving” it? Nothing is discarded in this process of 
increasingly complex definitions; rather the field becomes ever more cluttered. The 
value of these objects should be diluted by the constant expansion of the field, yet it is 
the value of the values expressed in the definition of cultural property that becomes 
faint or vague against the backdrop of a plethora of things. In a world of more and 
more preserved and “valuable” things, it is not clear any more why they are valuable. 
The value-generating and value-laden preservation of things and not-things becomes 
itself problematic in this realm. Preservers not only choose the ascetic path for 
themselves, they also remove any other choices from others. There is only one way 
to value culture; there is only one correct posture for experiencing “life”.
As such, the law has to consider the function of making a cultural property 
claim in order to settle the conflicts that arise. The function includes generating the 
grounds of and for the conflict. Legal analysis of such claims must both address the 
claims made regarding the physical object and the claims made regarding the right to 
make claims. The question of whose “property” the object is includes both these 
components. The “truth” of the object as property of a particular people, or of all
305 “[S]ince aphoristic form is prophylactic against forgetfulness, and since pain is the prime reenforcer 
of retention, aphorism and pain are internally related, and so this form spontaneously presents itself to 
a writer whose warrior violence must be turned against those he appears to admire: the healthy 
forgetters, the innocent brutes”. Danto, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 39.
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mankind (the “life”-related value of the object), and the “truth” of who would be able 
to make this kind of determination (the knowledge-based authority or capacity of the 
identifier/claimant of the object), merges in the definition of a given object as 
“cultural property”. In the next section, the question of ground is considered again, 
from the perspective of the second kind of truth-claim. Who can speak of or for the 
“truth” of the object? How must this speech be undertaken in order to keep the object 
in the realm of “life”, if such an undertaking is possible at all?
Conclusion: The value of these values
The question of why the thrust of cultural property instruments is the 
protection of valuable (worth preserving, knowledge-based) access to “life” is 
answered: because knowledge about life is itself valuable. Thus, the objects that lead 
to such knowledge are worth preserving. The paradox is that the object(s) must be 
preserved, but the object(s) per se are not valuable. As the field of cultural property 
shifts its boundaries, precisely through new definitions of what may constitute 
cultural property, the objects included within it, or that go to constitute it, also shift. 
This approach to the question of definitions raises two other related questions that 
must be addressed in conclusion of this Chapter. First, is a “general definition” of 
cultural property either possible or necessary? The search for any definition, much 
less a definition that could include all kinds of claims regarding “cultural property”, 
may be mistaken. Definitions announce, and also distinguish between what may 
enter the category, place or ground being identified, and what may not. Yet, lodged 
in each definition of cultural property is the notion (or myth) that it announces itself, 
presenting itself as a threshold and opening ground within itself that demands 
definitions from others hoping to enter into the realm proposed by the object. This 
leads to a second question. To what does the indeterminacy and flux within the 
notion of cultural property attach? Put differently, what is the substrate or 
fundamental concern that anchors the notion of “cultural property”?
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One of the hallmarks of cultural property disputes is the idea that the things at 
issue are always valuable and have always been valuable. Some element(s) of the 
definition/object must be responsive to this argument. As these determinations 
cannot be made once and for all, or in advance, the ground opened by cultural 
property -  definitions, objects, and law -  is one of discontinuities in surface. The 
seemingly exhaustive legal definitions are the location of gaps, paradoxes, 
inconsistent values, sudden switches of focus. In effect, the definitions discussed 
above do not determine the meaning of “cultural property”. Rather, they place the 
protected object in the position of a ladder or trellis, allowing the people claiming it to 
claim the ground from which it springs, and allowing that ground to support the 
claimants.306 As a conceptual structure, “cultural property” (either the term or the 
specific object) is the combination of the law and the object. It inhabits a middle 
realm between ground and claimants, a realm in which the law and the thing(s) 
interweave. In this vision, cultural property is the structure that allows attachment to 
something other than the object itself.307
The “something other” is then what requires definition. The argument here is 
that the “something other” is a kind of space or ground itself; it is the place in which 
the arguments and battles regarding identity occur. It is the “common ground” 
claimed for or by knowledge and reason as transmissible goods, i.e., “culture”. If the 
attempt to claim a constant ground for (necessarily) shifting identity is one element of 
what the attempt to claim cultural property is “about”, then the question presented is 
where, in the world of modernity, can this claim be made. What sort of space or
306 The Christian imagery is inescapable here. Exploring this imagery fully is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter, although obviously any discussion of the ‘se lf’ against the ground of “the law” must take on 
the question of Christianity. This is particularly true when working with the concept of the Nietzschean 
self, which is irradiated by the problem of selfhood in the context of Christianity. For an authoritative 
discussion of the relation between the notion of the Christian “se lf’ and the legal ground from which 
that springs (and vice-versa), see Tim Murphy, “Law and Society: The Penetrative Scheme and the 
Juridical Soul” in The Oldest Social Science? Configurations o f Law and Modernity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997).
307 The argument that the “ground” may be only, or even primarily, the concept o f “land” that 
accompanies theories of nationhood or the self-determination o f peoples is not addressed in this thesis. 
Certainly, cultural property disputes serve political functions and seek to anchor territorial claims. The 
strain of cultural property analysis that seeks to explain the desire for the object as a desire for the 
legitimation of, and entitlement to, a given political identity is extremely valuable.
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ground is necessary? The object o f cultural property creates the necessary space, but 
it is not defined by it. The “cultural property” opens up this space within itself. It is a 
space of constant conflict, requiring a particular posture from the actors who attempt 
to navigate it.
There are two hallmarks of cultural property that come out of this analysis. 
First, when one looks at the debates that arise out of the claim of ownership of a piece 
of “cultural property”, it is obvious that an object that is cultural property differs from 
other objects in its function, not in its age or source. The question regarding the 
function of cultural property goes to the question of “essence” or “value”, as do the 
preceding indicia. Some preliminary suggestions as to the function of cultural 
property would include: a mirror, a hammer, a scalpel, a means of differentiating past 
and future from present, a theft (from rightful owners and from thieves both), and a 
porous shell. Like any object, an object defined as “cultural property” can be 
redefined, misdefined, or forgotten. The definition attaches great value to the object, 
at least for the particular moment in which a culture claims the object as its property. 
Simultaneously, the language of this definition is predicated on the argument (if not 
belief) that the moment of the object is universal rather than particular. The 
momentariness of the definition is balanced by the etemality of the adjectives chosen. 
This is a realm of inversions and ironies, therefore, a place where utter certainties of 
description and substance (stone, bone, clay, etc.) expose uncertainties and conflicts.
Second, an object putatively becomes/can be recognized as cultural property, 
at least to the extent of being the foundation for a dispute regarding its ownership, 
when the object is equally valued on the same ground(s) — defined herein as in the 
same place -  by two different groups or cultures. This is a logical impossibility in the 
realm of cultural property law, as it is implicit in the argument from origin, as the law 
understands it, that origin is a singular and specific locus/event. More generally, the 
dualities contemplated by academic scholarship, the “clash of values” and 
oppositional accounts of identity, forbid thinking of cultural property claims as 
occurring in any sense without “genuine” attachment, that is, without living links
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between the object and the claimants. Nonetheless, when one looks at conflicts in 
this realm, one sees that the arguments are of ownership and generation or creation 
mixed. The skill to know the object, and the skill to make it, cross-fertilize each other 
in the minds of the contestants. Right beneath the surface lurks the structure of 
knowing/owning/making. Each of these three terms can pair with the others: 
knowing/making or knowing/owning are as accurate descriptions of this structure as 
owning/making. This structure accounts for the relevance of most hermeneutic 
schemes/schematics to the field of cultural property. To what extent interpretation is 
also “discovery” or “creation” is of immediate and obvious interest when looking at 
debates that arise in this field. In its essence, this is an argument about identity, in the 
modem sense (a ghost recognizing itself in, or taking over the gaze of a visitor to a 
museum), which attempts to flatten the modem conception of identity by referring to 
an absolute source of being that predates and survives this particular understanding of 
humanity at this time.
The making of the object through interpretation, however, is always, 
painfully, the second making. The origin eludes, as does the piece of cultural
* J/\Q
property itself. No matter how permeable, these artifacts remain impervious to our 
eyes. In this case, however, it is not knowledge but ownership that debunks most 
cherished myths of origin (even as it creates other myths). A myth of origin rarely 
survives the conflation of “then” and “now” that is represented by defining an object 
as cultural property. As “then” is not “now”, nor are “we” “them”. Our origin -  as 
owners -  is entirely other than the origin that the object was supposed to guarantee. 
Sooner or later, therefore, either the object demands its own “truth”, or it succumbs to 
a tmth that may or may not suit the role mapped out for it by its owner. At that
308 This is a necessary side-effect o f any attempt to “fix” knowledge in modernity. For example, 
Nietzsche’s repudiation of classical philology as practiced in Germany in the nineteenth century is a 
result, in part, of the reified and inaccurate relationship that classical scholars at that time had 
established between Ancient Greece and (their) modernity. “Were the classical philologists in fact to 
understand classical realities, he [Nietzsche] was to remark, they would recoil horrified. And they 
would do so in part at least because they would have to acknowledge that their own academic purposes 
had alienated them from their object o f study and concealed it from them”. MacIntyre, “Genealogies 
and Subversions”, p. 286. What was true of those scholars is equally true today o f any “purposive” 
scholarship.
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moment, the owner/commentator is free of a particular kind of twentieth- or twenty- 
first century illness. When one accepts defeat in the search for the “true essence” of 
the object, then one ceases to be deformed -  one takes up a different position opposite 
whatever drive it is whose inhibition and distortion have led to an 
unacknowledged complicity in a system of suppressions and repressions 
expressed in a fixation whose signs and symptoms are the treatment of highly 
abstract moral and epistemic notions as fetishes. That drive turns out to 
be...the will to power.309
One may still choose to excavate, if that is where pleasure lies, but the necropolis 
loses its authority to mediate wisdom, meaning, or life.
The morality of thought lies in a procedure that is neither entrenched nor 
detached, neither blind nor empty, neither atomistic nor consequential. ... But 
how much more difficult it has become to conform to such morality now that 
it is no longer possible to convince oneself of the identity of subject and 
object.... Nothing less is asked of the thinker today than that he should be at 
every moment both within things and outside them -  Munchhausen pulling 
himself out of the bog by his pig-tail becomes the pattern of knowledge which 
wishes to be more than either verification or speculation. And then the 
salaried philosophers come along and reproach us with having no definite 
point of view.310
309 MacIntyre, “Genealogies and Subversions”, p. 287.
310 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia (New York: Schocken Books, 1978) p. 74. (Translated E. F. N. 
Jephcott)
Chapter Four Narratives of Attachment: Memory
Chapter Four looks at the controversy surrounding the ownership of the
Parthenon Marbles in order to argue that narratives of attachment and belonging
underlie every attempt to use the law to determine ownership of ancient objects. The
Chapter then analyzes these narratives to show that the law in cultural property claims
attempts to allocate ownership of metaphors, as much as it seeks to allocate
ownership of objects. What is the link, however, between allocation of metaphors
and allocation of objects? Can objects and metaphors represent each other in the
realm of cultural property theory and law? What might the metaphors used in staking
claims to ancient objects represent? Against a reading of what Friedrich Nietzsche
111says about memory in On the Genealogy o f Morality, this Chapter looks to 
analyses of memory and mourning to suggest that the claims for the Parthenon 
Marbles are claims for (authorized) memory, and to query what sort of memory is 
being claimed: memory that references sterile mourning, or memory that instead 
avoids lament and nostalgia, and functions as one of the mechanisms of man’s 
“overcoming”. If it is the latter, then the claims for the Parthenon Marbles (or for any 
relics, iconic fragments or archaeological artifacts), represent memory that has 
resulted in completed mourning, a paradoxical position in which the city and its 
inhabitants claim the past in order to allow amnesia or forgetting to flourish, and thus 
to underwrite the possibility of a, or any, future.
Therefore, the following Chapter has several purposes. First, it seeks to 
establish the linkages between metaphors and objects that constitute one of the ways 
in which the discourses and objects of cultural property represent the epistemological 
and ideological terrain of “modernity”. Second, it supports the position, stated in the 
Introduction, that memory is the epistemological mode of modernity, and that cultural 
property discourse partakes of (and enables) that mode. Third, it sets out the
311 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.)
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substantive argument that the discourses of cultural property are narratives of 
attachment that derive their power (if not their validity) from the appropriation and 
manipulation of memory, or, put differently, that ownership and memory cross-define 
each other in this field. The discursive problems that arise -  fictionalization, 
mourning, and not least, forgetting -  are absolutely central to the processes of 
establishing ownership of any object of cultural property (not merely the Parthenon 
Marbles). In order to fulfill these purposes, the present Chapter turns again to the 
facts and law that have already been set out in Chapter Two, beginning to theorize the 
material that has already been presented. As such, the repetitions of the facts and law 
from Chapter Two in this Chapter and in Chapter Five are intended although not 
intended to be onerous.
Introduction: Memory and ownership
These dreamy blinkings-out 
Strike me as grace, i f  I  may say so,
Capital punishment,
Yes, but o f utmost clemency at work,
Whereby the human stuff, ready or not,
Tumbles, one last drum-roll, into thyme,
Out o f time, with just the fossil quirk
At heart to prove -  hold on, don’t tell me... What?
(James Merrill, “Losing the Marbles”)
“Just as expecting is possible only on the basis of awaiting, remembering is
- i p
possibly only on that of forgetting, and not vice versa. This is a tremendously 
cruel observation: although it is commonly acknowledged that memory may hurt, 
Heidegger points out that the pain of memory depends upon the different, and 
possibly greater, pain of forgetting. To remember, one must be in a state of
312 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 388-9. (Translated by J. 
Macquarrie and E. Robinson)
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forgetfulness after having not been in such a state: that is, to remember one must be 
in a state of loss. What is remembered is thus resuscitated, created, retrieved or 
otherwise brought into being or into consciousness or both as an acquisition or re­
acquisition of the lost object. In political theory, the lost object is originary racial or 
political purity, a beginning that is predicated on the destruction of memory itself.313 
In law, and in particular in claims regarding the allocation of cultural property, what 
is to be gained by tropes or narrative events of remembering or forgetting? Bluntly, 
property. The argument proposed is that the narrative of ownership is one of the 
shifting membranes between memory and forgetting. Cultural property discourse and 
autobiographical tropes occur in the same space and have the same object(s) and 
criteria. They make property out of the past, spinning gold out of straw or treasures 
out of some alliance between things and the stories told about them. Like all 
memorial narratives, they are mechanisms of appropriation and lies. The effect is to 
create property out of what may not have been property before it was claimed.
To claim ownership of an ancient object, the law requires a declaration of
provenance. Yet, the “past” that underlies the debates regarding memory and the
ownership of ancient objects, and that forms the substrate(s) of the account(s) of
origin, is itself in the making.314 “Memory, history, and relics have long served as
mutual metaphors”.315 The account of provenance is itself a combination of history,
-1 1 £
memory, and fiction. The techniques used to support cultural property claims, and 
to create the narratives of attachment to the object, are techniques of memorialization, 
which in modernity (as suggested above) reference mourning. However, this Chapter 
argues that these memorial narratives are turned, not towards the past but towards the 
future. “To be is to have been, and to project our messy, malleable past into our
313 Paul Connerton, How societies remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989).
314 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985); Peter J. Fowler, The Past in Contemporary Society. Then, Now (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); Adrian Forty and Susanne Kiichler eds, The Art o f  Forgetting (Oxford and 
New York: Berg, 1999).
315 Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p. 251.
316 Ibid. “History, fiction and faction”, pp. 224-38.
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unknown future.” They function as the mechanisms of the process of 
“overcoming” that Nietzsche describes in On the Genealogy o f Morality, the process
that forms modem “man” out of his precursor, a “necessarily forgetful animal, in
• 110 whom forgetting is a strength...”. The mechanisms of “overcoming” require
memory as a positive, or active force. Therefore, the narratives that underlie claims
for ancient objects seek to manage the loss that inevitably accompanies time, to
overcome memory itself, and through the ownership of the object, to bring mourning
to an end.
“The past” and the case of the Parthenon Marbles
The disputes regarding the ownership of the Parthenon Marbles serve as 
exemplars of the process of “overcoming” on many interpretive levels. Speaking at a 
debate in the Oxford Union in 1986, Melina Mercouri declared “There are no Elgin 
Marbles!” 319 In 2001, there are no longer any Elgin Marbles.320 It is a small elision, 
yet one that represents a strategic victory over Lord Elgin, and over his memory. The 
statues themselves remain in the British Museum. As objects patinated with layers of 
meanings and affiliations that constantly fluctuate, they continue to elude both 
identification and ownership. They are glossed, at any given moment, by discourses 
and strategies of memory and forgetting. The question of who owns the Parthenon 
Marbles may be better considered by asking how these sculptures can be owned, and 
what mechanisms of “ownership” are used. The question “who owns” addresses the 
ownership of memory and history as much as it does the ownership of fragments of a 
ruined building. As regards the allocation of ancient objects, it is paradigmatic of all 
cultural property discourse. Yet, it may be particularly relevant to the allocation of
317 Ibid. p. xxv.
318 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality, p. 39
3,9 In June 1986, the topic for debate in the Oxford Union was the return o f the Parthenon Marbles to 
Greece. Melina Mercouri, then Greek Minister of Culture, argued for their return. 
http://www.uk.digiserve.com/mentor/marbles
320 The frieze removed from the Parthenon by agents of Lord Elgin and acquired by Parliament on 
behalf of the British people in 1816, with the conditions that they always be kept together and they 
always be known as the “Elgin Marbles”, is “now officially called the Parthenon Marbles by both 
Britain and Greece”. The Guardian, Friday 26 October 2001. 
http://www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/elgin
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modem objects and modem sacred sites as well. War constantly creates mins and 
those who mourn them, and the question of who owns these ruins is as relevant to the 
future as it is to the past.
As previously described in Chapter Two, the question of whether the
Parthenon Marbles should be returned to Athens is one of the oldest questions in
1cultural property law, and is continuously debated in the news media and on the
‘X'JIInternet. To restate, briefly, the issues, claims for the restitution or retention of the 
Marbles have been made on behalf of the British, the Greeks, and currently, the 
Parthenon itself, but it is not clear what “ownership” of these stones would mean.
The bases of the claims for retention or restitution now turn as much on principles of 
cultural internationalism (“The cultural property of all mankind”) as on cultural 
nationalism (“They are Greek”; “The British are the true inheritors of the Ancient 
Greeks”).324 Questions of stewardship and accountability also currently loom as large 
as the more traditional arguments based in standard principles of contract and 
property law. Certainly, both the Greek the British governments are less than clear, 
and possibly less than honest, about the grounds for their claims of these objects.
The Greek government currently claims the Parthenon Marbles on the basis 
that they are fragments of the Parthenon, and that the Parthenon is a symbol of the 
cultural heritage of the whole world and should be as complete as possible. This 
claim carefully balances the “cultural internationalist” and “cultural nationalist” 
views of the Parthenon, accepts as a given the territorial basis for Greek ownership of 
the Parthenon, and glosses over the reality that the sculptures would be placed in a 
museum rather than on the monument. The Greek government is attempting to shame 
the British government into returning the sculptures by leaving a large open space for 
the sculptures in the new museum that is being built on the Acropolis. Their absence 
demands and connotes their presence: it is (already) monumental.
321 See Chapter Two, n. 62.
322 See Chapter Two, n. 63.
323 See Chapter Two, n. 55.
324 See Chapter Two, n. 54.
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The British government steadfastly refuses to yield the Marbles, which have 
played a part in British identity and political life since Lord Elgin sold them to the 
nation in 1816. Although the basic claim for retention is that the Marbles were 
legally acquired, the British also claim that Lord Elgin saved the Marbles by 
removing them from the Acropolis, and that in the years since their removal they 
have become part of the British cultural heritage. The British claim of good 
stewardship and art historical accountability was shaken by William St. Clair’s 
devastating proof of damage to the Marbles by cleaning carried out at Lord Duveen’s 
request.326 Now, the British, like the Greeks a generation, or a century, ago, fall back 
on their claim to Ancient Greece. The conflict between the modem Greeks and the 
British government reflects and turns on the battle being waged for the ownership of 
memory, history, autochthony, filiation, and descent from the “Greeks”. As such, the 
perspectives taken on the legal claims explicitly327 and implicitly interrogate the 
meaning of “the past”. One cannot discuss cultural property questions without taking 
a position on the accessibility of “the past” to modem observation. The case of the 
Parthenon Marbles exemplifies this point as well; the imperative of assessing the 
construction of memory as a strategy of ownership becomes apparent when looking at 
the history of the Parthenon and the Marbles.
The Parthenon
In both sets of claims, the Parthenon itself stands as the primary cipher. Even 
before the Marbles, the history of the Parthenon itself displays the links between 
memory, history, and civic identity that are at the heart of public buildings. No public 
building is built by accident. The choice of what it memorializes, or represents, 
however, changes over time. Any public building risks this fluidity of function and
325 The grounds for the restitution o f the Parthenon Marbles are set out in Chapter Two, n. 65.
326 St. Clair, “The Elgin Marbles: Questions of Stewardship and Accountability” (see Chapter Two).
327 See Chapter Two, “The Parthenon Marbles” generally.
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• 328meaning. In the case of the Parthenon, memory, mourning, and forgetting were 
inextricably intertwined from when it first came into being. This complex of signs, in 
stone, continues to the present day. Therefore, any attempt to set out the history of 
the Parthenon must address the question of what is retained and what is discarded of 
original meaning or intent. The Parthenon was built a generation after the Persians
^  Q
laid waste many of the earlier temples on the Acropolis. Pericles directed the 
rebuilding of the Parthenon in order to erase the memory of the Persian conquest of 
Athens, and to commemorate the predominance of Athens among the city-states of 
Ancient Greece. However, within a few years after its completion, and before the 
temple of the Erechtheion was finished, the Peloponnesian War began between 
Athens and Sparta. The Athenians lost this war a generation later.330 Thus the 
marker of Athenian triumph over the Persians (and of domination over the other city- 
states that formed the Delian League) shifted almost immediately to a symbol of loss. 
Within two generations, the political power that the Parthenon was intended to 
represent had come to an end.
In this sense, the “Elgin” or “Parthenon” Marbles anchor the history of the 
Parthenon rather than the other way around, as to tell the story of the Parthenon is to 
choose an arbitrary moment of origin, and continue. The history of the Parthenon is 
as complicated as the history of Athens. In later antiquity, the Parthenon was 
appropriated by non-Athenian Greeks and by the Romans as a symbol of later 
regimes’ appropriation of the classical Athenians’ patrimony. The building then 
remained largely unchanged until the Byzantine Emperor Constantine converted to 
Christianity and declared Christianity the official religion of the Empire in the fourth 
century A.D. In the early sixth century, the Parthenon was converted to a Greek 
Orthodox church. It was dedicated to Our Lady of the Holy Wisdom, in order to 
maintain and benefit from the linkages with the pre-existing worship of Athena.
328 Gillian Rose proposes the idea o f the built form as being constantly in process — architecture is 
indeed “the most synaesthetic, most exposed, bearer of social utopianism”. Gillian Rose, The Broken 
Middle (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 300. She argues that architecture, like 
law, is the privileged occupier of the moment between, the middle in which is performed the difficult
and unending art of educating power and of moderating between particular, singular and universal.
329 Herodotus, The Histories, Bk VIII Ch. 53, p. 628. (Everyman Library edn)
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Athens nevertheless remained a provincial center of the Byzantine Empire until 1204, 
when invaders, primarily crusaders (Franks) and Venetians, began to conquer the 
Byzantine Empire. At that point, the Parthenon became the Roman Catholic church 
of Notre Dame, and a large tower was built near the entrance to the Acropolis.
In 1453, the Ottomans occupied Greece and took possession of Athens. The 
Acropolis, as a militarily strategic position, served as the fortress of the Ottoman 
army posted in Athens. In 1687, during the attempt by the Venetian general Morosini 
to retake Athens, the Parthenon was being used as a munitions arsenal by the Turkish 
forces. Shelling Athens from the harbour, Morosini hit the Parthenon. The building 
exploded. After that, it was a ruin. In the following year, the Turks re-captured 
Athens, and built a small minaret and mosque on the ruins of the Parthenon. They 
also used it to garrison some army officers, building small houses among the ruins.
By the end of the eighteenth century, Athens was a small Oriental town, with a 
multicultural population, churches, mosques, palm trees, camels, traveling gentlemen 
and artists from Europe. At the time of the Greek War of Independence against the 
Ottoman Empire,331 the Acropolis bore the traces of these other incarnations.
In 1833, the Greek state was established with the support of the European 
powers. At this point the Parthenon assumed the form and meaning that it carries 
today. The European regard for Ancient Greece and the virtues and values of 
classicism not only contributed to the recognition of the modem Greek state, but also 
mandated that state’s emphasis on Ancient Greece and the identity of its people with 
the Ancient Greeks. The reconstruction of the Parthenon began immediately. The
struggle to establish and maintain the chosen national identity meant that the traces of 
medieval and late Hellenistic history vanished. Even pre-classical archaic structures 
on the Acropolis were nearly lost. “Greece”, and by extension “Athens”, was no 
longer multicultural and multilingual, it was “purely” classical. As a result of this 
decision, the Parthenon was deliberately restored as a ruin:
330 431-404 B.C.
331 The Greek War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire began in 1821 and continued until 1828.
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In 1834 the Bavarian neo-classical architect Leo von Klenze was invited to 
Athens to advise the new government on a policy for the future of the 
Acropolis. Like Elgin and most of his contemporaries, von Klenze admired 
the Athens of the fifth century above all other periods of the past. He 
proposed that Greece should repair the surviving monuments, using a mixture 
of old marble and modem imagination. They would, however, remain as 
ruins, romantic and picturesque, a lasting reminder of what had been lost and 
what had been regained.333
This plan was acted upon by successive Greek governments, until 1890:
when virtually everything had already gone, the so-called “purist” approach to 
the Acropolis came to an end. The Parthenon was now a badly ruined 
building of the fifth century. The Acropolis was a fully dug archaeological 
site.334
The memorial was complete.
The building, in its “finished” form has come to symbolize an Athens that 
existed for less than one hundred years, and yet which has come to represent the 
Greeks that exist two and a half thousand years later. All Greeks have not become 
Athenians, but “the people of Greece came to regard the Parthenon as the “soul of 
Greece”.335 However, following the history of the Parthenon as set out above, does 
the “soul of Greece”, thus defined, belong to the Greeks? This soul may well be as 
British, as French, as German, as it is Greek. Pericles began the making of the 
Parthenon. The Europeans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries passionately 
supported the Classical history of the building. The Greeks of the eighteenth,
332 St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, pp. 322-4.
333 Ibid. p. 316.
334 Ibid. p. 326.
335 Ibid. p. 325, quoting Melina Mercouri.
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nineteenth, and twentieth centuries have appropriated both “origins”: the origin of 
Pericles, and that of classical scholarship. These Greeks ensured that:
[t]he temple.. .which for more than a thousand years, according to one 
traveller, had languished as a place for the worship of a Jewish peasant and an 
Arab camel driver, had at last been returned to its true purpose.336
This statement can be read as a failure as well as a success. One must ask what this 
sort of return represents. One must also ask how ownership claims can be resolved or 
even understood in this context.
The frieze
The sculptures at the center of the dispute distill the discourse of remembrance
‘i n ' i
and sacrifice that the building itself represents. The Marbles are large sections of 
the frieze that ran around the entire Parthenon. Currently, as described in Chapter 
Two, the bulk of the frieze is in the Duveen Gallery of the British Museum, although 
there are a few panels in the Acropolis Museum in Athens. Directly in front of the 
entrance to the Duveen Gallery, in the middle of one of the long walls of the rectangle 
that makes up the Gallery, is the East frieze, which consists of the focus of the 
ceremonial procession. Here, there are the gods of Olympus, two adults (a man 
and a woman), two girls bearing trays with folded cloths on them, a child that could 
be either a girl or a boy, and magistrates or tribal heroes. The gods ranked on either 
side look away from the scene. The meaning of this tableau is a mystery. Clearly, 
the frieze refers to an event that engages and concerns the entire population of
336 Ibid. p. 327 (n. 62 omitted).
337 The frieze represents a gathering of the citizens of Athens, engaged in a communal and 
commemorative activity. See infra Chapter Five for fuller description of the frieze; see also St. Clair, 
Lord Elgin and the Marbles, pp. 51-53, Beard, The Parthenon, “Making Sense o f the Frieze”, pp. 
128-37.
338 Rather than using the long walls o f the rectangle to display the long sides of the frieze, as it was
found on the rectangle of the Parthenon, the display arranges the frieze so as to show, immediately, its
culmination. Arguably, this decision is in keeping with Duveen’s decision to “clean” the Marbles. At 
the time the Duveen Gallery was built, the Western eye arranged the Marbles as “art” rather than 
“artifacts” -  an obvious point as Duveen was an art dealer.
339 St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, pp. 53-5.
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Athens. Until recently, scholars speculated that the frieze depicted the Panathenaic 
Festival, which celebrated Athena, the founding deity of Athens, but this theory has 
never been wholly accepted as the correct account of what the frieze depicts.340 
Indeed, it is impossible to know what the true meaning of the scene “really” is. The 
meaning of the frieze is a matter of interpretation.341
Recent scholarship suggests that the subject-matter of the frieze 
commemorates not the Panathenaic Festival, but one of the ancestor-myths of the 
political founding of Athens, the sacrifice of Erechtheus’s daughters.342 In this myth, 
the ancient king Erechtheus was told that he must sacrifice one of his three daughters 
in order to be guaranteed success in the war against the Thracians.343 Erechtheus was 
either the second or the first great founding father of Athens, either a descendant of 
Kekrops and Erechthonious, the mythical founders of the autochthonous Athenian 
race, or an alternative incarnation of these figures.344 The Erechtheion on the 
Acropolis also commemorates Erechtheus. Herodotus writes that from earliest times 
there was a “temple of Erechtheus the Earth-born, as he is called, in this citadel. ..”.345
The people of Athens and the city of Athens could not be distinguished from 
each other. In Euripides’s Erechtheus,346 Erechtheus’s wife Praxithea justifies the 
sacrifice of her daughters by identifying Athenians as an autochthonous people.347
340 “James Stuart and Nicholas Revett, travelers who documented their visit to the Acropolis with 
drawings and descriptions published in 1787, were the first to identify the frieze as the Panathenaic 
procession, an integral part of Athena’s birthday festival”. Joan B. Connelly, “Parthenon and 
Parthenoi: A Mythological Interpretation of the Parthenon Frieze” in American Journal o f  
Archaeology 100 53-80 (1996), p. 53.
34,There are no ancient sources on the meaning of the frieze. Connelly, “Parthenon and Parthenoi", p. 
53. See also Chapter Five, infra.
342 Ibid. generally.
343 Ibid. p. 53-80; St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, p. 54.
344 Kekrops/Erichthonios/Erectheus was the first man that sprung out of the earth of the Acropolis 
when the goddess Athena prevailed against Poseidon in the struggle to be the patron of the city-state.
345 Herodotus, The Histories, Bk VIII, Ch. 53.
346 “As it happens, a substantial number of new fragments of a lost play by Euripides, the Erechtheus, 
have been recovered from the papyrus used for wrapping an Egyptian mummy in the Sorbonne. .. .By 
an amazing piece o f good fortune in which the Greeks would have seen the hand of a friendly god, the 
recently recovered fragments include the justificatory speech o f Erechtheus’ wife Praxithea...” St. 
Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, p. 55.
347 C. Collard, M. J. Cropp and K. H. Lee, eds, Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays, Vol. I (1995), 
p. 159.
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Although autochthony will be discussed more fully in the next Chapter (Chapter 
Five), for the moment it is worth noting that as citizens, the Ancient Athenians of the 
classical period considered themselves to be a people that sprung from the land of the 
Acropolis itself.348 Praxithea herself may be represented on the Parthenon frieze,349 
and it is interesting to note that another of the Athenians’ autochthonous ancestors, 
the figure of Kekrops, was also represented on the West pediment of the Parthenon.350 
Arguably, therefore, the frieze memorializes civic memory of origin and sacrifice.
Certainly, the Acropolis served as the center of Athens and of its cults and 
myths long before the Classical Parthenon was constructed.351 Visiting the Acropolis 
Museum352 in search of panels from the Classical frieze, one sees that the figures 
from the archaic Parthenons depicted the same narrative program. The sculptures 
from the pediments of the earlier temples on the site show:
The “frightening monsters” with their superhuman strength and daemonic 
power, and the.. .lions tearing at the flesh of.. .calves...Their purpose is not to 
relate a story, but merely to remind one of the existence in the world of 
terrible powers that are overawing and overwhelming. ...Yet there is no one 
more powerful than man ... Attic sculpture displays the terrible power of 
supernatural beings but at the same time projects the human being, both heroic 
and mythical, who succeeds in harnessing this power.353
348 Manolis Andronicos, The Acropolis (Athens: Ekdotike Athenon S.A., 1980), p. 14.
349 See discussion in Chapter Five, infra, regarding the meaning of the central panel o f the Parthenon 
Frieze.
350 This figure may be seen in the Acropolis Museum as it was “left in the pediment by Elgin’s agents 
because it was then thought to be a Roman replacemet”, B. F. Cook, The Elgin Marbles (London: 
British Museum Press, 1997), p. 57.
351 Andronicos, The Acropolis, p. 14.
352 “Built as inconspicuously as possible in the southeastern corner o f the sacred rock, the Acropolis 
Museum contains in its few rooms the sculptures found on the Acropolis, votive offerings to Athena or 
adornments from her temples.... The creations of the Archaic art of the sixth century B.C., collected 
and displayed in the first rooms of the Museum, and those of the flowering of Classical art which 
[peaked].. .during the thirty or forty years of the second half o f the fifth century B.C. in the shape of  
the sculptures of the Parthenon and the parapet of the temple of Athena Nike, offer the visitor a unique 
vision...”. Ibid. p. 68. A new, much larger Museum is currently planned.
353 Ibid. p. 69.
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At the time that the frieze was created, the Golden Age of Athens had vanquished the 
“frightening monsters”. Yet, Connelly shows that the Parthenon Marbles are in 
keeping with the narrative program of the archaic Parthenon as well as the Classical 
temple ordered by Pericles.354 As in Von Klenze’s scheme almost two millennia 
later, the program is one of memorializing and “overcoming” simultaneously. 
However, the act at the heart of the Parthenon frieze is an act of sacrifice that holds 
both elements of the program in stasis. On the Parthenon frieze, it is always before 
the sacrifice: the sacrifice has not yet been made; the future of the city hangs in the 
balance. The link between a people and their place of origin might always portray 
this particular moment, deliberately or not. Memory and the future -  “overcoming” -  
may be dependent on each other and opposed. At the heart of this conjunction (or 
trajectory) are human sacrifice, war, death, and a grim commitment to the future. The 
Classical order and rhythm of the Parthenon frieze displays (in the form of a mystery 
to modem viewers) these necessities.
The discourse of cultural property is origin-obsessed, relentlessly backward- 
looking. The very idea of “cultural property” references re-claiming, rather than
i r e
merely claiming; the act of establishing origin is portrayed as an act of recollection. 
For very ancient objects, such as the Parthenon frieze, the recollection must take the 
form of a narrative that links the claimant with ahistorical time. This narrative, 
impossibly, turns on memory.
[I]n his list of peoples who inhabit the Peloponnese, the historian Herodotus 
carefully distinguishes those “staying in the same place”, meaning those 
whose ancestor is autochthonous, from the rest who are considered immigrant, 
or at least displaced populations...But autochthony must be earned. ...[0]ut
354 “This new reading allows the full sculptural program of the Parthenon to be understood as a 
coherent whole: the west pediment shows the original contest between Athena and Poseidon for 
patronage of the city; the frieze commemorates the first military threat to Athens launched by 
Poseidon’s son Eumolpos and the virgin sacrifice that ensured victory for the Athenians.... Thus, the 
full sculptural program serves as a greater metaphor for the Athenian triumph over the Persians in 480 
B.C., in short, the nexus o f ‘saving the city” from exotic outsiders and the preservation of Athens by 
and for the autochthonous Athenians”. Connelly, “Parthenon and Parthenon, p. 71.
355 “All beginnings contain an element of recollection”. Paul Connerton, How societies remember, p. 
6 .
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o f Herodotus ’ statement a... criterion emerges, implicit but imperative, which 
adds to the transmission o f the soil that o f memory. It is well to occupy the 
land, but even better to maintain the autochthonous tradition, in order to 
strengthen the ties that bind the present to the time of origin.356
To maintain the autochthonous tradition means to possess cultural objects 
such that the acts of claiming and possessing do the work o f memory. This is 
narrative work. It requires a purposive engagement with the past in order to 
fictionalize it.
The Parthenon frieze suggests that the work of memory is ambiguous in its 
valorization of accuracy; rather than pure or objective recollection, it is, in a sense, 
memory management. “Overcoming” the memorialized moment, that is, moving into 
the future, may mean overcoming memory itself.357 Certainly, the frieze shows that 
for the Ancient Greeks, the future was built on the collapse of “time immemorial” 
into “time memorial”; and indeed, into “time remembered”.358 Within the realm of 
cultural property, this sort of purposive relativization and historicization of “the past”, 
interacting with cultural memory and cultural forgetting, constitute the field on 
which, or through which, cultural property (and the related fields of museum
359management and “heritage” sites) has become an ever-expanding discourse. 
Nevertheless, despite the claims of memory and autochthony, there is no possible 
uninterrupted relationship with ancient objects. Memory is at issue because it 
underpins the claim of autochthony, but also because it is an essential narrative trope 
of the fictions o f uninterrupted attachment that are necessary in cultural property 
claims. These (fictional) claims are in turn necessary to annex the past as a 
foundation for the continuing survival of a people or polis, that is, for a foundation, 
not for a particular future, but for the possibility of any future.
356 Loraux, Born o f the Earth: Myth and Politics in Athens (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2000), pp. 14-15. (emphasis added)
357 Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p. 205.
358 The argument that the modem obsession with cultural property represents not only unease about the 
exclusively future time valorized by modernity, but also an attempt to find the epistemic grounds from 
which to vault forward is addressed in Chapter Five, infra.
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Memory: techniques of “overcoming”
The sort of active or generative memory that figures narrative is its own 
object, creating itself out of the exercise of its own faculties. It serves as both 
structure and substance of narrative. This may be seen in the different ways that the 
art of memory is practiced in different historical periods. The balance between 
mneme and anamnesis shifts over time, as does the “direction” of memory and the 
“place” or “landscape” in which memory is presumed to operate.360
The understanding that genealogies of (self-) knowledge are also exercises of 
the will, and thus artifacts of human creation, begins, in the modem era, with 
Nietzsche. In Sections 1-3 of the Second Essay of On the Genealogy o f Morality,361 
Nietzsche examines how “nature” “[bred] an animal which is able to make 
promises”. The human ability to make promises is bred in counter-force to the
natural, healthy state of forgetfulness. Memory is an expression of will, created 
through some symbiosis between “nature” and “man”.
[Precisely this necessarily forgetful animal, in whom forgetting is a strength, 
representing a form of robust health, has bred for himself a counter-device, 
memory, with the help of which forgetfulness can be suspended.. .in those 
cases where.. .a promise is to be made: consequently, it is by no means 
merely a passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its 
impact,.. .instead it is an active desire not to let go, a desire to keep on 
desiring what has been, on some occasion, desired, really it is the will’s 
memory: so that a world of.. .circumstances and even acts of will may be
359 Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p. xv.
360 Raphael Samuel, Theatres o f Memory: Vol. 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture 
(London: Verso, 1994).
361 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality, “Guilt”, “bad conscience” and related matters” (1994) pp. 
38-71.
362 Ibid. p. 38.
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placed quite safely in between the original “I will” . . .and the actual discharge 
of the will.363
The act of making a promise triggers the ability to remember, or rather, to 
suspend forgetfulness. This ability is the cornerstone of “the sovereign individuaV\ a 
man who has been made reliable by the “straightjacket” of the “morality of custom” 
and who, because of his own reliability, because of the sublimation of his animal self, 
now possesses a will that allows him to be predictable to himself and responsible to 
others.
Society and the morality of custom, working through brute force, overcome 
the “frightening monsters” of human nature. They:
were simply the means to...the sovereign individual...like only to itself, 
having freed itself from the morality of custom, an autonomous, supra-ethical 
individual (because “autonomous” and “ethical” are mutually exclusive)...a 
man.. .who has the right to make a promise -  and has.. .an actual awareness of 
power and freedom, a feeling that man in general has reached completion.364
Brute force -  pain -  links the present with the promise made in the past, 
continues (or guarantees the continuation) of that desiring self. This continuation, 
through the complex of pain, social benefits, promises and the enforced discharge of 
fixed desire, constitutes the sort of memory that is, in turn, the cornerstone of 
reason.365 One could say, this sort of memory is the cornerstone of this sort of 
reason.366 Nietzsche here is engaged in diagramming the tools and processes that led 
to a “man who is now free”, ”a “master of the free will” because he “really does have 
the right to make a promise”.
363 Ibid. p. 39.
364 Ibid. p. 40.
365 “With the aid of...[pain],...man was eventually able to retain five or six “I-don’t-want-to’s” in his 
memory, in connection with which a promise had been made, in order to enjoy the advantages of 
society -  and there you are! With the aid of this sort of memory, people finally came to ‘reason’!”
Ibid p. 42.
366 Tim Murphy, “Foucault: rationality against Reason and History”, in Philip Windsor, ed., Reason and 
History (Leicester Leicester University Press, 1990).
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A promise, a guarantee of the will’s desire, leads to freedom. However, there 
are two problems with this. First, man is not free, regardless of his “actual awareness 
of power and freedom”. Not even Zarathustra is (wholly) free.367 This degree of will 
and of concomitant “freedom” is merely an interim point in the development of 
“man”. Memory gives man the right to the future, but a split exists between the 
repressions, pain, and “breeding” that lead to the right, and the use of it. Humankind 
must reach the future in order to become free, an objective that not only defines 
Nietzsche’s scheme for the next step of mankind, the next “overcoming” that will 
continue and invert the processes that brought us thus far, but also as regards the 
possibility, the field or ground for this process. The desire to keep on desiring into 
the future is the minimum requirement for the nexus of time and will that may, in 
each instant, change the pain of self-overcoming into the affirmation of life.368 
Second, in Nietzsche’s scheme, the desire to make the promise must predate memory 
and reason both. As the example of Zarathustra shows, it also postdates memory and 
reason. Yet, the “blond beast” or the “superman” putatively gains something entirely 
different from making promises than the self-satisfaction of being reliable that the 
“sovereign individual” feels.369 One could argue that the “blond beast” and the
367 “A seer, a wilier, a creator, a future itself and a bridge to the future -  and alas, also like a cripple 
upon this bridge: Zarathustra is all o f this”. Nietzsche, “Of Redemption”, Thus Spake Zarathustra 
(Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1997), p. 161.
368 Keep in mind that one o f the underlying questions here is time in all its permutations: “According to 
Heidegger, Zarathustra teaches not morality but metaphysics: he brings a message o f ‘redemption’ 
which may release us from ‘antipathy’ -  Widerwille, literally, ‘against will’ -  towards the passage of  
time”. This does not release us from willing, rather it defines willing as “the ‘Being o f beings as a 
whole’”, and therefore antipathy becomes affirmation. Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 88. In this 
schema, time and will are indissolubly linked.
369 NB: the question of the “individual” must be approached very, very carefully. Thus far I have used 
the term only insofar as Nietzsche uses it. For a discussion of the term and its possible meanings in 
modernity, see Murphy, The Oldest Social Science. In particular, die nexus between “individual”, 
“memory” and “future” is caught and questioned in the middle of the inversion or “overcoming” that 
society is presently: “Should we not let go of our memories? Should we not allow ourselves to be 
open to the future, and learn to live without the fantasy of security and paternity which the older other 
vision, which we can now see as a vision, held out, once, to us? [W]e need...to be more sensitive to the 
rather peculiar character of the individualism which has been installed in our age, using the building 
blocks of so many half-memories, and to recognize that this modem individualism sits alongside 
epistemic and orientational attitudes and practices through which this same individual is effaced into 
the average man. The freedom of the individual is triumphant at the same time as the erasure of the 
institutional and epistemic presuppositions which for so long sustained the individual as a ‘meaningful’ 
project”. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science, p. 34. (n. 99 omitted)
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superman” gain the ability to make important or fateful promises: to enact human 
sacrifices, to deny contractual society, to be an autochthonous citizen of a polis that 
we cannot imagine. It is not clear what the purpose of memory or reason would be to 
a person who remembers and forgets seamlessly, without the aide-memoire of pain.
In this shifting world of forces and objects, Nietzsche’s analyses illuminate 
what is at stake in debates regarding cultural property. Nietzsche’s inversion of the 
past into the future, of memory into desire, sets a new horizon-line for addressing 
cultural property claims. “For Nietzsche all great things bring about their own demise 
through a process of self-overcoming”.370 The claim for return of cultural objects, the 
reaching for and use of great art, great ancient cultures: these gestures form an act of 
self-overcoming, a necessary and necessarily-cannibalized foundation for the future. 
The gesture is the “dice-throw”, the scooping up the past in order to throw it forward, 
to overcome, to invert, to survive, to grow, to be stronger, to be the same but 
different. The desire to keep on desiring (memory) and the object through which 
desire focuses itself (the Parthenon Marbles) conspire in an elision of time, an attempt 
to slip the constraints of time and vault into immortality. What else is required by 
“nature” for the sovereign individual, does the sovereign individual come to require 
of himself? The very notion of desire, of “longing”, is pinned to immortality.371 
Immortality and mortality, mourning, alterity: memory is concerned with what can 
be acquired and overcome. As in archaeology, memory is concerned with what can 
come to function as a foundation, which will in turn, and necessarily be forgotten.
If the gesture is the dice-throw and the field or ground for this gesture is the 
shifting field of forces geared to immortality, the figure that animates the ground of 
this discourse is the figure of memory, and the technique by which it does so is a
370 On the Genealogy o f  Morality, editor’s introduction, Keith Ansell-Pearson, p. xix.
371 Susan Stewart makes this point in On Longing: Narratives o f the Miniature, the Gigantic, the 
Souvenir, the Collection (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993). She traces the meaning 
of “longing” as longing for or after immortality (1713, Oxford English Dictionary). She continues: 
“[T]he location of desire, or...the direction o f force in the desiring narrative, is always a future-past, a 
deferment of experience in the direction of origin and thus eschaton, the point where narrative 
begins/ends...” . Stewart, On Longing, p. x.
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steadfast fictionalization, or “lying”, in the face of a “truth”372 that might express any 
other will to power. The hallmarks of memory as mechanism of cultural property 
claims, like those of memory as a technique of “overcoming”, are falsehood and 
repression. Memory inverts into forced, not “natural” forgetting, it is uncomfortable 
with both the past and the future. Engaging in the discourses of memory mean taking 
up a (consciously?) resistant posture, in which memory, and forgetting,373 both stand 
as barriers to the strategies and tactics of competing wills.
This stance raises the question of representation: language and “reality” have 
to be untangled in order for the techniques of memory and narrative to be visible. 
Modem ideas of memory both partake in and must address this problem, in contrast 
to ancient or medieval constructions of memory, in which memory is coeval with 
knowledge, organized on a grid of representation in which the phenomenological 
triangle of viewer/object/perspective remains unproblematic.374 The fictionalizing or 
“lying” stance is that of narrative. The past as narrative requires a (constructed) link
' i ' j e
between the authority of the poet or storyteller and that of the scholar.
372 any sort of truth: political, historical, scientific. “Truth” is a term that must be explored in some 
depth. Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), attempts to resolve the internal contradictions regarding “truth” in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy.
373 Cf. Peter Goodrich, “Of law and forgetting: literature, ethics and legal judgment” in Law in the 
Courts o f  Love: Literature and other minor jurisprudences (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 
pp. 112-37. Goodrich makes the point that law resists (denies) its genre (literature), and through this 
“aspires to assume the modem character and quality of the discourse o f fate” Ibid. p. 112. Fate cannot 
be argued with, it exists at no and at all times, and, working within the available personae and scenes 
of the law, it allows judgment without responsibility. Goodrich argues that the confusion and denial of 
genres is deliberate and disingenuous, and is a technique of forgetting that “must be correlated initially 
to the phantasm of an origin. Forgetting institutes an invisible and so absolute cause, a non-empirical 
source, an image or symbol o f certitude.. .which memory cannot directly supply and yet which science 
needs as the most basic justification o f its enterprise”. Goodrich, Law in the Courts o f Love, pp. 121-2.
374 The two basic modem treatises on memory and the ars memoria, as well as a growing field of legal 
analysis that derives from the techniques of literary and anthropological criticism, demonstrate that 
memory and forgetting have only recently been understood as primarily psychological states connected 
to “individual” psyches. Rather, memory served many communal, social functions. Among scholars, 
memory and learning or knowledge were indissolubly linked. Remembered (and actively 
remembering) texts identified members of a community to each other, and guaranteed their continued 
membership in that community. Mnemonic technique anchored rhetoric, and thus oratory, public 
argument and persuasion of all kinds. Frances Yates, The Art o f Memory (London: Ark Paperbacks,
1984); Mary Carruthers, The Book o f Memory: A Study o f Memory in Medieval Culture (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
375 There is an interesting question here about the various senses that are used in memory and that 
underpin (different kinds of) authority (even though mnemonics are a tool o f rhetoric): the blind poet
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The figure of memory (Mnemosyne)
The modem art of memory (as seen in psychoanalysis, oral history and 
“heritage” discourses) is rooted in the Romantic movement in poetry and painting, as 
well as in the notion of “resurrectionism”.376 This is to root modem memory in a 
persistent sense of anxiety and nostalgia, a position that it shares with other concepts 
(particularly that of time) in “modernity”.377 The direction of speech is towards the 
dead rather than towards the living, the direction of vision is internal rather than 
external. Therefore, the link between memory and the past requires an examination 
of the link between memory and mourning. In the realms of literary criticism, 
memory as a trope or figure is connected to mourning and to mortality, thus to the 
ethics of identity and alterity.378 Considering the work of Paul de Man -  and 
eulogizing de Man after his death -  Derrida links the figure of Mnemosyne379 with 
mourning. He draws a distinction, rooted in psychoanalytic theory, between possible 
and impossible mourning. In possible mourning, one interiorizes the image or ideal 
of the other, as opposed to an “impossible mourning, which, leaving the other his 
alterity, respecting thus his infinite remove, either refuses to take or is incapable of 
taking the other within oneself, as in the tomb or the vault of some narcissism”. 
Derrida defines the tropological use of “memory” to mean a certain relation that
or storyteller, the sighted scholar who has committed a text so perfectly to memory that he can “read it 
into” the blank center o f a page of commentary and marginal comments -  the center of the page left 
blank by later commentators, so only those who had read and memorized -  internalized -  the text, 
could “read” the book. Carruthers, The Book o f  Memory, Ch. 6: “ Memory and Authority”, pp. 189- 
220, see pp. 217-18.
376 Samuel, Theatres o f Memory, p. viii: “’resurrectionism’... [was]. . .a history which aimed to give a 
voice to the voiceless and speak to the fallen dead”.
377 “[The Romantic era’s] idea of memory was premised on a sense of loss. It divorced memory-work 
from any claim to science, assigning it instead to the realm of the intuitive and instinctual. It pictured 
the mind not as a watchtower but as a labyrinth, a subterranean place full of contrived corridors and 
hidden passages. Instead of anamnesis, the recollection that resulted from memory-training and 
conscious acts of will, imaginative weight fell on what Proust called ‘involuntary memory’ -  the 
sleeping traumas which spring to life in times o f crisis”. Samuel, Theatres o f Memory, p. ix.
378 Jacques Derrida, “Part I: Mnemosyne” in Memoires: fo r Paul de Man (New York and Chichester: 
Columbia University Press, 1986). See also Goodrich, Law in the Courts o f  Love.
379 the goddess of memory, who also represents wisdom and is the mother o f the Muses
380 Derrida, Memoires, p. 6.
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exists between a speaker and his or her subject, a relation that is internal but that 
makes the internal visible to the speaker, so in a sense turns him or her inside out.
Once again, the defining moment of memory is the vault from origin 
(unknown and unknowable) into the future (also unknown and unknowable). In order 
for memory to be more than “a technics, a recording”, impossible mourning must be
™  i
attempted via an originary affirmation. Memory depends on affirmation, a pre­
existing, non-rational “yes” that extends into an always-unknowable future.382 In this
l O - l
sense, Derrida (and de Man) access the themes addressed by Nietzsche. Yet, this 
affirmation, while bringing the self into resolution for the self, does not rest there.
The key to “impossible” mourning is precisely that it rests both before and beyond the 
self, anchoring the dual, or Janus-faced nature of narrative: “Is narrative possible? 
Who can claim to know what a narrative entails? Or, before that, the memory it lays 
claim to?”384 In the meeting of mortal with mortal, which is “really” the meeting of 
mortal with his or her own mortality, what we have “is the origin of fiction, of 
apocryphal figuration.. .”385 An opening, in language, becomes possible out of the 
impossibility of “true” mourning. This generates the deployment of several genres 
and tropes that describe the work of memory: autobiography,386 prosopopeia and the
ooo
epitaph, and allegory. Fiction empts to fill the space otherwise left always 
empty. The originary affirmation remains a “yes” that cries out “I will!”
381 Ibid. p. 32.
382 “[T]he “yes”, which is a non-active act, which states or describes nothing, which in itself neither 
manifests nor defines any content, this yes only commits, before and beyond everything else. And to 
do so, it must repeat itself to itself: yes, yes. It must preserve memory; it must commit itself to 
keeping its own memory; it must promise itself to itself; it must bind itself to memory for memory, if  
anything is ever to come from the future. This is the law, and this is what the performative category, in 
its current state, can merely approach, at the moment when “yes” is said, and “yes” to that “yes”. Ibid.
p. 20.
383 Ibid. p. 31. As will be seen below, resistance, affirmation, and truth converge in criticism that 
attempts to denude language of its generic (lyrical) and pseudo-historical character, that demands 
rigorous attention to the work of memory.
384 Ibid. p. 10.
385 Ibid. p. 34.
386 Ibid. pp. 22-24.
387 Ibid. pp. 25-27.
388 Derrida describes de Man’s definition of “allegory” as “a sort of narrative (rather than historical) 
fable -  or rather, that of a story which certain people know how to tell about something which, finally, 
is not historical”. Ibid. p. 36.
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These genres and tropes are all interstitial, reflecting the interstitial nature of 
memory and narrative in this scheme of analysis. Like memory, they inhabit the 
space “between Being and the law”389 and “between fiction and truth...”.390 Like 
memory, they cannot possibly (or impossibly) express the truth. In Derrida’s work, 
“[t]he ‘truth’ of ‘true mourning’ is.. .part of the procession” that Nietzsche describes: 
“What is truth then? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, and 
anthropomorphisms”.391 “True mourning” is only slightly “less deluded” than these 
other forms of truth. “The most it can do is to allow for non-comprehension and 
enumerate .. .prosaic, or better, historical modes of language power”.392 This 
stripping away of the comforts of language brings out and makes possible analyses of 
‘“ resistances’ and of the symptoms they produce (for example the ‘resistance to 
theory’ in literary studies)”.393 In this sense, true mourning functions as a resistance 
to resistance, as an acceptance of the little “truth” available to the mourning subject, 
who has become, himself, the object of his own memory. In this endeavour, the 
space opened between speech and image is familiar.394 The distance between the sign 
and the signifier, between the “self’ and the “other” has already begun to be explored, 
and the resulting landscape is now being imported, more or less wholesale, into this 
realm of images and attachments, beliefs based in mythologies of family and history, 
and entitlements conferred, still, by blood.395 Despite the “alliance” of affirmation, 
and the future-oriented finitude which is “the trace of the other in us”,396
389 Ibid. p. 10.
390 Ibid. p. 22.
391 Ibid. p. 30, quoting Paul de Man in “Anthropomorphism and the Trope in the Lyric”, which begins 
with a quote from Nietzsche.
392 Idem, quoting Paul de Man in “Anthropomorphism and the Trope in the Lyric”, p. 262.
393 Idem
394 One could say, cynically, that in the modem, or recent literature, memory becomes important again 
as the latest prey of modernity, the most recent “thing” to become post-modern.
395 Cf. Julia Kristeva, Strangers to ourselves (New York: Columbia University Press.
1991). (Translated by Leon Roudiez)
396 Derrida, Memoires, p. 29.
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Derrida knows that “in memory o f’ are words that we can never resolve to our 
satisfaction: “[w]e remain in disbelief itself. For never will we believe either in death 
or immortality.. 397
In Derrida’s scheme, we overcome not mourning but our own mourning, and 
then rarely. The work of memory and mourning, however, is the work of 
“overcoming” described in the Genealogy. Man forces an unnatural result, and in the 
rupture or rift that creates, a new faculty comes into being. With the new faculty 
comes a new “man”. Caught between forgetting and impossible mourning, we 
expand past our boundaries: we speak of others’ lives when they are not there to 
contradict us, and of time that has (always?) already slipped its moorings. We take 
ownership of the past. This act of affirmation -  the “yes” that cries out “I will!”— is 
the act needed to claim ancient objects or to occupy or rebuild ruins. It is a cry of 
fictional recognition, of desire-driven appropriation, of power that seeks to overturn 
the loss o f memory in the past. It is unethical, brutal, and it is a relief.
The results of purposive memory: the future
Does the link between memory and mourning only arise when we face the 
alterity of death, which is in fact that of our own mortality? Or is “death” what we 
always face in the past, the meaning of “the past” to us? It is possible that when 
facing an ancient object -  freighted with the past, but immortal, outlasting 
comprehensible stretches of human time -  the relationship between memory and 
mortality, between memory and mourning changes. Our conception of the 
immortality of the object may restructure the process(es) of memory in us, so that the 
impossible (either mourning or immortality) becomes possible (in some evolutionary 
fantasy, guaranteed by the narrative of “the past”). Alternatively, the terrible fragility 
of ancient things may cause greater mourning. If, however, these questions resolve 
themselves into questions of immortality, of endless desire rather than “endless
397 Ibid. p .  21.
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•  398mourning”, then we stand in a complicated, compromised position opposite time. 
We stand in the position of “afterwards” in order to move forward, a position that 
affirms the necessary affirmation, and raises interesting questions.399
A different reading of the possibilities of memory and mourning suggests a 
different approach to take to achieve “reason”, in order to access a different version 
of (civic) “overcoming”. In the reading proposed by Gillian Rose, reason can be 
released from the debates that diminish it in modernity (the schisms between 
representation and reality, between metaphysics and ontology), and also the 
brutalities that lodge it in mourning. She argues that memory and reason can work 
together gradually to rediscover their own moveable boundaries, as they explore the 
boundaries of the soul, the city and the sacred.400 In theory, reason can work with and 
through memory to complete mourning. Completed mourning acknowledges the 
creative involvement of action in the configurations of power and law: it does not find 
itself unequivocally in a closed circuit that exclusively confers logic and power.401 
Action then is not caught between representation (metaphysics) and ethics, or 
between ontology and “the law” of naming, of language. Rather, “explorations of our 
mutual entanglements in power” can be based on an understanding of “reality” that is 
neither founded in metaphysics nor results in narcissism. As a result, reason can 
survive modernity402 and its denial of classical philosophical foundations:
[I]f.. .“reality” is intrinsically relational and experience is generated between 
what interconnected actors posit as independent of them and their difficult 
discovery of those positings, then the critique of representation becomes 
possible without it depending on any outworn metaphysical base.403
398 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 11.
399 This is a question of forced civic amnesia as well as one o f anamnesis. For the stance required, see: 
Nicole Loraux, “Of Amnesty and Its Opposite”, in Mothers in Mourning (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), pp. 83-109; Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation o f Reality in 
Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). (Translated by Willard R. Trask)
400 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation, generally.
401 Ibid. pp. 11-12.
402 For an expanded explanation of this relation/opposition, see Rose, ibid pp. 27-31.
403 Ibid. p. 13.
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The freedom that results is positive and outwardly-directed.
The view of “reality” that Rose argues for here depends on a 
“phenomenological description of experience”, and it sustains learning, growth, and 
knowledge “as fallible and precarious, but risk-able”.404 The “risk” is directly the 
opposite from that contemplated by Derrida. It is a risk of making “temporarily 
constitutive positings of each other which form and reform both selves”,405 which is a 
risk of positing, failing, and positing again. The risk is of “activity beyond activity”406 
rather than the Levinasian “passivity beyond passivity” which results from 
interiorized mourning. “Activity beyond activity” remains an ethical formulation of 
the problem, but its “direction of fit” with “otherness” is different than Levinas’s. In 
this analysis, the idea of political action is not necessarily determined by a closed or 
already-defined notion of the subject. The realm that we would like to live in may be 
barred to us, but there is a huge realm of possible action remaining. Memory and 
mourning are turned not towards the individual but towards the polis.
Rose discusses this through analyzing the meaning of a painting by Poussin, 
Gathering the Ashes o f Phocion 407 Phocion’s mourning wife defies the law of the 
city to gather his ashes. One reading of the act of gathering the ashes is that it is an 
act of perfect love; it is opposed to reason and to law, and it is necessarily outside the 
boundaries of the unjust city, which is represented by the classical architecture 
depicted behind the two women. Rose puts forward the opposite argument. She 
argues that the classical buildings
present the rational order which throws into relief the specific act of injustice 
perpetrated by the current representatives of the city -  an act which takes
405 Idem (emphasis added).
406 Idem (emphasis added).
407 “Phocion was an Athenian general and statesman, who offered a model o f civic virtue in his public 
and his private life. ...[He] was eventually accused of treason by his enemies, and was sentenced to 
die...by taking hemlock. As an additional disgrace, Phocion’s burial within Athens was forbidden, 
and no Athenian was to provide fire for his funeral. His body was taken outside the city walls and 
burnt by a paid alien; his ashes were left untended on the pyre. ... The painting shows Phocion’s wife 
with a trusted woman companion. They have come to the place outside the city wall where the body of 
Phocion was burnt so that Phocion’s wife may gather his ashes...”. Ibid. p. 23.
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place outside the boundary wall of the built city. The gathering of the ashes is 
a protest against arbitrary power; it is not a protest against power and the law 
as such. To oppose anarchic, individual love or good to civil or public ill is to 
deny the third which gives meaning to both.. .the just city and the just act, the 
just man and the just woman. In Poussin’s painting, this transcendent but 
moumable justice is configured, its absence given presence, in the 
architectural perspective which frames and focuses the enacted justice of the 
two women. To see the built forms themselves as ciphers of the unjust city 
has political consequences: it perpetuates endless dying and endless tyranny, 
and it ruins the possibility of political action.408
The grieving woman and the acts of memorialization and mourning correct 
the law, do not challenge reason. The citizens of the polls are the “just man and the 
just woman”. The just city is the city that creates these people; they are “sovereign 
individuals”, they are themselves memorialized.
There are too many differences between Phocion’s wife and Praxithea to 
attempt a true analogy. Nevertheless, despite their differences, the stories have a few 
similarities. In the just city (or the city perceived as just), memory and mourning 
invert into autochthony and immortality. On the walls or against the walls of the 
living city, or on the outskirts of the ideal(-ized) (interiorized) city, mourning finishes 
and memory has work to do amongst a web of forces and experiences. To do the 
work of memory and to complete mourning in this context, one has to reject the 
(purely) interstitial reading of the nature of memory itself. Praxithea and Phocion’s 
(unnamed) wife act to create the necessary tropes of memorialization, and their 
actions save and reflect the just city. This is in keeping with the legal analyses 
referenced above, as well with theories of historical and political memory. The 
argument made by Raphael Samuel in Theatres o f Memory, and in much of the 
contemporary discourse in history, heritage and museum studies, is that:
408 Ibid. p .  26.
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[MJemory.. .is an active, shaping force; that it is dynamic -  what it contrives 
symptomatically to forget is as important as what it remembers -  and that it is 
dialectically related to historical thought, rather than being some kind of
-  - 409negative other to it.
This is the sort of memory used in and by cultural property discourse. It is the 
memory of autobiographical and fictional tropes turned to the uses of law, to claim a 
belief in the continuation of a just place, a just future.
Forgetting
The question of forgetting first arose as the description of one aspect of how 
memory serves as resistance and mechanism, forcing the human being out of a 
singular state and into a position of (personal and political) responsibility to others.410 
To return briefly to the question, and to the Ancient Greeks, is forgetting any more 
possible than true memory or mourning? The Ancient Greeks recognized and 
rejected what the city feared: the “fascination of loss”, “pleasure of tears” and 
“suspended time” which threatens the positivity of the political sphere: “Hence the 
rejection of memory when it tries to be the guardian of rifts and breaches: the city 
wants to live and perpetuate itself without breaks, and its citizens must not wear 
themselves out with crying” 411 In the ancient Greek polis, mourning or lamentation 
had to stay within emotionally and politically acceptable bounds. The result could be 
“tantamount to the banning of memory -  that is, of certain kinds of memory”.412 The 
exception to this rule was the “lamentation of mothers” -  women who had the right to 
mourn publicly. Although Praxithea was allowed to mourn, Loraux, speaking of her
409 Samuel, Theatres o f  Memory, p. x.
410 cf. Goodrich, Law in the Courts o f Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences.
411 Loraux, Mothers in Mourning, p. 10.
412 “[I]n the year 492, the dramatist Phrynicus presented his Athenian audience with a tragedy about 
the capture o f the Ionian city o f Miletus by the Persians in 494. .. .The emotional impact on the 
audience -  a veritable explosion of tears -  led to such a political uproar that Phrynicus was fined one 
thousand drachmas as punishment for having ‘reminded’ the Athenians ‘o f their own misfortunes’... 
[A]ny future performance of this tragedy.. .was interdicted by the state...”. Gregory Nagy, 
“Foreword”, in Loraux, Mothers in Mourning, p.xi.
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zeal to sacrifice her daughters, comments that Praxithea is “Athenian” more than 
“mother” and that as Praxithea wraps herself in the autochthonous ideal, she is “elated 
with a very personal fanatical sense of citizenship that she pushes to the limits of 
deceit” in not just offering her daughter but “freely giving” her...”.413 Praxithea is 
poised to memorialize, not mourn, her daughter in the service of the Athenian city.
“Laws exist to delimit the bounds of mourning”.414 In the law of Ancient 
Greece, mourning ends with memorialization and the command to forget. The 
command to forget encapsulates the essence of the Ancient Greek idea of amnesty. 
Forgetting weaves personal mourning into political life; as regards the law, it is 
within the ambit of power to compel amnesty. Civic memory and civic forgetting 
were linked but orthogonal to mourning and lamentation. The memory was banned in 
order to ban the rage and the endless cycles of retaliation that accompany absolute 
grief; it was legal and legally enforced forgetting. Amnesty and amnesia were 
linked.415 What was selected fo r  forgetting was what was deemed no longer essential 
fo r the future o f the city or the people, 4 1 6  Is this possible today?417 As Loraux asked 
regarding the Ancient Greeks, is there ever absolution for absolute grief, cycles of 
endless retaliation? In Ancient Greece, amnesty was “formal civic act of 
nonremembering” 418 The discourse of cultural property shows us that rather than 
remembering and refusing to remember, we forget and refuse to forget. In this sense, 
we are still where Nietzsche placed us over a century ago.
What does this mean for cultural property?
The links between objects, memory, and history -  between things and 
interpretive discourse -  are themselves the fabric of the discursive field through
413 Loraux, Mothers in Mourning, p. 14.
4,4 Ibid. p. 19.
415 Loraux, “Of Amnesty and Its Opposite”, in Mothers in Mourning, pp. 83-4.
4,6 Ibid. pp. 84-93. I do not do her argument justice, as she displays a complexity of thought and scope 
of erudition that would require a Chapter of its own.
417 There is a great deal o f scholarship on this question. See, for example, Forty and Kuchler eds, The 
Art o f Forgetting.
418 Nagy, “Foreword” in Loraux, Mothers in Mourning, p. xii.
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\which the law generates the narratives that validate claims to pieces of cultural 
property. The narratives of past events are themselves often, if not essentially, 
fictional.419 The narrative that defines a relic is the narrative that weaves memory and 
history into and through the physical object, destabilizing the “thing-ness” of the 
object itself420 Furthermore, “the past’s empirical absence leaves a grain of doubt 
which philosophical analysis cannot wholly allay”.421 It may seem self-evident that 
physical objects anchor the narrative(s) of the past better than remembered events; 
arguably a vase or statue or piece of flint keeps its shape through time, is merely 
glossed by the often competing or challenged stories told about it. Yet both as 
physical objects and as loci of memory or history, relics are themselves in flux. The 
physical being of objects leads inevitably to their decay. As importantly, however, 
objects (in particular of this kind) cannot be separated from the disciplines of memory 
and history, and the meanings that attach to or are found in these disciplines 422 
Objects from the ancient past may remain physically present while being 
phenomenologically irrelevant to the knowledge of the past that they are presumed to 
guarantee.423 In short:
Memory, history, and relics offer routes to the past best traversed in 
combination. Each route requires the others for the journey to be significant 
and credible. Relics trigger recollection, which history affirms and extends
419 “All accounts of the past tell stories about it, and hence are partly invented; as we have seen, story­
telling also imposes its exigencies on history”. Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country,
p. 229.
420 “Every relic thus exists simultaneously in the past and in the present. What leads us to identify 
things as antiquated or ancient varies with environment and history, with individual and culture, with 
historical awareness and inclination”. Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p. 241. See, also, 
Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy.
421 Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, p. 190.
422 “Ubiquitous as they are, relics suffer greater attrition than do memories or histories. Whereas 
history in print and memories recorded on tape can be disseminated without limit and are thus 
potentially immortal, physical relics are continually worn away. ...Were artifacts like memories, 
everything ever built might be brought to light again, Freud suggests.... Remote and recent memories 
often survive along with present impressions of the same scene, but for artifacts the new must replace 
the old [or the old the new]; material things emerge by discarding previous integuments. Otherwise 
past and present would blur into unintelligibility.... Artifacts are ceaselessly effaced, whether suddenly 
destroyed by earthquake or flood, war or iconoclasm, or slowly perishing by erosion. Less of last 
week survives than o f yesterday, less o f last year than of last month”. Ibid. p. 239.
423 “[AJrtifacts are simultaneously past and present; their historical connotations coincide with their 
modern roles, commingling and sometimes confusing them.... The tangible past is in continual flux, 
altering, ageing, renewing, and always interacting with the present”. Ibid. p. 248.
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backwards in time. History in isolation is barren and lifeless; relics mean only
what history and memory convey.424
In this argument, once again memory is like history: “inherently revisionist 
and never more chameleon than when it appears to stay the same”.425 Like history, 
memory is a creature of the present,426 and like memory, history is a story told 
according to the constraints or rules of fiction.427 In this scheme, critical theory 
should recognize that memory constructed in this manner functions to allow 
necessary fictions. The truths that are at stake in cultural property debates cannot be 
erased by knowledge, as they are both fictional and real; they are stories told about 
desire, translated into promises regarding the future. In this sense, the fictions of 
memory become “truths” as obdurate and permeable as the objects themselves.
Unless this understanding serves as the linchpin of analyses of claims for return, the 
objects themselves -  the bowls and columns and vases and masks -  remain 
untouched, still elude theory. An object can only be understood -  in its ownership as 
well as in any other quality -  by understanding the stories that are told about it. ITie 
“falseness” of the memory is in direct proportion to the magnitude (if not the meaning 
of) the claim to the object.
Objects that are defined as cultural property are riddled with absences: the 
people who made the object, those who worshipped it or at it, the various fluxes of 
populations that acquired it, “legally” or not. Rights attach to long-dead figures in the 
past, which are reanimated and returned to relevance. In this sense, old objects are 
always palimpsests, come to the present with erasures and attachments, marginal 
interpretations and unintended emendations. The authority of history or science, the
424 Ibid. p. 249.
425 Samuel, Theatres o f Memory, p. x.
426 “[Mjemory is historically conditioned, changing colour and shape according to the emergencies of 
the moment;.. .it is progressively altered from generation to generation. It bears the impress of 
experience, in however mediated a way. It is stamped with the ruling passions o f its time”. Samuel, 
Theatres o f Memory, p. x.
427 “[Hjistory involves a series o f erasures, emendations and amalgamations quite similar to those 
which Freud sets out in his account of “screen memories”, where the unconscious mind, splitting, 
telescoping, displacing and projecting, transposes incidents from one time register to another and 
materializes thought in imagery”. Idem.
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428identities that would seem to control possession or reappropriation of these objects, 
are brought to the “thing itself’ in overlapping, purposeful waves. There is thus a 
primary contradiction in attempting to understand the field on which cultural property 
debates are enacted. The fluidity of the discourse comes up against the solidity of the 
object. The reverse is also true: the solidity of the discourse (for example, the 
language of law and the tropes or patterns of “cases” and “judgments”) comes up 
against the fluidity of objects that are always being interpreted and thus recreated. 
There is an ever-shifting line or “membrane” between discourse and (physical) object, 
the membrane that itself creates “property”.
As such, ownership occurs on this line. The valid owner is, or will be, the 
owner that is directing the vector of narrative discourses of desire and attachment.429 
This membrane is mediated by power, by will, and by the process of human 
development, the exercise of will to move forward through the process of 
“overcoming” described by Friedrich Nietzsche in his philosophy.430 The question of 
“justice”, hotly debated, also performs this strange inversion from past to future, from 
the stem rules of ownership and contract that define what Nietzsche labels 
“prehistory” or “morality of custom” to a legal scheme of justice premised on the 
increasing wealth and security of the original owners of the object. Following 
Nietzsche, the superabundance of goods and (cultural) security means that certain 
communities can “afford” to “lose” the objects that used to represent their most 
cherished possessions. On the other hand, as the Western world becomes richer, 
museums, heritage sites, and claims for cultural property are proliferating. It is 
possible that in the endless future of modernity, ownership of the past becomes ever 
more necessary. As a result of these inherent contradictions and shifting attachments
428 For example, identities of nationhood, language, purpose, ethnic association.
429 See, generally, for property and desire, Jeanne Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, 
property, and the feminine (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
430 Will to power and the composition of “the world” in Nietzsche’s philosophy merge; see Clark, 
Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, Ch. 7: The Will to Power, pp. 205-44, in particular the point that 
“The idea is that the world consists not o f things, but o f quanta o f force engaged in something o f the 
order o f ‘universal power-struggle’ ...with each center of force having or being a tendency to extend its 
influence and incorporate other such centers... .Heidegger seems right that will to power constitutes 
Nietzsche’s answer to the metaphysical question concerning the essence of what is ...”. p. 206.
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to objects, the field of cultural property analysis must be approached via a theory or 
philosophy that can address the fluidity of the conflicts presented. The question of 
origin and that of narrative need to be addressed in a way that allows for the eruption 
as well as the recovery of contested objects.
To return to the question presented by the case of the Parthenon Marbles, the 
foregoing analysis seeks only to explore some of the investments and mechanisms 
that perpetuate the conflict, rather than to propose any particular solution. Property 
does not exist without the desire for possession, and it is that desire that must be 
understood.431 Cultural property is, strangely, more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
desire than other sorts of property, because it requires the memory of many people 
and the shared concern for a common future. The language of cultural property law 
makes the assumption that this sort of interest exists. But if it doesn’t? Artifacts are 
vulnerable to war, decay, and the depredations of collectors; they are vulnerable not 
to amnesia but to the dreadful forgetting that underlies flares of memory and 
memorialization. The debate(s) regarding the ownership of the Marbles are better, 
overall, than the alternative to such debates.
Conclusion: Memory as ownership
The Parthenon is an iconic ruin. Fragmented, it still appears whole from an 
(essential) distance. For the modem person in Athens, the act of looking upwards has 
come to presume the experience of looking backwards in time, to a structure that 
retains its outline and authenticity from the originary point of its coming into being 
until the present moment, and which must be protected, unchanged, into the future. 
As has been suggested above, however, this experience is fictional, depending upon 
managed omissions and recently-acquired memories. This may not matter. It is the 
fierceness of the gaze rather than the clarity of the vision that wins such claims. 
Memory is always forgetting itself. It exceeds its boundaries, it knows impossible 
things, and it vanishes terribly and leaves nothing in its wake. As the romantic ideal
431 See Schroeder, The Vestal and the Fasces.
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collapses into the recognition of present artificiality and fragility, one must take a 
position on the questions of these claims regarding the past: one must contemplate 
whether the Parthenon requires the pieces taken from it, and which claimants require 
the ownership of the ruins more. We look to law to resolve these questions for us, to 
make fragments into wholes, things and stories both, transformed into objects that can 
be claimed or owned rather than simply found, lost, or mourned.
Simultaneously, however, arguments based around the possessive urge create 
a void around them, turn the full world of modernity, the world of forces and 
discourses, tactics and strategies, into a seeming emptiness. In part, this is because 
will creates a vacuum around itself of necessity, it requires a space in which to 
operate. In the most extreme formulation of the argument presented in this Chapter, 
we do not remember or own anything at all. To succeed in claims for ancient objects 
we must find a justification for ownership that prevents the very notion of owning an 
object that has outlasted immemorial human generations from seeming ridiculous.
By the time a legal or diplomatic claim is made for the “return” of some “property” 
by a “people”, the complex of desiring and storytelling, of self and object, present and 
past, that which is created by will, and that which is denied or promised by “history”, 
have all merged into claims of memory and attachment that sound like “I want” in 
full cry, or (its synonyms) “I deserve”, “I am entitled to”, “I reclaim”. To translate 
this cry into “justice” means to decode it, to find the engine that drives its tremendous 
power. In the philosophy of Nietzsche and the workings of memory, there is a 
beginning to this endeavour. In the Parthenon Marbles, like in all ancient artifacts, 
there is enough silence to make an end.
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Chapter Five Narratives of Origin: “Autochthonous” Heritage
The earth is the very quintessence o f the human condition... 432
(Hannah Arendt)
Chapter Five looks again at the case of the Parthenon Marbles. However, 
whereas the previous Chapter looked at the narratives of attachment that underlie 
legal claims, this Chapter looks at the narratives of origin (original possession and 
original identity) that are also used to establish ownership. This Chapter uses the 
same complex of fact, law and socio-historical materials to argue that the issues 
inhering in the legal claims for the return or retention of ancient objects of cultural 
property are issues that have to do with claiming a particular ground of (and for) 
origin on the parts of the claimants. Once again, the problem has as much to do with 
epistemology as it has to do with possession. The substantive argument made here is 
that narratives of origin in cultural property discourse are meant to stand against, or 
resist, the effects of the genealogical approach to knowledge. The primary effect of 
the genealogical approach to knowledge (an approach that has already been discussed 
in Chapter Three) is the almost-complete loss of certainty as to the truth of 
assessments of origin. This has two subsidiary effects: first, the effect on the object 
at stake is that it is increasingly “erased” by the discourses that seek to describe and to 
own it. The object is described and re-described according to the nodes of power, 
history, truth and possession that constitute it at any given moment. Second, in the 
realm of discourses of ownership, the effect of the genealogical approach is to “erase” 
the category of “owner” as well as that of “object”. Objects and owners, therefore, 
are in a state of flux.
This Chapter makes the substantive argument, intended to apply to all 
“cultural property”, that the claims brought for ownership are meant to address this 
situation of originary erasure and loss. It argues that the arguments regarding 
“origin” turn on commodification and heritage as a means of replacing genealogy
432 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 2.
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with certainty. Once again, we are in the realm of fiction. The fictions of heritage 
and the reifications of commodification seek to stand against the flux described 
above. “Heritage management” and commodification of the desired (fictional or 
mythological) originary identity are the techniques whereby the (irrational and 
unsustainable) desire for a particular and unshakeable origin is guaranteed by and 
transformed into ownership of the object itself.
This Chapter therefore proceeds in four steps. First, with reference to the 
Parthenon Marbles, it describes the search for rootedness or originary identity.
Again, some repetition of facts, law, or history from Chapters Two and Four is 
necessary (not merely inevitable). The Parthenon Marbles materials are here being 
analyzed to provide a substantive segment of a theorization of cultural property; as 
such, with each set of arguments the materials have to be re-examined. Second, more 
generally this Chapter demonstrates how this search is inescapably frustrated by the 
genealogical approach to origin. Third, it proposes that the response to this situation 
is found in the increasing prevalence of “heritage” and “commodification” in 
modernity. Finally, it concludes that the claims for repatriation, and even for 
retention, of a particular object turn on the claimants adopting the position of 
“autochthonous” peoples. This position is briefly distinguished from that of 
“indigenous peoples”, although this distinction (and its collapse) will be addressed at 
greater length in Chapter Six. This Chapter ends by considering whether the 
“autochthonous” position also reflects the problematics of the human condition 
discussed in the Introduction. The reliance on “heritage” may be both a response to 
“genealogy” and recognition that the loss of the earth itself is unbearable; possibly 
we seek to link ourselves in an archaic manner to that which may be leaving us 
behind.
Introduction: In search of “rootedness”
This Chapter focuses on the question that has been asked, implicitly when not 
explicitly, throughout this thesis. How do we assess, and indeed constitute, the value
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of cultural property? The case of the Parthenon Marbles, and the philosophy of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze, begin to address this 
question. The main point of the Chapter is that the value of an object of cultural 
property is in our use of it to stake a claim to a particular origin, and through that, to a 
rootedness in the world that can best be described or understood as the claim to an 
autochthonous identity. There are two further arguments that arise from this central 
premise. First, the reason for this claim is the uncertainty provoked by the status of 
the disciplines of origin and knowledge in modernity. Second, the effect of claiming 
this sort of rootedness is to destabilize the traditional and essentialist distinctions 
between “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” in this particular context, as narratives 
of origin, when traced back to their foundations, have largely similar goals. These are 
goals of primary “nobility”, “belonging”, “ownership” that can be merely stated 
rather than needing to be argued,433 As such, the goals of claiming autochthonous 
rootedness to the earth itself mirror the goals of some modem genres of 
scholarship.434 As in legal discourse the ownership of the objects at stake is the mode 
through which these meanings are expressed, the meaning or place of the law will be 
discussed through the legal formulations of means of owning origin, or “heritage”.
To recapitulate the central theorization of cultural property proposed in this 
thesis, the value, definition, and meaning(s) of cultural property are located at the 
nexus of two vectors: narratives of attachment and narratives of origin. Against this 
background, the determination (question) of origin must be understood as both
433 However, it is important not to confuse a reductionist approach to similarities of content among 
foundation myths with the more nuanced scholarship that looks to the purpose o f these myths. 
“Nineteenth-century German scholarship attempted to derive these multiple legends from a single 
myth, a creation myth common to all Greeks and which each city presented in its own local form: men 
bom of the Earth or the union of the Earth and the Sky.. ..But beyond the fact that these wearisome 
reductions to a single, semipitemal story generally overlook the specific traits o f each tradition or each 
figure, divine or human..., it is a poor method always to seek to reconstitute the singular, as if a 
primitive, unitary logos, lost for all time, continues to be expressed through fragments of discourse, 
accidental traces o f a paradigm that has disappeared.... It is not that each city wishes to tell in its own 
way the story of the birth of the first man. Every foundation myth is less concerned with providing a 
version of the beginnings of humankind than with postulating the original nobility o f a founder...”. 
Loraux, Bom o f the Earth, p. 9.
434 See, for example, the debate about the claims, purposes and problems of Afrocentric retellings of 
intellectual history: Lefkowitz, Not Out o f  Africa, especially “The Myth o f the Stolen Legacy”, pp. 
122-54.
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discursive and factual, that is, as inhabiting a field in which where a thing comes from 
is a matter of (usually ever-changing) interpretation. In this field, the claim to 
autochthonous ground (through these narratives of origin) is cross-referenced with the 
claims to memory (communal, social, political, architectural, rhetorical and other 
forms) as a genre of narratives of attachment. The claim(s) to memory have been 
addressed in the previous Chapter. The claim to origin is addressed here.
The research in the case of the Parthenon Marbles that founds this part of the 
thesis arguably shows that the most important discourse of origin in cultural property 
law postulates the autochthonous identity of the people making the claim to the 
object. The link between autochthonous origins and techniques of memory as 
forming claims to identity and ownership (of objects and land) is very old. To repeat 
the quotation from Herodotus given in the previous Chapter:
[I]n his list of peoples who inhabit the Peloponnese, the historian Herodotus 
carefully distinguishes those “staying in the same place”, meaning those 
whose ancestor is autochthonous, from the rest who are considered immigrant, 
or at least displaced populations.. .But autochthony must be earned. 
Etymologically only the first ancestor bom from the soil is autochthonous, he 
whose arrival establishes city life and legitimates the link between the people 
and their land. One further step, and the autochthony of the ancestor, 
transmitted by filiation, extends to all his descendants. Historians take note of 
this extension, at the same time employing the word subject to two conditions: 
When it concerns a people, autochthony characterizes the strict relationship 
which, from the beginning and uninterruptedly, attaches them to their land. 
...But out of Herodotus’ statement a second criterion emerges, implicit but 
imperative, which adds to the transmission of the soil, that of memory. It is 
well to occupy the land, but even better to maintain the autochthonous 
tradition, in order to strengthen the ties that bind the present to the time of
• ■ 435origin.
435 Loraux, Born o f  the Earth, pp. 14-15.
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Rather than looking at the requirements of memory, this Chapter looks at the 
complex of autochthony, filiation (heritage) and soil also at the center of the disputes 
regarding the ownership of very ancient objects.
The question remains, however, how to assess the “origin” of any ancient 
object. Therefore, the second step of the argument made here consists of aerating 
some of the problems that arise. The discourses that determine origin are discourses 
irradiated by all the uncertainties and shifting allegiances that characterize 
scholarship, or more precisely, knowledge in modernity. After Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Michel Foucault, the structure of knowledge, at least as the evaluation of values 
is concerned, is genealogy. The effect of this is to heighten the problems at issue. 
Certainty of knowledge, and the kind of certainty that could possibly ground claims 
of autochthony, is in very short supply in this scheme of knowledge. Rather, we must 
accept that the very knowledge we rely on to ground our claims to these objects is 
knowledge that erases rather than maintains certainty regarding origins. The 
discourses that we rely on in modernity are discourses that presume a fluid landscape 
of “nodes” and “rhizomes”, of contingent connections and sudden disconnections.
The more we look at an object through this sort of lens, especially a valued object, the 
more it fades from our view.
Therefore, we must be able to conceptualize a place in which neither 
“rootedness” nor ownership can be contested. “Heritage” is the modem form of 
origin-ownership. In the heritage scheme, origin becomes a product that can be 
owned and thus bought, sold, heightened, or traded. Commodification, therefore, 
becomes an interesting and necessary discourse (or topic) in this context. Not only 
are there many legal arguments regarding the commodification of the objects at stake, 
but also, in the argument of this Chapter, commodification is a necessary, and 
necessarily artificial, reification of the narratives of origin in this field. The 
commodification of narratives of origin, understood as “heritage”, along with 
fundamental claims to autochthony, serve as resistance to the process of erasure and 
loss that otherwise attends our attempts to find a kind of ground(ing) in these sorts of
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objects. Commodification is thus erroneous and necessary, highly artificial and yet 
fundamental to our valuation of cultural property.
The argument made in this Chapter, although proceeding through a close 
reading of the myths underlying the Parthenon frieze, could as easily be turned to the 
myths underlying the Indian Coalition’s claim for the return of the bones of 
Kennewick Man. The substance of the myths and meanings that inhere in the case of 
Kennewick Man will be discussed later in the thesis. For the moment, the issues that 
animate the argument are equally applicable to Kennewick Man. These issues are the 
means by which the subjects of dispute are created in the discursive field of cultural 
property, and intertwined with this, the meaning of “autochthonous” in this field, as 
well as the means by which the construction of “heritage” is responsive to the 
problems raised by narratives of origin in modernity.
The discursive and the factual define the same field (description makes 
the objects)
The traveler Pausanias, visiting the Acropolis in the second centuury A.D., 
described the sculptures that he saw decorating the pediments of the 
Parthenon as well as Pheidias’s monumental statue of Athena housed within 
(Paus. 1.24.5). He made no mention...however, of the 160-m-long frieze, set 
high and in the shadows of the exterior colonnade. Without an ancient source 
to confirm what the ancient viewers saw in this frieze, modem interpreters 
have been free to reconstruct a meaning on their own.436
The sculptures at the center of the dispute are large sections of the frieze that 
ran around the entire Parthenon 437 Currently, as described above, the bulk of the
436 Connelly, “Parthenon and ParthenoF, p. 53.
437 The frieze begins on the West side of the Parthenon, the side that the visitor first sees when entering 
the compound of the Acropolis. From there it then moves around the long North and South sides of 
the building until the two sides of the procession meet at the East side. From the West side therefore, 
which consists o f scenes of preparation, the procession moves up the North and the South sides in rows 
of horsemen, chariots, various marshals directing the procession and youths holding the horses, elders,
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frieze is in the Duveen Gallery of the British Museum, although there are a few 
panels in the Acropolis Museum in Athens, and two panels in the Louvre in Paris.
The Duveen Gallery has been described in Chapter Four, but again, it is worth 
restating the way in which the Marbles are displayed within the Gallery, and the 
experience of viewing them in their present location. Fundamentally, when one visits 
the Duveen Gallery, one sees a vista of classical art in a space specifically designed 
for it. The room is bare, colourless, dressed in polished stone, and set up in a counter­
intuitive manner. The gallery is a long rectangle, which one enters in the middle of 
one of the long walls. The fragments from the East frieze are to the right, and then 
the North frieze occupies the rest of the long wall on the right and continues on the 
opposite (long) wall. On the left is the beginning of the South frieze, which also 
continues on the opposite wall. Directly in front of the visitor is the East frieze, 
which consists of the focus of the ceremonial procession. As one enters the gallery, 
directly opposite the main door one sees the scene that originally existed on the East 
side of the Parthenon.
Horsemen, charioteers, musicians, water-carriers, animals for sacrifice all 
converge, from their two sides, on a strikingly enigmatic climax which is 
shown directly over the eastern door itself... :a piece of cloth is held up by, or 
passed between, a man and a child (male or female, it is not clear); behind the 
man, a woman seems about to take more cloth, or perhaps padded stools, from 
a pair of girls; on either side a group of deities, 12 in all, sit with their backs to 
the scene -  recognizably superhuman, because even seated they equal the 
height of the standing mortals.438
This culmination consists of a “mystery”.439 Clearly, the frieze refers to an 
event that engages and concerns the entire population of Athens, and there is a great 
deal of scholarship speculating on what that event might be. Until recently, the most
musicians, water-jar carriers, tray-bearers, and animals being led to sacrifice. The two arms meet at 
the ceremonial scene that takes place on the East side of the Parthenon. Here, there are the gods of 
Olympus, two adults (a man and a woman), two girls bearing trays with folded cloths on them, a child 
that could be either a girl or a boy, and magistrates or tribal heroes. St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the 
Marbles, pp. 51-53; Beard, The Parthenon, “Making Sense o f the Frieze”, pp. 128-37.
438 Ibid. p. 129.
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prevalent theory was that the frieze depicted the Panathenaic Festival, which 
celebrated Athena, the founding deity of Athens. James Stuart in the Antiquities o f  
Athens first proposed this theory in 1789. For many people this remains the most 
plausible explanation of the frieze.440 However, it does not account for the 
differences between what is historically known about the Panathenaic Festival and 
what is depicted on the frieze, and in particular, this theory does not account for “why 
the Athenians broke what seems otherwise to have been an iron rule of Greek temple 
sculpture -  that only mythological scenes, and never events from real life, were 
represented”.441 The problems of meaning are deepened by other considerations. 
First, as Mary Beard asks, “How, after all, would we recognise the correct ‘solution’ 
if we found it?”442 Second, the recent restoration of the Parthenon has uncovered 
heretofore unknown and surprising evidence of a second frieze, running around the 
inner eastern porch and over the main eastern door of the Parthenon. A fire destroyed 
this frieze in the third century A.D. The remaining fragments suggest that it was 
shorter than the frieze that still exists, and was seemingly carved more deeply. As far 
as can be reconstructed, it featured a row of standing female figures. No one knows 
what it could have meant, although “it is almost bound to have been seen as the 
continuation of the narrative which ended.. .at the scene with the peplos or shroud”.443
This striking new discovery only throws more attention on the meaning of the 
central scene of the surviving frieze.444 For the purposes of this Chapter, as for 
Chapter Four, the most persuasive account seems that put forward by Joan B. 
Connelly in “Parthenon and Parthenoi: A Mythological Interpretation of the 
Parthenon Frieze”.445 Therefore, it is worth restating Connelly’s project and
439 St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, pp. 53-5.
440 Sue Blundell, “Marriage and the maiden: narratives on the Parthenon”, in Sue Blundell and 
Margaret Williamson eds, The Sacred and the Feminine in Ancient Greece (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1980), pp. 47-70.
441 Beard, The Parthenon, p. 135.
442 Ibid. p. 136.
443 Ibid. p. 137.
444 “[I]t is an unsettling thought that the premise on which almost every explanation o f ‘our’ frieze has 
always been based -  that the strangely low-key incident with the cloth marks the climax of the story -  
is now called into question”. Beard, The Parthenon, p. 137.
445 American Journal o f Archaeology 100 (1996) 53-80.
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conclusions here. Connelly’s purpose is to take “a fresh look at the frieze within the 
context of the story preserved in the Erechtheus, and thereby allow for a very 
different reading of the images, one that may find greater harmony with the sculptural 
program of the Parthenon as a whole”.446 Connelly suggests that the subject matter of 
the frieze commemorates one of the founding myths of Athens (a topic in keeping 
with the standard sculptural programs of ancient Greek temples). Specifically, the 
Parthenon frieze depicts the myth in which one of the ancient kings of Athens, 
Erechtheus, was told that he must sacrifice one of his daughters in order to be 
guaranteed success in a war against the Thracians.447 All three had sworn, however, 
that if one must die they would all share that fate. Arguably, the East side of the 
frieze shows Erechtheus, his wife Praxithea, and the three daughters in the moment 
before the sacrifice. Erechtheus was the second great founding father of Athens.
Thus, the legend surrounding Erechtheus was one of the ancestor or tribal myths of 
Athens and a common topic or theme in Athenian art.
The mythical founders of the Athenian race, Kekrops and Erechthonios, 
sprung from the earth of the Acropolis448 and were portrayed as half-serpent, half­
man. These figures “represented a fundamental element of the land itself. The lower 
half of [their bodies]...was a serpent, indicating... [their] chthonic origin”.449 
Erechtheus is commonly accepted as Erechthonios’s grandson, although the names 
“Erechtheus” “Erechthonios” and “Kekrops” are often used interchangeably in other 
tellings of this foundational myth. As has already been stated in Chapter Four, the 
ancient Athenians of the classical period considered themselves to be an 
autochthonous people, a people that sprung from the land of the Acropolis itself450
446 Connelly, “Parthenon and Parthenoi ”, p. 57.
447 St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, p. 54.
448 “Hephaistos had once tried to rape Athene, and when she repulsed him he ejaculated onto her leg; 
the wool which she used to wipe away his semen was thrown onto the ground, and as a result a child, 
Erichthonious, was bom from the earth. The infant, who in some versions of the story had a torso 
which terminated in a snake, was then adopted by Athene as her foster-child and entrusted to the care 
of the daughters of Kekrops”. Blundell, “Marriage and the maiden: narratives on the Parthenon”, p. 
65.
449 Andronicos, The Acropolis, p. 16.
450 Ibid. p. 14.
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Therefore, arguably the subject matter of the frieze commemorates the union of race 
and land, man and earth as a founding moment of Athenian originary identity.
This identity was worth death in war and death in human sacrifice. A clear 
statement of this is found in Euripides’s Erechtheus,451 Once again, it is worth 
repeating the material presented earlier, as Erechtheus’s wife Praxithea’s speech goes 
to the assertion of autochthony via the soil as much as it does through the operation of 
memory and memorial techniques. In this play, Praxithea justifies the sacrifice of her 
daughters by saying that she is giving her children to the “city” much as a mother 
would send her sons to battle. This analogy maintains the political and the physical 
definition of autochthony: not only getting flesh and blood from the land, but giving 
it back. This relation makes Praxithea a “citizen” of Athens. It is, in many ways, a 
brutal exchange:
I shall give my daughter to be put to death. I take many things into account 
and first of all that I could not find any other city better than this. To begin 
with we are an autochthonous people... [Sjomeone who settles in one city 
from another is ... a citizen in name but not in his actions.452
This is the relationship to origin and identity that is arguably represented on the 
Parthenon frieze. A settler could die defending Athens but not partake in this 
relationship.
In support of Connelly’s position, when one visits the Acropolis Museum453 in 
search of pieces of the frieze, one has a completely different experience from that 
when one visits the British Museum. The Acropolis served as the center of Athens 
and of its cults and myths long before the Parthenon was constructed, and thus the 
museum places the remaining pieces of frieze in the context of other and very
451 See Chapter Four, n. 347.
452 C. Collard et al. Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays, vol. I (1995), p. 159.
453 See Chapter Four, n. 352.
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different artifacts.454 These artifacts, again first discussed in Chapter Four, are also 
relevant here. The sculptures of the archaic Parthenon consist of
“frightening monsters” with their superhuman strength and daemonic power,
.. .Their purpose is not to relate a story, but merely to remind one of the 
existence in the world of terrible powers that are overawing and 
overwhelming. Yet [finally] there is no one more powerful than man.... Attic 
sculpture displays the terrible power of supernatural beings but at the same 
time projects the human being, both heroic and mythical, who succeeds in 
harnessing this power 455
The figures on the pediments of the archaic Parthenon are half-man and half­
serpent, brightly-coloured animals, scenes of humankind’s “overcoming” both the 
bonds of memory and forgetting that constitute the process of becoming human,456 
and the dangers that attend chthonic origins and attachments. Although the Golden 
Age of Athens vanquished the “frightening monsters”, in the Classical order and 
rhythm of the Parthenon frieze is embedded the story of the link between a people 
and their place of origin. At the heart of this link are human sacrifice, war, death, and 
the political survival of the community.
Indeed, these concerns gave shape and meaning to the entire Parthenon 
itself.457 As Beard comments, “[t]he building and the funding of the Parthenon are
• • 458inseparable from the Athenian empire, its profits, its debates and discontents”.
Long after Athens ceased to be an empire, the Parthenon as a public building 
continued to represent the shifts in power and political and religious identity that 
attend all major civic structures that survive from antiquity. As discussed earlier,459 
even the most cursory history of the Parthenon and the artifacts that survive from it 
show that there is only the most fictional unity between the building itself and the
454 Andronicos, The Acropolis, p. 14.
455 Ibid. p. 69.
456 See Chapter Four generally.
457 See Chapter Four, “The Parthenon”.
458 Beard, The Parthenon, p. 39.
459 See Chapter Four, “The Parthenon”.
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“origins” that are contained within it. The line of descent from the Ancient Greek 
builders of the Parthenon to the modem Europeans that make up the Greek people 
today is contestable.460 Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
educated (usually expatriate) Greeks published scholarly arguments demonstrating 
the identity of “modem” and “Ancient” Greeks through the continuing identity of 
territory, language, and in some cases, physiognomy. (Indeed, argument on these 
themes continues today as regards the return or retention of the “Marbles”.)
It was originally as part of this struggle to establish and maintain the chosen 
national identity that the buildings on the Acropolis were restored. In contrast to the 
archaeological conventions followed today, the restoration of the Parthenon in the 
nineteenth century involved excavating down to the rock of the Acropolis. As both 
an expression of this belief and in order to achieve this result, the Parthenon was 
restored as a Romantic ruin of fifth century Athens 461 The traces of medieval and 
late Hellenistic history vanished. “Greece”, and by extension “Athens”, was not the 
multicultural, multilingual backwater it was during Ottoman rule, it instead came to 
represent, uninterruptedly, the center of the Classical, democratic world.
Throughout its history, and certainly in the present, the Parthenon and the 
Parthenon frieze462 retain their function as a link between race and soil, citizen and 
origin. This is of course not unique to the Parthenon. Cultural property claims 
regarding very ancient objects either occur in the context of the art market (which is 
one of almost pure commodification), or, by contrast, contest the right to occupy 
(inherit or own) these positions, that of member of the race, citizen of the (imaginary) 
city, product of the particular soil. Indeed, the two sources of value intermix and 
cross-define each other over the centuries. As a result, it is difficult to separate them 
today. In so far as broad understandings are useful in this field, our modem
460 St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles, pp. 322-4.
461 Ibid. p. 316. For a full discussion of the program of restoration of the Parthenon, see Chapters Two 
and Four.
462 The Marbles are often, if  not always, meant to stand for the Parthenon itself. See Beard, The 
Parthenon, p. 168 and generally.
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valorization of “autochthonous” might well merge with what it meant to the Ancient 
Greeks.
Autochthony defined
The terms autochthonic and autochthonous463 derive from the Greek 
autokhthon, bom from the earth [kthon] itself [autos] of one’s homeland. Yet the 
meaning of “coming from the earth of one’s homeland” is not simple. On the one 
hand: “Man comes from the earth. On this point -  ground zero of myth.. .poets and 
philosophers, national traditions of the poleis, and tales of the origins of the Greek 
race all agree.”464 On the other hand:
:: [I]n order to characterize the beginnings of humanity, myths multiply the
repetition, the reduplication, the discontinuity. Sometimes men are bom from 
primordial beings who are themselves derived from the earth, and who, in a 
sort of dress rehearsal, ensure the transition between the origin and the times 
of men. .. .Sometimes reduplication and discontinuity dominate, and the myth 
is prepared to annihilate a first human race in order to give humanity a new 
start: the flood removes men from the face of the earth, but Deucalion and 
Pyrrha, by throwing stones onto the ground, produce a new human race that 
instantly engages in the process of reproducing itself. ...For man qua man was 
bom of men, and not of the unknown.465
In this case, man was not bom from woman but from stones thrown by the 
righteous, which in turn means, from law:
The Athenian myth of autochthony - according to which each citizen 
originated in an ancestor bom of the soil of the city - is the primordial 
example of a legal institution that generated its own founding origin. Nicole 
Loraux observes that the myth of autochthony was constituted in the present,
463 “Native to the soil, aboriginal, indigenous” , “Consisting of or formed from indigenous material 
(opp. allochthonous)” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989)
464 Loraux, Bom of the Earth, p. 1.
465 Ibid. p. 3.
155
by means of a technique that was always poised in the middle, between origin 
and end... This primordial myth of institutional origin, in which the force of 
autochthony was constituted only by its continued iteration, illustrates how 
legal origins were constituted and sustained by their present dramatisation and 
reception. Although the time of transmission was an institutional time, and 
although that time was ostensibly inscribed in historical duration, in fact the 
institution generated the historical duration to which it referred.466
The repetition within mythical time is enacted by the repetition in legal time. 
Origins are purposive, and are purposively responsive to the present. This is visible in 
the debate(s) regarding the ownership of heritage, as well as in Praxithea’s speech in 
the Erechtheus. For the moment, however, this is also visible in the debates 
regarding ownership in this field more generally. The law requires an account of 
ownership that institutes and re-institutes the claim of the original possessors in each 
following holder of the “property”. In the case of cultural property, it requires that 
one collapses identity: the same Greeks make the claim for the Marbles’ return, the 
inheritors of Periclean Athens make the claim for their retention. In both cases, the 
claim is one of autochthonous “ground”. Yet, simultaneously, it is the distance from 
that very origin that opens the space for the institution of both “knowledge” (as a 
reflexive endeavour) and law. “[Everything takes place in a manner suggesting that 
the Greeks were less interested in their origins per se than in this separation from 
their origins which definitively constituted the human condition.”467
Discourses of origin
The legal definitions of cultural property set out two common requirements: 
for a thing to be cultural property, one must know where it came from, and it must be 
(or be made to be) meaningful to more than one person. Interpreting these 
requirements characterizes most of the debates concerning the ownership of contested 
objects. In a sense, therefore, the law seeks to understand the value of this originary
466 Alain Pottage, “An original genetic inheritance”, forthcoming.
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narrative. As the narrative is essentially purposive, seeking to establish originary 
ground and continuing entitlement, the issues of value are complex. A starting point 
to untangle these issues is in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. In On the
468Genealogy o f Morality, Nietzsche addresses exactly this problematic of (ethically
and politically) purposive accounts of origin. Indeed, the complex of iterating origin 
while deriving the space of this iteration from the distance from origin -  the problem 
of constructing origin as a source of fundamentally legal security -  is also addressed 
by Nietzsche. The following argument will take up one of these strands rather than 
attempting to engage with all of them. What is the purpose of narratives of 
autochthonous origin in the realm of cultural property? That it is indeed 
autochthonous origin at stake will become clear through the following analysis.
The understanding that values are themselves subject to discourse, as well as 
to the related ideas of utility and desire, begins, in the modem era, with Nietzsche. 
There is a certain joyous amount of irony in turning to Nietzsche in reference to 
cultural property claims, and to the Parthenon Marbles in particular: the arguments 
made for the return of the “Marbles” would provoke an exquisite sympathy on his 
part. In contrast to the Ancient Greeks, Nietzsche would find the modem Greeks now 
muddle-headed, intellectually sentimental, and petty, all this obvious in that they are 
or/gT«-obsessed. In the modem Greeks’ desire for “their” Marbles is their emergence 
as Europeans, arguably a hundred years later than the nineteenth-century Europeans 
that Nietzsche freely vilified throughout his work. Neither “blond beasts” nor 
supermen, the modem Greeks become “historians” and join the credulous, anxious 
plebeians described by Michel Foucault:
We have become barbarians with respect to those rare moments of high 
civilization: cities in ruin and enigmatic monuments are spread out before us; 
we stop before gaping walls; we ask what gods inhabited these empty temples. 
Great epochs lacked this curiosity, lacked our excessive deference; they 
ignored their predecessors: the classical period ignored Shakespeare.
467 Loraux, Bom o f the Earth, p. 4.
468 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality.
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.Europeans no longer know themselves; they ignore their mixed ancestries and
seek a proper role.469
To make a claim to anything extremely ancient on the basis of filiation or descent is 
indeed to “ignore.. .mixed ancestries”. The question is, however, what is the “proper 
role” that is being sought? Additionally, how is this proper role being sought? 
Although it is worth saying at the outset that Nietzsche himself would regard this 
endeavour with scorn, the main thinkers of and after Nietzsche’s “genealogy” (Michel 
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze) might help to answer these questions.
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche addresses the question of the “value of values”, 
or the source of value-judgments such as “good” or “evil”. He questions where the 
notion of values (for example, justice, or Christian values) itself originates, and what 
animates this notion. As such, he addresses the question of origin itself. The first step 
of his argument is to identify the standard philosophical argument of his day, which 
located origin, particularly in regard to values, as the “purpose” of a thing. Nietzsche 
disagrees with this formulation. Understanding the purpose does not lead to 
understanding the origin of a value, but only to understanding of the uses to which the 
will to power has put it. He contrasts a genealogy of the will to power with a 
genealogy of the valorization of origin itself, thus putting forward his concept of 
origin, which is one of “emergence” or “descent”. In the area of discourse about 
cultural property claims to very ancient objects, the analogies run as follows: in these 
claims, the “original” or the “authentic” is privileged as guarantors of the value of the 
objects and of the identity of the claimants. If one were merely to question the 
narrativity of the accounts of origin, one would be left (more or less) with a deeper 
understanding of the purpose(s) of these accounts. Genealogy applied to the mere 
narrative as will to power might well explain the differing claims and histories 
presented, but it would not explain why origin itself is important in this field.
469 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in Language, counter-memory, practice (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 59
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On the other hand, genealogy per se gets closer to Nietzsche’s idea of origin: 
emergence or descent is a conception of origin (and the values expressed therein) that 
depends upon a constant fluidity of “becoming” or “emerging” that can be understood 
as the process by which things and relations are constituted as valuable. For example, 
rather than looking to fluctuations in the accounts of origin or ownership that irradiate 
these kinds of cultural property claims, a genealogical analysis of the nexus that we 
think of as the Parthenon Marbles case would expose the valorization of the 
following: the objects themselves (the frieze is now visible as “the Parthenon 
Marbles”); the narratives of attachments to the object (the legal, historical and ethical 
cultural property claims); and last but not least, the people making the claim(s) (in 
their chosen identity, i.e., the Greeks as “Europeans”). Genealogy, expressed as 
becoming/emergence/descent (origin), asks “what is emerging in these claims?” In 
order to understand the complex that is the Parthenon Marbles, and other ancient 
objects cases that depend upon assessments and creations of origin (i.e. Kennewick 
Man), we must turn to the analyses of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze for an 
understanding of the devolution of genealogy from these problematics.
In the realm of cultural property disputes, the kinds of proprietary claims 
made are expressed through narratives that function both as genealogies and as 
something different. In many of the claims in the Parthenon Marbles case, we can 
easily see the narrative regarding the past -  the purposive retelling of past events -  as 
the Nietzschean will to power expressing itself by reconstructing and reconstituting 
both the object(s) at stake (the Marbles) and “history” (the modem Greek state 
aligning itself in 1833 not with its medieval or Byzantine ancestry but with Ancient 
Greece). Yet also, we can see that by telling stories about the past in this manner, the 
claimants are addressing or are accessing the question of time. The claimants in this 
case are turning the past into a narrative that can somehow be completed within or by 
human experience. The attempt is to push inhuman reaches of time (and incredibly 
ancient, if not immortal, objects) into a structure that can be held within human 
finitude through the operation of identities such as: “the same objects”, or “the same 
Greeks”. These identities are unsupportable given that they rely on knowledge for
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their determination, and indeed, that they rely on the kind of knowledge that is the 
hallmark of modernity, of which genealogy is both tool and product. The eruption of 
this problematic of time means that narrative regarding the past cannot be accounted 
for solely by the will to power and the genealogy of purpose. The kind of time being 
manipulated requires that we ask what sort of narrative genre can be imagined to 
underwrite these kinds of claims? The claim made either explicitly or implicitly in 
cultural property claims for ancient objects is that the origin of the object, objectively, 
presents a series of ineluctable necessities, which in turn mandate a certain legal 
outcome. These necessities are conceived of as historical truths or realities that are 
imbued with their own moral force. The force of the “truths” means that the law must 
necessarily conform to the proposed (or unearthed) “origin”. This raises the question 
of the performative capabilities of “forces” understood in this way (as the overlap 
between “origin” and “truth” in the genealogical endeavour of knowledge).
To understand the demand for return of the Parthenon Marbles, we must begin 
by understanding what forces might mean in this context. We begin with the paradox 
regarding origin sketched out above (regarding autochthony): Foucault states clearly 
that genealogy “opposes itself to the search for “origins”.470 It stands against original 
identity, as at the (historical) beginning of things, one always finds disparity and 
difference. Deleuze states the content of the objection: Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
“sense and values” had to be critique, in which “value” implies a critical reversal of 
the foundational processes of philosophy. Rather than founding values in some 
historically- or “objective[ly-]” derived origin and then removing values from 
criticism, Nietzsche discovered the two “inseparable moments of critical philosophy” 
in (1) “the referring back of all things and any kind of origin to values”; and (2) “the 
referring back of these values to something which is, as it were, their origin and 
determines their value”.471 Thus, in Deleuze’s reading, Nietzsche removes 
philosophy from the “indifferent element” which had been its medium. Values 
cannot be indifferent to their origins; nor may a simple derivation or smooth
470 Ibid. p. 140.
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beginning be allowed to stand unchallenged, as this in turn suggests an indifferent 
origin for values. The value of any value (and certainly the value of such a thing as a 
“truth” or an “origin”) is always descended from “something which is, at it were, their 
origin...”. The content of this “something” is what the search for origin must 
uncover.
Foucault and Deleuze argue that the beginning or center of any “something” 
of this kind (and definitely of all values or valuations that are taken as orthodox later) 
stands not an originary unity, but an originary struggle. It is this struggle that 
determines essence, that is foundational and that gives rise to the state of (later) 
existence which in turn founds the possibilities of evaluation472 that are used in 
determining values and their origins. To refuse to see distance, disparity, struggle, 
ambivalence or contingency in beginnings is to fail to do philosophy, i.e., to fail to 
affirm life. The meaning of disparity or difference is therefore not factual but 
philosophically positive: “The differential element is both a critique of the value of 
values and the positive element of a creation”.473 Difference is an active element 
constitutive of each origin, not “the” origin. As such, it is one of the foundational 
eruptions that defines “genealogy”:
Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values.
Genealogy is opposed to absolute values as it is to relative or utilitarian ones. 
Genealogy signifies the differential element of values from which value itself 
derives. Genealogy thus means origin or birth, but also difference or distance
i * - 474in the origin,
Foucault arrives at the same conclusion: “The origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, 
the point where the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse, the site of a
471 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: The Athlone Press, 1983), p. 2. (Translated by 
Hugh Tomlinson)
472 “evaluation” defined. Ibid. p. 1.
473 Ibid. p. 2
474 Idem
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fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost”.475 He goes on to 
say:
A genealogy of values, morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never 
confuse itself with a quest or their “origins”, will never neglect as inaccessible 
the vicissitudes of history. On the contrary, it will cultivate the details and 
accidents that accompany every beginning...it will await their emergence, 
once unmasked, as the face of the other. ...The genealogist needs history to 
dispel the chimeras of the origin...476
The creative philosophical act and the (functional?) historical act do not merge but 
rather entwine, paralleling each other at some points in each analysis and winding 
around each other at others.
The difference in all origin(s) can be understood as the hierarchy of forces 
present at the (any) beginning: “Hierarchy is the originary fact, the identity of 
difference and origin”.477 In this sense, as will be seen when discussing the meaning 
of “force”, perhaps the philosophical and the historical arguments come closer than is 
first apparent. They are also closely connected when discussing “becoming” 
(Deleuze) and “emerging” (Foucault). This is the final point to be made about the 
(non-)meaning of “origin” for purposes of marking out a theoretical realm for this 
Chapter. Interestingly, “becoming” and “emerging” serve as half-way points or 
hinges between “origin”/genealogy and “sense”/force. They are active, non-abstract 
processes that derive meaning from the notion of (some) origin, but their energy or 
activity from concrete (if not always identifiable) forces. These processes serve as 
good examples of what Foucault and Deleuze might mean when they claim that ideas 
and objects may be interchangeable with each other, or at least may function as the 
same sorts of things. Deleuze discusses the idea of “becoming” through a discussion 
of Nietzsche’s use of the figure of Heraclitus. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche,
475 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 143.
476 Ibid. p. 144.
477 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 7.
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• •  4 7 8Heraclitus is a tragic thinker. The problem in Heraclitus’s work is justice, as it is in 
Nietzsche’s.479 When Deleuze writes that life is “radically innocent and just”480 for 
Heraclitus, he is describing the modality in which Nietzsche believes justice is 
possible.481 The elements of this modality are: the instinct of play as the basis for 
understanding existence; existence is an aesthetic rather than religious or moral 
phenomenon; and most importantly, making “an affirmation of becoming”.482 In 
Nietzsche’s work, Heraclitus thinks two thoughts: “there is no being everything is 
becoming”, and “being is the being of becoming as such” 483 Deleuze then aligns 
multiplicity with becoming, and unity with being. The two terms (the two fluid 
thoughts of Heraclitus, the realm of possible justice) are related as manifestation 
(becoming) and affirmation (being). Therefore becoming is multiplicity and 
manifestation and being is unity and affirmation, and they are both, or all, 
complete(d) in each moment of the existence of any particular thing 484 Rather than 
making existence responsible or blameworthy, affirming becoming and affirming the 
being of becoming is a game. The third term to these two moments is the player, who 
Deleuze also identifies as the artist or the child. In the “dicethrow” that this game 
enacts, justice is the law of this world, not a sum of injustices to be expiated. Justice
478 “Multiple and pluralist affirmation -  this is the essence o f the tragic”. Ibid. p. 17.
479 Nietzsche states that Christian ideology and tragic thinking pose the highest question in philosophy: 
“Has existence a meaning?” This question is the most experimental and empirical question possible, 
because it poses the problems of interpretation and evaluation simultaneously. Deleuze goes on to note 
that “[s]trictly speaking it means ‘what is justice?’ and Nietzsche can say without exaggeration that the 
whole o f his work is an effort to understand this properly”. Ibid. p. 18.
480 Ibid. p. 23.
481 Justice is not possible without innocence, in that ressentiment (it’s your fault), bad conscience (it’s 
my fault), and responsibility (it’s the result o f their common actions) while motivated by the instinct of 
revenge, are not simple psychological events but rather “the fundamental categories o f Semitic and 
Christian thought, of our way of thinking and interpreting existence in general”. Ibid. p. 21. The new 
ideal or interpretation or way of thinking would then have to be irresponsibility, in the most positive 
sense. The question must shift from, is blameworthy existence responsible or not, to, is existence 
blameworthy or innocent? The concept of innocence here is primary or originary but not religious. 
Instead, here is where Deleuze finds his multiple truth: “innocence, the innocence o f plurality, the 
innocence of becoming and of all that is”. Ibid._ p. 22 (n. 17 omitted) Heraclitus, as a pre-Socratic 
philosopher and an innocent, escapes being labeled “irresponsible” in the “child” sense that Nietzsche 
applies to the other Greeks. See also ibid. p. 29.
482 Ibid. p. 23.
483 Idem
484 The figure of completion is the figure of “return”: “Return is the being o f that which becomes. 
Return is the being o f becoming itself, the being which is affirmed in becoming. The eternal return as 
law of becoming, as justice and as being”. Idem
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and hubris are completely opposed in this scheme.485 The just figure is the player, not 
the priest, historian, or other custodian of values. The player is irradiated, constantly 
transformed, by the game. As will be seen in a moment, this is true of things as well, 
as things are no more than a collection of forces arranged in a temporary and ever- 
shifting hierarchy. In this way, justice becomes possible. It need not be enacted in 
response to the past, but merely found in the constantly-shifting play of forces in the 
present.
If Deleuze analyses “origin” by means of Heraclitus, Foucault breaks 
Nietzsche’s notion of “origin” into “descent” and “emergence”. “Descent”
(“Herkunft”) means the ancient affiliation to a group, i.e., blood, social class or 
tradition. It is a mechanism for sorting out different traits, for finding the differential 
element that animates any claims of a unified soul or coherent self-identity. The 
notion of descent, as a component of genealogy, “does not resemble the evolution of a 
species and does not map the destiny of a people” 486 Like “descent”, “emergence”
(“Enstehung1’) works with Deleuze’s exposition of “becoming” to argue against any 
teleological arguments based in claims of self-evident meaning. Current 
developments are not necessarily culminations:
As it is wrong to search for descent in an uninterrupted continuity, we should 
avoid thinking of emergence as the final term of an historical development; 
the eye was not always intended for contemplation, and punishment has had 
other purposes than setting an example.487
Rather, all emergences occur against a background of hostile forces. A 
species must protect its form against destruction either by outsiders or by internal 
weakness(es). Each emergence is interesting in the context of the play of 
dominations -  of strong and weak forces confronting and appropriating each other -  
that must be interpreted. The interpretation becomes itself an actor or player in the
485 Ibid. p. 25.
486 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 146.
487 Ibid. p. 148.
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endless combat. Once again, the historical act becomes a (philosophically?) creative 
one:
[I]f interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of 
rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, 
to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to 
subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of 
interpretations.488
Interpretation succeeds when it exits the realm of metaphysics, that is, when it ceases 
to serve as “the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin” in order to expose 
instead the contested and contingent “development of humanity”.489
In both Deleuze and Foucault’s analyses, the attempt to understand origin 
requires attempting to understand a hierarchy of forces acting within a layered and 
repeating present. Metaphysics, traditional philosophy, values reified by 
constructions of origin or historical error give way to a philosophy of sense and 
values that is encapsulated in a game played by a figure that has no thought of 
winning it. This figure only seeks to affirm the play. To play, in Foucauldian terms, 
is to place all thoughts of the “immortal in man” within a “process of 
development”.490 This is where meaning is found in the historical “sense”. Foucault 
relies on the notion of “effective” history rather than on any more anthropomorphic 
figure in order to state the same requirement of active affirmation: “‘Effective’ 
history...will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended 
continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding, it is made for 
cutting [trancher]”.m  In regard to the necessarily active mode of philosophy as 
critique, Deleuze agrees. “This way of being is that of the philosopher precisely 
because he intends to wield the differential element as critic and creator and therefore
488 Ibid. p. 151-2
489 Ibid. p. 151.
490 Ibid. p. 152.
491 Ibid. p. 154.
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as a hammer”.492 The “knowledge” that “cuts” and the “philosopher” that “hammers” 
perform the same operation. “Trancher” means to cut off,\ to make an end rather than 
“to dissect”. The act of intervention in each formulation is in part an act of 
destruction. Origin and telos are thus necessarily in the same phrase, regardless of 
who or what utters it. The reason to search the (possible) beginning(s) is in order to 
recognize the constant end(s). To speak of origin or telos without each other and the 
present moment is to lack awareness of law (becoming) and necessity (play).493 It is 
to join the Greeks in their blindness to original law (that is, it is to join them in the 
enaction of the autochthonic myth rather than in the iteration of the autochthonic 
origin), “without exception or possible infraction”.494 In contemplating the dangers 
of arguments based in “origin”, Deleuze and Foucault find that any analysis of 
“origin” must commit itself to the present while remaining strangely unattached from 
the traditional directionality of time. The moment of origin does not describe the 
starting point from a certain past to an identifiable future.
Nietzsche the genealogist turns away from questions of origin even as he 
answers them (“Pudenda origo ”).495 What “emerges” is and is not what begins. The 
search for origins is useless, as it serves only to direct our attention to the present or 
to a purely simian past. When we look for origins, what we find are forces: rules, 
violence, desire, compromises and masks. Analysis in this realm does not solve the 
problems of causality, meaning or identification that it is meant to solve. Therefore, 
if not “the inviolable identity of their origin”,496 what and where do things come 
from? Deleuze writes that:
A thing is sometimes this, sometimes that, sometimes something more 
complicated -  depending on the forces.. .which take possession of it. ... [T]he 
evaluation of this and that, the delicate weighing of each thing and its sense, 
the estimation of the forces which define the aspects of a thing and its 
relations with others at every instant -  all this (or all that) depends on
492 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 2.
493 Ibid. p. 29.
494 Idem
495 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” p. 141, quoting Nietzsche, The Dawn, p. 102.
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philosophy’s greatest art -  that of interpretation. To interpret and even to 
evaluate is always to weigh.497
For Foucault, as discussed above, interpretation is the seizure of 
fundamentally meaningless rules in order to impose a meaning upon them. Contra 
metaphysics, “the development of humanity is a series of interpretations”.498 It is 
worth noting that Foucault and Deleuze are not saying the same thing here. The 
thing-ness of a thing or the meaning of a historical development are both derived 
rather than discovered (or worse: “re-discovered”) 499 For Deleuze, however, this 
derivation must occur in the context of believing (in) the mask that a particular force 
wears. Mimicry or trickery is not merely a function of the survival or triumph of 
certain forces. “The mask or the trick are laws of nature and therefore something 
more than mere mask or trick”.500 They also guide the task of interpretation, both in 
that “the art of interpreting must also be an art of piercing masks.. .and the point of 
keeping up the mask while it is being reshaped”.501
The present is not privileged -  rather, it is not permitted the luxury of being 
predetermined. The questions raised in or by an object in the present do not have 
“logical”, “a priori”, or “deductive” answers in reference to the past. In this realm, 
“the past” is clearly demarcated as terra incognita. Therefore, history and its cognates 
-  narrative, memory, law -  can be resistance or desire, but they cannot be truth. 
Therefore, they do not answer questions unless they win a battle against other forces 
also clamouring to affirm their difference from each other. In this sense, genealogy 
must enter the arena under the standard of knowledge, that is, as both subject and 
object. Origin is not equivalent to the present-day understanding of the purpose of a 
thing. Not even historical (or archaeological) analyses of “purpose” lead to origin, as 
the genealogy of purpose shows only “that the will to power has achieved mastery
496 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 142.
497 Deleuze Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 4.
498 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, p. 151.
499 Ibid. pp. 153-4.
500 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 5.
501 Idem.
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over something less powerful and impressed upon it its own idea.. .of a use-
C A 'J
function”. Ideas of what things are for  only comment on the present or a series of
infinite presents; they leave the past untouched. Yet how to determine the value of 
the (“true”?) origin of the object? Or even, the value of the origin to us? Nietzsche 
singles out the error of relying on “purpose”, but his analysis applies to other forms of 
conceptualizing values (and value503) as well. The values that we project backwards 
add another layer of opacity between us and the meaning of the object or even our 
continuing desire for it. Despite -  or rather because of -  our narrative, the past is 
fundamentally opaque to the present.
At this point, we have narratives of origin that stand against a “true” knowledge of 
origin; narratives of attachment that stand against “knowledge” as it exists in 
modernity, that is, as a product of science, epistemes, discourses, genealogy itself; 
and thus which stand against the very forms and techniques that makes them possible. 
It becomes clear that the claims of origin and ownership, resolving into genealogy 
and narratives of attachment, are in fact resistances to the kind of knowledge and 
composition of subject(s), objects(s) and selves about which Nietzsche writes: “[t]he 
sight of man now makes us tired... We are tired of man. . .”.504 This creates more than 
a few problems for the resolution of cultural property claims. First, it may be a truism 
of cultural property analysis that evolution of a species and destiny of a people is the 
final point of most appropriative arguments based in claims of origin (i.e., original 
ownership of a given object, or originary rights in land or artifacts as expressing the 
ongoing identity of a people in a self-evident or uncomplicated manner). However, 
Foucault and Deleuze’s readings of what knowledge means in modernity work 
against arguments of this type. Second, and as a result of the foregoing point, the 
fluidity of the “past” robs the people claiming it of the certainty of a “future”. The 
condition of knowledge as genealogy means that the only “ground” available is 
contested and uncertain, and possibly not stable enough to root the claimants deeply
502 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality, p. 55.
503 Cf. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality, Second Essay, Sections 4-5, 20, pp. 42-5 and 66-7.
504 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f Morality, First Essay: “Good and Evil”, “Good and Bad”, Section 
12, p. 27.
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enough to flourish in their (or any) future. Finally, the problem of “where things 
come from” is also a result of the condition of knowledge in modernity. Not only the 
diremption between representation and reality, but also that between the “mask” and 
the “forces” underneath it, mean that value will always be contested and contestable 
in an uneasily shifting field. Specific claims about the origin of the object, the notion 
of the common history of “mankind”, and legal arguments about ownership merge 
into and differentiate themselves from a background in which the genealogical game 
demonstrates that the separation of “origins” and their meanings only affirms their 
contingency.
In this field, knowledge and things are porous to each other, merge and 
intertwine so that although “origin” remains constantly and crucially important, the 
value of things shifts with our formulation or knowledge of them. This situation is 
anathema to the actors (and forces) that rely upon definite values, and definite origins. 
If however the state of any attempt at knowledge or valuation results in the loss of 
certainty, then what remains is the possible construction o f certainty -  certainty as a 
fictional and fiercely-maintained substrate to the ownership of (or claim to) these 
ancient objects. Although there are many responses to valuation or valorization in 
this context, there are two that are of particular relevance to cultural property law: 
heritage and commodification. The increasingly-prevalent concept of “heritage” is 
the solution that we have come up with in order to endure (or correct) the reality of 
this radical contingency. The argument here is that “heritage” as it is being 
developed folds “origin” into “law”. The operation of heritage -  its creation and 
maintenance -  conforms with the questions of commodification that irradiate the field 
of cultural property. As importantly, however, heritage guarantees both the myth and 
iteration of (a kind of) autochthony. It enables an image of origin and maintains a 
legal space in which to preserve this image, regardless of the “truth” or the “slippage” 
in the narratives that a heritage site presents. This part of the argument begins by 
noting the commodification issues that inhere in cultural property cases, and then 
examines these issues in the wider context of “heritage”.
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Commodification
The term “commodification” can be construed narrowly or broadly. Narrowly 
construed, commodification describes actual buying and selling (or legally 
permitted buying and selling) of something. Broadly construed, 
commodification includes not only actual buying and selling, but also market 
rhetoric, the practice of thinking about interactions as if they were sale 
transactions, and market methodology, the use of monetary cost-benefit 
analysis to judge these interactions.505
(Margaret Jane Radin)
The heated debate regarding commodification of cultural property has two 
aspects: first, there are questions regarding the appropriateness of reifying the value 
of the objects by recourse to market rhetoric, and second, there are the practical 
questions regarding the appropriateness of the sale of these objects on the art 
market.506 As regards the Parthenon Marbles, the questions of commodification and 
alienability are more than usually intertwined, as if the Marbles can be alienated, then 
they can be alienated from the Greeks both in terms of value and in terms of
c(\n
ownership. The following analysis proceeds by briefly noting the commodification 
argument(s) in Professor J. H. Merryman’s foundational article, and later book, 
“Thinking About the Elgin Marbles”.508 These arguments have been set out earlier, 
but will be recapitulated here.
505 Margaret Jane Radin, “Market Inalienability”, 100 Harvard Law Review 1849, 1859 (1987).
506 There is a great deal o f literature on this topic. For an analysis that thoroughly considers both 
aspects of the question, as well as providing an interesting and persuasive argument regarding “human 
flourishing”, see Harding, “Value, Obligation and Cultural Heritage”; for a piece focusing on issues 
arising in international markets, see John E. Putnam II, “Common Markets and Cultural Identity: 
Cultural Property Export Restrictions in the European Economic Community”, University o f  Chicago 
Legal Forum 457 (1992).
507 For a series of arguments for why this sort of alienation is wrong, see: Michael J. Reppas II, “The 
Deflowering o f the Parthenon: A Legal and Moral Analysis On Why the ‘Elgin Marbles’ Must Be 
Returned To Greece”, 9 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 911 
(1999); Moustakas, “Group Rights In Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability”.
508 Merryman, “Thinking About the Elgin Marbles”; Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles: 
Critical Essays on Cultural Property, Art and Law.
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As a threshold issue, the value of the Marbles in Merryman’s scheme is an 
already reified, art historical value. He begins by considering standard principles of 
property law, contract law and international law, and applying them to the facts. 
(Many other commentators find the facts of this case almost infinitely contestable.)509 
On the bases he considers, he finds that title to the Marbles did pass to the English, 
and that there are no compelling considerations that would argue for their return to 
the Greeks. Regardless of the substantive merits (or otherwise) of his position, what 
becomes clear by the end of his analysis is that he fails to take seriously the reasons 
that the values of preservation, of authenticity, and of (even admittedly “mystical”) 
attachment are so predominantly prevalent in this field.510 Rather, Merryman insists 
on speaking to the legal subject, in a confidential tone, and thus creating a community 
of commentators rather than possessors. Among us, he seems to be saying, emotion 
does not play a valid role in assessing disputes.
Yet, this unemotional assessment breaks down when Merryman exchanges 
discourses of ownership for those of art history. In keeping with the art-historical 
approach that he takes regarding the value of the Marbles, Merryman indicates that 
reasonable people may feel passionately about -  and would be correct to feel 
passionately about -  the preservation of cultural objects as objects.511 This means 
that his most cogent and passionate arguments are in favour of commodification, 
from the perspective of the value of preservation. The implicit argument is made 
through his claim that collecting and preservation are necessarily and benignly 
linked. This follows long-established patterns for determining the “correct” or 
“moral” ownership of valuable art or sacred objects, as the overriding value of 
preservation in cultural property law is closely linked to normative conceptions of 
rescue. Many possible critiques of this position exist. For example, these concepts 
are often only instrumentally connected, rather than logically following from each
509 Hitchens, The Elgin Marbles, St. Clair, Lord Elgin and the Marbles', St. Clair, “The Elgin Marbles: 
Questions of Stewardship and Accountability”.
510 As such, arguably he fails to see what the law is called upon to do in regards to these kinds of 
conflicts. This Chapter does not engage in an analysis of Merryman’s position overall. Please see the 
citations supra for nuanced and careful critiques of Merryman’s conclusions.
511 See Chapter Two, “The life o f objects”.
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other. Furthermore, the dangers as well as the virtues of the “collecting classes” are 
established historical fact,512 often requiring legal intervention.
Remaining in this vein, however, Merryman also sets out an explicit economic 
argument regarding the Greek claim to the Marbles. As stated more hilly in Chapter 
Two, Merryman argues that the “authentic” Marbles have to be shown to have greater 
value for Greeks than for anyone else, measured by whether, if the Marbles were for 
sale, Greeks would pay a higher price for them than non-Greeks.513 Therefore, the 
possibility of selling the Marbles, or the increased level of tourism to Greece, would 
constitute an economic advantage that might give the Greeks a valid claim to the 
return of the Marbles. But it is an inescapable conclusion that the values that inform 
the art/culture market are not the same as those that motivate cultural property claims, 
as, if Merryman were correct in his assessment of the values at stake, then there 
would be no ongoing cultural property claims or disputes.514
Margaret Radin has addressed the tension between various derivations of the 
value of things in her analysis of “commodification”. Commodification takes place 
in a discursive realm in which literal and metaphorical markets merge into each 
other.515 The process of commodification is dependent upon an acceptance of 
“market rhetoric”, which means “the discourse in which we conceive of and speak of 
something as if it were a commodity subject to market exchange”.516 The 
significance of the increasing reliance on market rhetoric, or the discourse of
512 Ibid. p. 45; see also Greenfield, The Return o f Cultural Treasures, p. 43.
513 “There must be some magic inherent in the authentic object, and not in an accurate reproduction, 
that speaks only to Greeks, or the argument fails”. Ibid. p. 1913. (n. 107 omitted)
514 It must be noted that it is precisely in order to claim a fundamentally non-economic link to such 
objects that the Greeks -  or any “plaintiffs”, before a real or an imaginary tribunal -  make such claims. 
As such, it is an error to maintain that the only value that can attach to the perception of authenticity in 
this context is economic. Merryman recognizes this, analogizing the Greek attitude to the Parthenon 
Marbles to other cases where a people believed that “[rjetum o f the object was essential to the well­
being of the group, perhaps even to its survival. There is an analogous mystical element in the attitude 
of some Greeks toward the Marbles: something essential is missing; there is a cultural wound”. Ibid. 
p. 1914. He concludes that nevertheless these beliefs cannot serve as a basis for allocating cultural 
property. In a sense, this merely re-argues the question of the Marbles as property, and therefore the 
basis o f the Greeks’ claim for ownership of them.
5.5 Radin, Contested Commodities, p. 2.
5.6 Ibid. p. 6.
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commodification, is multifold. First, “commodification worries seem to occur only in 
conjunction with other worries about social wrongs, in particular about subordination 
and redistribution of wealth”.517 Second, commodification implies the reduction of 
all value(s) to price, or sums of money. This flattens all evaluative discourse:
there is no mystery about which of two items is more valuable; it is the one 
with the higher price tag. Furthermore, for any two items, one of them must 
be more valuable than the other, or else the two must be equal in value. 
Moreover, transitivity holds: if A is more valuable than B and B is more 
valuable than C, then A is more valuable than C. Commodification thus
C I O
implies a strong form of value commensurability.
This approach is already applied to items of historic value or “cultural property” in 
the art market. Most art and antiquities dealers firmly believe that objects should go 
to the people who are prepared to pay the most for them, as they are the people who 
value the objects the most.
As an argument, it has a particular resonance at this time in this culture, for 
the reasons that Radin sets out throughout her work, as well as the increasing 
attention being paid to the commodification of cultural or other experience itself.519 It 
also bears a close similarity to the argument that Merryman makes regarding 
commodification of art objects, although he does not go so far as to make economic 
value the only indicator of worth:
It is not always clear what people mean by commodification or why they think 
it is undesirable. One possible meaning -  that the work of art is itself 
somehow reduced or sullied by being bought and sold -  surely does not bear 
scrutiny...[Sjuppose that the work is bought by someone who has no interest 
in art other than as an investment, someone who treats the work as a means of 
making a quick profit.... [I]f the work itself is not endangered or made less 
available for study and enjoyment, what is the harm?.. .[W]hy should
517 Ibid. p. 8.
5,8 Ibid. p. 9.
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awareness that a painting brought a high (or low) price at auction be a less 
legitimate part of what the viewer brings to it than awareness that the painter 
died young...? There is no pure aesthetic experience, no immaculate 
perception....[I]t is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the commodification 
objection expresses little more than an effete prejudice. It denigrates dealers 
and collectors as investors and speculators who contribute to the impairment 
of unspecified artistic values. Even museums, when they sell off works from 
their collections, become soulless commodifiers. . ..Such an attitude does not 
deserve to be taken seriously by serious people. ...There will be a market. 
Cultural objects will be bought and sold. The choice, if there is one, is 
between a licit market and a black market.520
In the most basic understanding of the debate, the acquisitive instinct in 
people is an engine for self-determination and self-identification, whether on the 
private or institutional level, nationally or internationally. To commodify today is 
thus to make things available, to bring them into one’s own sphere.
The most useful model for understanding what makes the Marbles valuable, 
and to what extent property rights can attach via these values, however, may not be 
the model that one finds in the art/culture industry, or in theories of transfer and 
allocation that are understood by reference to markets or free trade. There are real 
differences between auction houses and museums, even as there are real similarities.
519 See Jeremy Rifkin, The Age o f Access, and infra p. 179.
520 Merryman, “A licit international trade in cultural objects”, in Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, p. 
219.
521 “Although there are exceptions to the free trade principle relating to goods such as firearms, drugs, 
[etc.]... political leaders may urge that no more categories should be added to this list. The answer to 
this argument can only be to show that protection of the cultural heritage is as essential as the reasons 
for other exceptions and that significant and unique items of the cultural heritage cannot in any case be 
considered on the same level as commodities. .. .Some commentators in art market States claim that 
national policies on cultural exchange are aimed against the control o f export or protection o f cultural 
property by the States of origin. They do so on the ground that maximum benefit to all mankind is 
achieved by the freest movement of cultural objects (Merryman, 1986). Such arguments may not only 
be self-serving, by ensuring that the flow of cultural property goes where there is most money 
(irrespective o f any other criterion), but also sound paternalistic, assuming that cultural goods will be 
necessarily better appreciated and cared for in transit or importing States than in their States o f origin”. 
O’Keefe and Prott, Law and the Cultural Heritage, Vol.3, “Movement”, pp. 565-6.
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The ability to care for objects (in any sense of the verb: to house or to feel emotion) 
cannot be equated with the ability to pay more than others for them. Indeed, it is not 
clear that being able to “care” for them in art historical terms is at all the point. The 
objects themselves are often already so damaged, so partial, that what might make the 
cmcial difference in terms of allocation may be the ability to use them, or to 
transform them into the kind of substrate or ground from which they themselves have 
already been tom.
From the perspective of what threatens cultural property, one can see that 
forces of nature and forces of categorization amount to the same end result. The 
bonds between thing and people are weighed and measured, are judged. The object 
defines the owner, and vice-versa. The question becomes, not only what relationship, 
but also what posture earns or mirrors objects of such gravitas? This question inverts: 
what values have to be aspired to, or pretended, or espoused in order to be an owner 
in this realm?
Heritage
The arguments about commodification of the objects miss the point. At issue 
is die concept of commodifying the origins that are being claimed through these
522objects. The process by which this occurs in the creation of heritage, in which 
occurrences, artifacts, or even personalities of the past are transformed “into a product
mi #
intended for the satisfaction of contemporary consumption demands”. This is a 
commodification process, different from the sort(s) of commodification that
522 Heritage is generally defined as: (1) a property that descends to an heir; (2) something transmitted 
by or acquired from a predecessor; (3) tradition, something possessed as a result o f one’s natural 
situation or birth: birthright (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). In addition to these meanings, 
heritage has come to have other meanings: a relict physical survival from the past; a non-physical 
aspect o f the past when viewed from the present, including collective memory and the heritage o f  
everyday life; all accumulated cultural and artistic productivity, ex. “high culture”, “our national 
heritage” (which is a synonym for national culture broadly defined), and aboriginal peoples and group 
heritage; this includes the physical environment, ex. “heritage landscapes”, “heritage flora and fauna” 
as well as major commercial activity, ex. “the heritage industry”, selling goods and services with a 
heritage component, as well as the saleable past extended to a ‘saleable culturally distinctive present”, 
including the “ecomuseum” concept. Ashworth et al., Dissonant Heritage, pp. 1-3.
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Merryman and others imagine operates in the realm of cultural property. The 
question of whether objects per se are commodified is irrelevant in this field. The 
resources in this process are events, myths, folk memories, personalities, place and 
history itself. The selection is not a result of chance survival but of deliberate choice, 
something which we see in the story, or management, of the Acropolis and the 
Parthenon Marbles. In the transformative process, “selected resources are converted 
into products through “interpretation”.... Interpretation has been defined as “the 
basic art of telling the story of a place”.524 In the area of heritage and the 
commodification of culture -  in this specific example, of origin -  “Interpretation 
integrates resource elements by the shaping of a ‘core product’.”525 The core product 
is “the experience”, or intangible ideas or feelings conveyed through thematic 
interpretation. At the moment of consumption, the heritage product is entirely 
individual. Each consumer combines the possible resources, the interpretations 
presented, into a unique experience. The heritage producer of course also has broad 
powers of interpretation, giving rise to a “product range” from the resources listed 
above.526
Although the “heritage experience” is intensely personal, as each “visitor” or 
“consumer” creates it, this is an essentially legal structure:
By definition, heritage exists only in terms of the legatee and thus the heritage 
product is a response to the specific needs of actual or potential users. The 
concept of heritage is culturally constructed, thus there is an almost infinite
523 Ibid. p. 7.
524 Ibid. p. 8.
525 Idem
526 There are many implications and critiques of this model. These include the absence of a fixed 
determination of what resources are or might be; problems around the exercise of choice regarding the 
uses made of the past; problems regarding the definition o f authenticity -  who is authenticating the 
validity o f these uses o f the past? (Early museums failed to label artifacts as labels were considered an 
“irrelevant intrusion between the object and the viewer”. Ibid. p. 10)) Some critics reject the 
commodification argument, saying that the intrinsic value o f the resource shines through the attempted 
commercialization; others believe that the heritage model is not capable of being fully implemented, as 
it requires too much control or management realistically to exist in this form.
176
variety of possible heritages, each shaped for the requirements of specific 
consumer groups.527
The only constraints on this process are based in shared notions of criteria of 
authenticity. The assumption is that these “criteria are recognizable by consensus and 
measurable”. The most putatively obvious criterion is that of authenticity as, 
regardless of the need for external authentication, “Authenticity in the heritage model 
derives from the experience of the consumer and specifically from the extent that the 
product satisfies whatever expectations the consumer has of the past”.
Yet can the possible problems of authenticity be resolved? When one looks at 
the Acropolis, what does one see? Put differently, there is a difference between the 
past as history and the past as heritage. The distinction is: “If, however selective and 
subjective, ‘history is just the old things that happened to happen,’ then ‘heritage... is 
possession’”.530 The distinction turns on the process by which the past is constructed. 
If history assumes that past episodes really exist, the facts of history are a series of 
judgments accepted by historians. Heritage also assumes the past to exist,
even in the sense as Avalon or Atlantis exist, as products of a creative 
imagination, in response to some need in the creator. Heritage is, by the 
original definition of the word, determined by the legatee; all heritage is
531someone’s heritage and that someone determines that it exists.
Heritage is possession in that it is a product of the present that seeks to create and 
capture the past. It is irrelevant whether the past conforms to a historical or 
epistemological “truth”, as in this model heritage is purposefully developed in order 
to select an inheritance from an imagined past, and to decide what should be passed 
on to an imagined future. Therefore, one of the most striking features of heritage is 
that it is purposive (rather than true). Imagined memory, or mythic time (as opposed
527 Ibid. p. 8.
528 Ibid. p. 9.
529 Ibid. pp. 10-11.
530 Ibid. p. 6.
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to the “real time” of history) has real-world consequences. It helps modem social 
groups to shape their identity and thus their future.532
There are many legal ramifications/problems arising out of this formulation of 
heritage, turning on the question of ownership of origins:
At its simplest, all heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not 
someone else’s: the original meaning of an inheritance implies the existence 
of disinheritance and by extension any creation of heritage from the past 
disinherits someone completely or partially, actively or potentially. ..The 
attempted creation of a universal heritage which provides an equal but full 
inheritance for all is not only essentially illogical but the attempt to approach 
it rapidly creates its own problems.. . 533
The dissonance implicit in “heritage” is also the dissonance implicit in 
“commodification”: in changing resources into products, heritage products 
encompass all the tensions and dilemmas inherent in all commodification. In terms of 
product development, therefore, these would include problems regarding the conflicts 
between generalization and particularization, between homogenous and heterogenous 
products, and a focus on consumer expectation that leads inevitably to a reduction of 
the past into particularized place identities that lead to a spurious determination of 
“uniqueness” which plays a political role in the experience of the heritage 
“consumers”.534
531 Idem (emphasis added)
532 “By engaging with the idea o f ‘national heritage’ we are imaginatively (and as visitors and tourists, 
temporarily) constituting the ‘nation’ (or region, group, industry, etc.) as a real entity, according to the 
underlying assumptions. We are, in play, enacting the creation and development o f the concept o f the 
‘nation’, which.. .logically and imaginatively required its prefiguration in terms o f traditions, 
languages, folk arts, etc”. David Brett, The construction o f heritage (Cork: Cork University Press, 
1996), p. 156.
533 Ashworth et al., Dissonant Heritage, p. 21. In a sense, this is another answer to the attempt to 
comprehend the choice between cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism in the allocation of 
this kind of property.
534 Ibid. p. 22.
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It is this “uniqueness” that is at stake in the ownership (and commodification 
of) the Parthenon Marbles. As in all cases concerned with very ancient objects, the 
idea of the “uniqueness” is tied to ancient origins, and is meant to stand against all the 
vagaries of history, time, chance, and knowledge that would remove the solidity of 
this kind of ground from its modern-day would-be “inheritors”. As this is a 
uniqueness of which one can be possessed and of which one can be dispossessed, it is 
the locus of the contestation of the ownership of these objects. “Heritage 
disinheritance” is an inevitable result of heritage commodification. Even where the 
heritage commodities (i.e., the objects) are not at the center of ownership battles, any 
non-participating groups are disinherited by definition; even groups that “participate” 
in shaping the “heritage product” face the problems of choice among resources and 
the problem of already-existing “heritages” that don’t conform to present goals. The 
messages given by these heritage products may be dissonant in regard to prevailing 
norms, objectives, or dominant ideology. Arguably, drawing a distinction between 
identity and interpretation can only modify the inevitability of disinheritance. A 
society composed of different social groups can encompass different and exclusive 
heritages, via mutual indifference, tolerant acceptance as of necessity, or mutuality of 
esteem.535
This is not an option in the field of cultural property disputes. First, assuming 
that it is possible to draw a distinction between identity and interpretation, each side 
of that distinction would be contested and commodified. Second, obviously, this is a 
field generated by disputes. Interpretation and claims to ownership cannot be 
separated. “Progressive interpretations can make heroes out of villains and then 
villains from the heroes...”. The problem is, in effect, stopping the process of
interpretation. Once again, this is an attempt to succeed in an artificial and self- 
protective endeavour, to create a deliberate and necessary lie. This becomes ever 
more important as ever more aspects of daily life become commodified, or rather, as 
culture and commodity merge. As Jeremy Rifkin writes, “[ajfter hundreds of years of
535 Ibid. p. 30.
536 Ibid. p. 92.
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converting physical resources into propertied goods, we are now increasingly 
transforming cultural resources into paid-for personal experiences and 
entertainments”.537 Ancient objects then must “stand for” an originary past and unity 
that -  as a result of their falseness, of the imaginative act that constructs them -  
cannot be lost. This requires not only creating a narrative that cannot be challenged 
(as a foundational myth of autochthony, “even in the sense as Avalon or Atlantis", or 
the Parthenon, and metonymically the Parthenon Marbles), but also, finally, and in 
effect, owning or commodifying time itself. David Brett suggests this, proposing that 
“we cannot understand the idea of heritage without examining what it is possible to 
mean by such.. .notions as a distant then becoming a present now; and how the 
bringing of the past into the present requires a strategy whereby time is given spatial 
form in a place”.538
Conclusion: Autochthonous ground?
What becomes obvious is that the unity and the origin that the Parthenon 
Marbles point to are constructed out of necessity, held together with managed 
omissions and anachronistic technologies. Autochthonous ground is a myth that also 
flourishes in modernity. As regards the Parthenon, it is possible that in the encounter 
between the gaze from a distance and the experience of a closer, sharper vision, one is 
catapulted into an ethical relationship with the building itself. As the romantic ideal 
collapses into the recognition of present artificiality and fragility, one must take a 
position on the questions of unity, origin, and attachment: one must contemplate 
whether this structure requires the pieces taken from it, or in what way these pieces 
could be required and returned.
Looking more closely at the Parthenon frieze and the Parthenon itself, one 
becomes aware of a landscape littered with body-parts and pieces of objects valued in 
their fragmentation: the torso of a statue stands for the corpus of the building itself,
537 Rifkin, The Age o f Access, p. 137.
538 Brett, The construction o f heritage, pp. 14-15.
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and the dismay at the destruction and loss of beauty is managed through the notion 
that through this fragment one preserves and can access the time and certainties that 
have been assigned to classical Athens. Fragmentation, human sacrifice, war damage 
and the scavenging and “restorations” of collectors are resolved in the (paradoxical?) 
dream or desire of an originary unity. The law plays an important role in this 
endeavour. The international legal schemes of preservation of cultural property have 
been developed against the backdrop of war and continue to monitor claims made by 
the inhabitants of Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and other countries in which opposing ethnic 
and religious identities are in conflict. Legal theorists balance the claims of national 
identity against the commodification arguments made by lawyers and collectors. War 
and collectors, preservation in situ or in museums: law’s place is in a troublesome 
“afterwards”. It attempts to legislate or mandate the putting together of that which 
has all too obviously been ripped apart.
In this sense, law stands in its familiar position in modernity. In contrast to 
the Biblical story of Solomon and the harlots, it becomes clear that in the case of 
cultural property analysis, law arrives on the scene after the infant has been murdered, 
after “justice” has been done. (This would not have troubled an Ancient Greek. In 
the subject of the Parthenon frieze and in the plays that survive from that period, the 
“before” and “afterwards” of justice collapse into necessary violences.) In modernity, 
however, law has a different mandate than to ensure the justice that could have been 
celebrated on the altar of the Parthenon. Today, law stands after dismemberment, 
history, law itself. It must, in order to contemplate justice, move to a position of the 
present, if not the past. Law must somehow arrive at the moment before Solomon’s 
sword executes “justice” on the body of the infant.
It is interesting that we can live comfortably, easily in a world full of 
valorized fragments and still hold this ideal of justice as unification. Yet, this Chapter 
argues that we have no choice but to choose to believe in a fictional, resistant 
“origin”, one that can be bought, sold, shared, but not lost -  or to give up the idea of 
justice at all, as without some moment of originary certainty, or some uncontested
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ground, we lack the opening to the future that is necessary in order to mark out a 
landscape in which justice can be enacted. Only when facing the future does 
“afterwards” become “before”. In this sense, our effort in claiming ancient objects is 
to become, as the Ancient Greeks or the peoples represented by Kennewick Man, 
autochthonous peoples. We will plant ourselves in any small pieces of unearthed 
ancient marble, bones, soil.
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Chapter Six Cultural Property and Kennewick Man
Violence has changed its direction. When we were victorious we practiced it 
without its seeming to alter us; it broke down the others, but for us men our 
humanism remained intact. United by their profits, the peoples o f the mother 
countries baptized their commonwealth o f crimes, calling them fraternity and 
love; today violence, blocked everywhere, comes back on us through our 
soldiers, comes inside and takes possession o f us. Involution starts; the native 
recreates himself, and we, settlers and Europeans, ultras and liberals, we
C 1 Q
break up. (Jean-Paul Sartre)
Chapter Six continues the preceding analyses by looking at the arguments 
made up to this point in a case which is presently being “written” into a specifically 
legal narrative. Once again, the questions raised concern the claim to an ancient 
object, a nine-thousand-year-old skeleton. The claims made in support of ownership 
signify claims to land based on autochthony, and to history based on cultural 
narrative. Although it might appear that this case inhabits a specifically modem, or 
future-looking context, that of addressing the effects of colonialism and 
decolonization, in fact claiming ancient identity as a means of overcoming or re­
writing the effects (and experiences) of colonialism is one of the primary uses of 
cultural property discourse. It is certainly part of the story of the Parthenon Marbles. 
This Chapter seeks to confirm the accuracy of the theorization of cultural property 
that is being proposed in this thesis. The definition of these bones as porous, 
requiring interpretation; the fictional narratives of memory; the equally-fictional 
narratives of origin (heritage): do these arguments operate equally well to draw 
distinctions and claim ground in the “Manichean” world of colonialism? Can cultural 
property, so understood, read the black and white line has been drawn in America by 
these ancient, colourless bones?
539 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Preface” to Frantz Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 
1963), p. 28
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If so, then the theory proposed throughout this thesis is correct. This Chapter 
uses the dispute of Kennewick Man to contemplate whether “truth” (scientific, 
historical, or legal) exists in these sorts of cases, or if we are once again turning to 
cultural property discourses to create necessary fictions. As always, the point of these 
fictions is to underwrite a future in which continued existence and (new) justice are 
possible.
Introduction: “Indigenous” and “native“
When a human skeleton was discovered in 1996 near Kennewick,
Washington, along the bank of the Columbia River,540 the coroner and forensic 
anthropologist that were called in to examine the bones made two discoveries: first, 
that the bones seemed to belong to a Caucasoid man, and second, that the bones were 
nine thousand years old. These two facts or propositions could not coexist in the 
picture that scientists and historians had built up of America. The “first peoples” of 
America are thought to be the American Indians or Native Americans; a race that is 
descended from Mongoloid peoples that settled in North America. In the received 
history of the “peopling” of America, Caucasiod people came much later, as invaders 
or settlers that threatened and displaced these earliest inhabitants. Until relatively 
recently, the racial characteristics and the theory of the peopling of America that 
underlie this received history were taken as more or less uncontroversial. Recently, 
however, skeletal remains of great age and Caucasoid characteristics have been 
discovered in America. Recently also, the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA),541 in conjunction with the National Museum of the 
American Indian Act (NMAIA),542 make these skeletal remains (potentially) 
unavailable to the professionals that have been largely responsible for the account of 
early American settlement. Museum curators, archaeologists, anthropologists, and 
biologists (among others) may no longer have access to Native American skeletons,
540 Bonnichsen v. U.S., Dept, o f Army, 969 F.Supp. 628, 631 (D.Or. 1997).
541 25 U.S.C. sections 3001-13.
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either as “specimens” or as “exhibits”. The picture of the world is changing just at 
the moment that these professionals are no longer allowed, in an uncomplicated (or at 
least self-policed fashion) to direct the change.
The question posed by Douglas Preston in The New Yorker, “What was a 
Caucasoid man doing in the New World more than ninety-three centuries ago?”543 
resonates, therefore, in several different spheres of possible analysis. The question 
itself already points to the sorts of sociological, scientific and historical judgments 
that are being challenged and defended in the commentaries on this case. This 
formulation presupposes that we know what a Mongoloid man was “doing” in the 
“New World” more than ninety-three centuries ago. To some extent, the question in 
/tee/f supports the patently false proposition that knowledge about race and habitation 
in America has been, until now, uncontroversial. A skeleton calls forth the history of 
the skin and its sustenance: a history that is both disputed and ineffable. In the realms 
of law, science, and the media, the bones were fleshed and put into motion. 
“Kennewick Man’s” appearance as a controversy within the national consciousness 
must be assessed as a function of this moment in science, in time, and in culture. The 
colourless bones of Kennewick Man raise questions about flesh, race, and spirit in 
America, questions that apply to the various struggles of indigenous peoples and 
cultural property more generally.
The purpose of NAGPRA is both to prevent future desecration of Native 
American graves and grave-sites, and, perhaps more importantly, to make reparation 
for past plundering. At the center of the Act, of the controversy regarding the 
disposition of the bones, and of the conflict between Native American groups and 
scientists is the question of “indigenous” in America. The first part of this Chapter 
will thus look at law review articles, relevant media sources, and U.S. legislation.
The second will attempt to reposition the issues raised by looking at them through the 
lens of the development of the discipline of anthropology, as a way of understanding
542 20 United States Code 80q (1989), amended in 1996.
543 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 72.
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the inscription of the “values” that are now defined as “oppositional” by the foregoing 
sources. Running throughout this endeavour are theories of cultural property. As 
will be seen below, the legal academy’s analysis of Kennewick Man turns upon 
notions of cultural identity and cultural affiliation, the ownership rights that attach 
when such identity or affiliation is “proved”, and the gap between the positions of 
various “interest groups” on the effect(s) if not the meaning(s) of this skeleton in the 
fields of race and origin. As such, the proper positioning of the questions raised by 
Kennewick Man requires considering what sorts of legal and cultural analytical 
structures can encompass the question of the meaning of ownership, not only of 
original artifacts but also of origin itself, bred or discovered literally in the bone.
The dispute between the parties is cast in terms of scientific inquiry as well as 
in terms of cultural and historical certainty. Narrowly, at issue is the question of what 
“indigenous” means in the legislative scheme of the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).544 In broad terms, however, the 
question again is one regarding “origin” and the problematics of determining identity 
and ownership that accompany this concept in the realm of cultural property law. 
Broadly, the claim of the plaintiffs in the case {Bonnichsen v. U.S.)545 is that only now 
can science profitably examine ancient bones. New scientific techniques and 
instruments mean that these bones are a treasure trove of information regarding the 
“peopling” of America. Underlying this argument is the notion that only science can 
speak to this subject; furthermore, science must speak to this subject, not only for the 
benefit of Native Americans, but also for all of humankind. On the other hand, for 
many Native Americans, whether the skeleton displays Mongoloid or Caucasoid traits 
makes no difference to the skeleton’s identity. Their argument is that a people finally 
enfranchised with the same rights as other U.S. citizens, i.e., the right to the burial of 
their dead, must not allow these rights to be challenged by the same “science” that 
was an instrument of their original disenfranchisement. Furthermore, they argue, any 
human being on the American continent nine thousand years ago was a “native”
544 25 U.S.C. sections 3001-13, and See Chapter Two.
545 Bonnichsen v .U.S., 969 F.Supp. 628,631 (D.Or. 1997).
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American. As such, this case demonstrates the relevance of the foregoing analyses 
regarding the function of cultural property disputes in modernity. The argument 
made by this Chapter is that much like the dispute regarding the ownership of the 
Parthenon Marbles, the dispute regarding the ownership of these bones speaks more 
to an anxiety vis-a-vis the future than any possible certainty vis-a-vis the past.
In the legal commentaries on this case, the issues regarding the meaning of 
“indigenous” or “native” in the legislative scheme are defined polemically. Most 
often, the commentators discuss a “clash” between Native American and scientific 
values. The first argument made in this Chapter is that this framework cannot 
adequately address the questions of identity, ownership, and conflict that make the 
determination of the racial and cultural affiliation of 9,000-year-old bones a hotly 
debated question today. Rather, it is necessary to contemplate the Native American 
(“Mongoloid”) and European (“Caucasoid”) claims to the New World and the (old) 
earth that composes it. In the interweaving of claims regarding autochthonous origin, 
indigenous identity, and the claims of science and its philosophical offshoots, one can 
find the mirroring and continuation of the early wars between “settlers” and 
“Indians”. In order to understand why this conflict persists, and indeed erupts at 
every opportunity, it is necessary to understand why these claims are posed in the 
present; long after the question of “ownership” of New World/old earth has been 
answered. This Chapter argues, first, that there is another territory, that of knowledge 
and the value o f knowledge itself which is being fought for at this time. The conflicts 
and clashes that are being located in the realm of law in turn are based in a conflict 
regarding epistemology. Indeed, the problem is one of “facts” in this area. When 
something is so old, how do we know what it is or whom it might possibly belong to? 
This sort of question underlies legal conflicts and serves as the substrate for the cases 
that erupt in the public consciousness. The battle before the court in this case does 
not merely concern entitlement to knowledge within the constraints of NAGPRA, but 
entitlement to knowledge itself as the one thing that can trump law, politics, identity, 
and history in America. When the assessment of knowledge (or different kinds of
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knowledges) questions or destabilizes the power balance of the dissemination and 
authorization of knowledge itself, wars of colonialization once again break out.
In the question regarding the disposition of Kennewick Man -  of what 
happens to these bones -  the field on which the debate is being conducted is 
organized by the values or problems that define the American national consciousness. 
As will be shown below, the foundational concerns of American self-consciousness 
(as they display themselves in the debates concerning Kennewick Man) are progress 
and identity. These two terms are in some tension with each other. From the 
perspective of the dominant culture, an American (of any origin) is a person who 
makes progress the hallmark of their identity. A non-American is a person who 
chooses identity over progress. A “Native” American is the repository, in the story 
that Americans tell of their history, of the conflict and fluctuations between these two 
poles. A “Native American” that moves (“forward”) into the dominant mode of 
“civilization” is an American, entitled to the protections that the United States 
Constitution guarantees to all Americans. A “Native American” that refuses this 
identity, choosing instead a different set of values that either define “progress” in a 
different way or reject it entirely, is a “Native”, or “native”, or, in the previous 
century, a “savage” (open to pity, censure, and education). The second argument of 
this Chapter is that this structure remains true in the present, or rather, recurs when a 
conflict between “progress” and “identity” arises. The development of “savage” into 
“Native” doubles back into “indigenous”, a term of art in the cultural property 
lexicon.
The third argument that this Chapter makes is that the debate over the 
meaning of “indigenous” does not constitute a reappropriation of Native American 
identity, but an appropriation of it. Whatever “indigenous” means, it cannot mean 
“natural” given such a history and discursive field. The links between “Native” and 
“savage”, and “science” and “progress”, reference colonialism. More specifically, 
these linkages reference the colonization of “original” peoples by settlers who anchor 
themselves and their values by force. The colonization of original inhabitants is the
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background to any modem debate(s) regarding indigenous rights or cultural property. 
The conflicts and congruences listed above move across and through the history of 
colonization. “Progress” or “Native” reach their apogee as descriptive terms against 
the personhood (however defined: bodies and minds, but also query “souls”546) of the 
colonized. In this realm, the ancient bones of Kennewick Man hold many positions: 
original man, but not “Native”, this contested by the parties in this case, therefore: 
original man, thus “indigenous”; this contested yet again: non-indigenous because not 
“Native” (Caucasoid, settler); belonging to scientists as an “early American”, 
belonging to Native Americans as “one of us”. The bones become a totem; as they 
are unfleshed, they can be made to wear skins of different colours. When they are 
gathered up, studied, identified, they constitute a kind of kaleidoscope of identity and 
political and scientific necessity. The constitutive pieces add up to more than one 
phantasm in the American landscape. If at issue is decolonization, which this Chapter 
claims is always more or less at issue in debates regarding the return of objects of 
cultural property, then what must be addressed is what Fanon refers to as “the 
replacing of certain ‘species’ of men by another ‘species’ of men”:
At whatever level we study it -  relationships between individuals, new names 
for sports clubs, the human admixture at cocktail parties, in the police, on the 
directing boards of national or private banks -  decolonization is quite simply 
the replacing of a certain “species” of men by another “species” of men. 
Without any period of transition, there is a total, complete, and absolute 
substitution.547
This is not an evolutionary argument, although it raises, as an imperative, the 
questions of the development of “man”. Whether the “native” is Nietzsche’s “blond 
beast” or the American (noble?) savage, he or she is a classified entity, a “man” in 
“modernity”, of (and representative of) this time. To then place the concerns at issue 
within the context of a “clash of values” as the American law review articles do is to 
make a category mistake. The central value that attaches to the very notion of “man”
546 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1977). 
(Translated by Alan Sheridan)
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or “human being” is missing. Yet how to begin to derive this value? This Chapter 
suggests two routes: one via the claims(s) attached to the dead, and the other via the 
claims that are made between the living. To begin with the first route, a question that 
irradiates the various approaches to the scientific study of Kennewick Man is: when 
do the dead become “history”? That such a question is central to modem legal and 
social theory is unavoidable; the theorizing of modernity has remained transfixed 
with its own reflection in and through war and the atrocities that accompany state- 
sanctioned violence. In keeping with this, the well-established link between cultural 
property and war is as evident in the case of Kennewick Man as it is in UNESCO 
claims arising out of civil wars and invasions around the world. The ethnic cleansing 
and related looting and dispersal of cultural artifacts that have become familiar in the 
media and over the internet in the past years548 were practiced as well in America in 
the first two hundred years of European settlement. As will be seen below, many of 
the practices of collectors and scientists in anthropology easily fall into this category.
However, a colonized people have had a different sort of war waged upon 
them as well:
Not so very long ago, the earth numbered two thousand million inhabitants: 
five hundred million men, and one thousand five hundred million natives.
The former had the Word; the others had the use of it... .From Paris, from 
London, from Amsterdam we would utter the words “Parthenon! 
Brotherhood!” and somewhere in Africa or Asia lips would open “...thenon!
.. .therhood!”549
As in colonialism the Word is given, in the process of decolonization, the 
battle moves to the realm of culture, history and knowledge. The claims to cultural 
property in philosophy, education, and science can be seen as reclaiming “the Word” 
in this sense. To make claims on reason and rationality, to exercise control over the
547 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, “Concerning Violence”, p. 35.
548 For an comprehensive guide to the “looting” question, please see: 
http://wings.buffalo.edu/anthropology/Documents/lootbib.html
549 Sartre, “Preface” to The Wretched o f the Earth, p. 7.
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instruments of knowledge and to determine whether or not something is worth 
knowing is in fact to wage the war of decolonization. It is a war that cannot be 
forestalled or managed by the other side, either by the settler or, after a while, by the 
elite native bourgeoisie. The claim to knowing, speaking, or allowing is a 
rebellion.550
There are at least two ways to understand, therefore, attachment to the dead in 
cultural property analysis. First, there is attachment to the dead members of the tribe, 
race, or group; the claims of these dead are to protection from further dishonour and 
desecration. Second, there is the attachment to the soon-to-be-dead, in the sense that 
Fanon describes the realization that mobilizes decolonization in colonized people.
The certainty of one’s own death becomes a fact and a companion; one is attached to 
it precisely as one is attached to one’s culture and values. The “man” who is ready to 
fight against colonialism places himself with the already-dead.
It will not be without fearful losses; the colonial army becomes ferocious; the 
country is marked out, there are mopping-up operations, transfers of 
population, reprisal expeditions, and they massacre women and children. He 
knows this; this new man begins his life as a man at the end of it; he considers 
himself as a potential corpse.551
As part of this, there is attachment to the martyred or symbolic dead. On the 
battlefield in which (future) law must address (past) violence, the dead who were 
killed in the struggle against (to take the place of) the settler become martyrs. In the 
“Manichean” world of colonialism, the “natives” that transgress, that cross the 
boundaries from one side to the other, are atavistic figures of transgression and 
escape.
550 “During the period o f decolonization, the native’s reason is appealed to. ... [But] [t]he violence 
with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and the aggressiveness which has permeated the 
victory o f these values over the ways of life and of thought of the native mean that, in revenge, the 
native laughs in mockery when Western values are mentioned in front of him. In the colonial context 
the settler only ends his work of breaking in the native when the latter admits loudly and intelligibly 
the supremacy of the white man’s values. In the period of decolonization, the colonized masses mock 
at these very values, insult them, and vomit them up”. Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth, p. 43.
551 Sartre, “Preface” to The Wretched o f  the Earth, p. 23.
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This Chapter argues that the ancient dead belong, somewhat paradoxically, to 
this last group. They stand both far behind and ahead of the living. Whether the 
identification of these figures comes from myth, from art, or from oral histories, they 
occupy a strangely-fluid place in time: origin is placed before the eyes of the present, 
as a goal or as a guarantee. As such, we must address to what extent this relationship 
with the ancient dead is a mechanism of inverting or reversing the vectors of 
identification and power that have not only impacted the flesh of the colonized
C M
people, but have also penetrated into the depths of their past. When origin is once 
again prior to vision (rather than the end result of searching), then the direction of 
attack changes. The person in possession of origin is in possession of power rather 
than serving as the substrate for the gaze of the colonizer. As a result of not only the 
abuses perpetrated on the native body, but also of the struggle for shifting meaning, 
the dead result in different sorts of specters for settler and native in the decolonized 
world.553
If Native Americans struggle to claim the bones of Kennewick Man in order 
to lay claim to an uncolonized past and a decolonized future, how do we understand 
the identities being occupied in the present? Vis-a-vis both progress and identity, the 
Native Americans interested in this case554 are refusing to countenance further 
identification from the outside. In this sense, they are refusing to stand in the position
552 Arguably, this is the situation that the Greeks of 1833 faced vis-a-vis their recent history of Ottoman 
occupation. Why not keep any “memory” of medieval history on the Acropolis? Certainly the reason 
is in part due to the kind of chauvinism that Bernal postulates in his depiction of the “Aryan model” in 
Black Athena. However, the Greeks must also have been engaged in rejecting the absolute knowledge 
that to some (unacceptable) extent, the Greeks had been made, as modems, by the Ottoman 
occupation.
553 It is not clear that these dead are important in the same way to people who can determine their 
status in the present. First, as has been pointed out in many of the law review articles on Kennewick 
Man, the grave protection and burial laws are different for members o f the dominant culture. Second, 
the iconography of dead bodies is theorized differently according to different sorts o f politics. In 
political anthropology, corpses that belong to the dominant culture symbolize other sorts o f struggles, 
and in/on a landscape where the sacred requires different sorts o f protection. “Introduction: Corpses on 
the move” in Katherine Verdery, The Political Lives o f Dead Bodies in the Postsocialist 
Transformation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
554 The Coalition of tribes that have presented amicus briefs in this case are not strictly parties to the 
lawsuit, in which the parties are a coalition of scientists and the Corps of Engineers. Please see 
Chapter Two, and the discussion infra.
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of “other” in order to guarantee the dominant culture’s “same”. This is a negative 
identification, however. The question remains, what is a native?
NATIVE: bom thrall (cf. NEIF) xv; (astrol.) subject of a horoscope; one bom in 
a particular place xvi; original or usual inhabitant xvii. -  medL. nativus, sb. 
use of L. nativus adj. (whence na-tive adj. xiv, of one’s birth xv)....555
From “bom thrall” one can see the progression to “indigenous person” via 
“native/savage” in American scholarship and ideology from Colonial times forward. 
“Bom thrall”, however, as will be discussed below, applies, in the American 
mythology, to the presumption that Native Americans suffered not from slavery of 
the body but of the mind; that they were bom thrall to ignorance of civilization, bom 
different in terms of goals and values. The early settlers of America considered this 
slavery of the worst sort. The Native Americans only became “savages” through their 
refusal to “learn”, a refusal that became constituted as an incapacity. Presently, the 
factors that in turn lead to the determination of “indigenous” identity turn around the 
notion of “original inhabitant”. Yet these factors, as set out by various legal theorists, 
include the following: a claim to autochthonous origin, including the sacred 
component of the group’s own coming into being; “sacred” and/or “spiritual” 
narratives of attachment to the land; and often a “trust” (in the legal sense) 
relationship between the colonizers and the original inhabitants. To the present day, 
it is not only “being there first” that constitutes the indigenous person; it is how one is 
“there”. The mode of habitation and the values that are expressed are determined in 
the first instance by experts, i.e., anthropologists, archaeologists and paleontologists. 
Later, the indigenous group begins to speak for itself, which is a rupture of a 
different, and for the dominant culture, more serious kind.
Against this background, the American response to the discovery of 
Kennewick Man in the media is easier to understand. It is not possible to summarize, 
briefly, the range of articles and comments that have attempted to deal with the
555 The Oxford Dictionary o f English Etymology, ed. C. T. Onions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1966).
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questions presented by this case.556 As always in political or ethical conflict, each 
commentator wants to be in control of the grounds or positioning of the debate. 
Nevertheless, it is the “people” that give this dispute its weight. The most 
sophisticated articles in the most liberal of all fora circle gingerly around the same 
points that are made in considerably less enlightened media. For example, the 
commentator in The New Yorker, quoted above, writes at the end of the article:
Some tabloids and radio talk shows have referred to Kennewick as a “white 
man” and have suggested that his discovery changes everything with respect 
to the rights of Native Americans in this country. ..There are some less 
racially enlightened folk in the neighborhood who are saying, “Hey, our 
ancestors were here first, so we don’t owe the Indians anything”.
This is clearly racist nonsense: these new theories cannot erase or negate the 
existing history of genocide, broken treaties, and repression. However, it does 
raise an interesting question: If the original inhabitants of the New World 
were Europeans who were pushed out by Indians, would it change the
c c n
Indians’ position in the great moral landscape?
The answer given by a scientist, in the same article, is also quite indicative of 
the endeavour being undertaken by the American establishment to frame the debate 
and answer the (absurd} question: “If you go back far enough, eventually we all have 
a common ancestor — we ’re all the same.”558 This is the project and the conflict: are 
we all the same? can we be made to be all the same? and if we are all the same, who 
gets to decide what we are? Identity constituted as property raises questions of 
ownership and use, claims of status and rights that can only be answered or 
adjudicated in a landscape in which brute force and brutish philosophies still exert 
considerable power.
556 http://www.kennewick-man.com/
557 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 81.
558 Idem
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The conflict as positioned in the law review articles
The commentators writing in American law review articles make cogent 
claims that the best understanding of the legal claims being made559 is as a “clash of 
values” between native and dominant cultures. Usually, but not always, the 
conclusion is that the cultural differences are irreconcilable. In these analyses, 
NAGPRA will always contain a series of fault-lines between people(s) that cannot be 
crossed by law (and by extension by reason). One law review article concludes that 
the problem is one of reason contra faith, in the great historical tradition of opposition 
to scientific advances that question or conflict with religious doctrine.560 Another 
argues that the depth or degree of cultural difference means that only power can force 
a solution; as it did in the history of the past two centuries in America:
The irreconcilable cultural differences between Native Americans and Anglo- 
Americans are thought to be the reason for.. .military conflict, for if Anglo- 
Americans could not make Native Americans conform to Anglo-American 
ideas.. .they, instead, conquered them. By analogy, if Native American and 
Anglo-American perceptions of human remains are irreconcilable, disputes 
such as Kennewick Man will be resolved by sheer power, albeit legal, rather 
than military, power.561
However, the second writer resolves the above analogy in a way that is extremely 
similar to the argument of the first: “No compromise is possible where belief meets 
logic”.562
It is difficult to imagine, however, which cultural identifications or practices 
can be cleanly defined as “belief’ and which are “logic”. The distinctions at issue 
here are determined perceptually and historically; this relativism irradiates all aspects 
of the modem world, particularly, one could say, “science”. This section of the
559 See Chapter Two, supra, for a complete statement of the issues that arise.
560 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”.
561 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 381.
562 Idem
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Chapter attempts to consider these positions and their resolution into “values” that 
can “conflict” with each other.563 The argument being made is that the descriptive 
and the prescriptive, the utilitarian and the extreme become facets of each other in 
which the very notion of “valuation” is quite possibly compromised. For example, 
Two of this country’s highest values are the objective pursuit of knowledge 
using scientific methods and respect for people’s religious traditions and 
convictions. On occasion, these values have come into conflict, and public 
policies have been developed to address the competing concerns.564
Or:
The struggle between Indians and archaeologists is one that encompasses two 
fundamental principles: equal protection for everyone under the law and 
religious freedom.565
In order to locate and explore the differing values cited, the law review 
articles discuss the specific narratives of myth, religion, science, and origin that are 
held to create the conflict. The different accounts are presented as equal and opposed 
quantities. 566 The question of indigenous identity, posed as a question regarding the 
origin of humankind in North America, becomes a dispute between, on the one hand, 
tribal accounts of how Native Americans came to inhabit the earth, and on the other, 
scientific theories of migration of peoples from Europe or Asia. Underlying this 
dispute is an entire host of differences, metaphysical, legal, and sociological that 
possibly “explains” the reason(s) for the conflict.
563 The question of how cultural differences become epistemological or ethical imperatives, or vice- 
versa, is obviously too broad to be resolved in this Chapter. Underlying the various accounts of origin 
are supporting philosophical positions regarding the meaning(s) o f time and place, o f the possible and 
the impossible. Nor is such a project necessarily required in order to understand what is at stake in this 
case. Nevertheless, in looking at the discussion of Kennewick Man, one sees epistemological lines 
drawn and ethical positions taken in a sort of seamless web, in which knowledge and the right to 
knowledge merge and should not be separated.
564 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 369.
565 Riding In , “Without Ethics and Morality”, p. 12.
566 For example, the sections that address the cosmological or metaphysical problems arising from the 
accommodation of differing views of death and/or (re)burial are titled: “COMPETING VIEWS AND 
INTERESTS UNDERLYING BONNISCHEN v.UNITED STATES” (Lannan, “Anthropology and 
Restless Spirits”, p. 382) and “SOME ARGUABLY IRRECONCILABLE CULTURAL 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NATIVE AMERICANS AND ANGLO-AMERICANS”.( Ackerman, 
“Kennewick Man”, p. 373).
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There are at least four major categories of “cultural difference” between 
Native Americans and others. These are different conceptions of time, different 
conceptions of the relationship between humans and animals, different conceptions of 
property, and different valuations of science. Each will be summarized briefly and
discussed separately. First, time in the Native American cosmology is cyclical rather 
than linear.568 This conceptualization has very important consequences for the idea of 
the “past”. For example,
[bjecause Anglo-Americans view time linearly, it is reasonable to assume that 
the older the human remains the less likely that we will feel any emotional 
disconcertion over their being scientifically analyzed.... [Whereas]
[ijmportant relationships which Anglo-Americans think of as in the past are 
conceived by Native Americans as immediate.569
The notion discussed above, in which dead bodies have the rights and 
responsibilities of “history” rather than “human beings” attached to them, does not 
exist in the Native American (metaphysical) universe. Dead bodies never become 
objectified, thus never lose their human claim on the living. In Anglo-American 
terms, therefore, Native American human remains retain the claim that the newly- 
dead make to proper burial, rather than exchanging this for the study and preservation 
that are perceived to accrue to the long dead.
Second, the difference in the relationship between humans and animals in the 
Native as opposed to the Anglo-American cultural tradition also leads to potential 
conflict regarding Kennewick Man:
Whereas Anglo-American traditions see humans as clearly below God and 
above other animals, Native American traditions do not make sharp
567 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man” pp. 373-81.
568 Ibid. p. 374.
569 Idem.
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distinctions among these three groups; further, humans are free to interact 
with gods and other animals.570
The significance of this Native American belief in light of burial practices is 
again linked to the continuing viability, for lack of a better word, of the dead. The 
dead leave this world for a similar world, in which the same relationships between the 
human, natural, and divine are maintained. The living have the responsibility to 
ensure the placement of the dead in the next world by maintaining their placement in 
this one. The superimposition of the realms of the dead and the living again means 
that the dead do not fade from human care with the passage of time. Rather, when the 
dead go into the earth, they continue to inhabit the world that gives all members of 
the Native American community their own continuing identity. This may be seen not 
only in the study of Native American identity-structures, but also in the legal 
arguments made for Native American regulation of paleontological resources.
Third, the different conceptions o f property are also a potential fault-line 
between the Native American and the scientific or Anglo-American communities.
The lack of private property in Native American tribes and culture, in conjunction 
with the foregoing differences, means that
[tjhe Native American concept of property is relevant to Kennewick Man 
because the idea of someone having the “right to possession” of human 
remains is offensive and incomprehensible. How can one own the dead? 
Further, evidence suggests that Native Americans are unconcerned if human 
remains are repatriated to the wrong Native American group.571
Interestingly, this would seem to make a mockery of NAGPRA’s “ownership 
and control” scheme of allocation. Why agree to this language if the communitarian 
ownership structure of property made it offensive? The problem here is not the 
substantive content of the cultural practice, but rather the notion of the difference:
570 Ibid. p. 375.
571 Ibid. p. 377.
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given that Native Americans think of ownership differently, the assumption is that 
they cannot “own” their dead. However, it is a truism that ownership is “a bundle of 
rights”. The rights of “ownership or control” include the right to protect, to allocate, 
to preserve, to determine the meaning of “benefit” in the particular context and to 
determine who may be a beneficiary. These are all considerations that inform the 
Native American arguments in the reburial debate.572 Ancestors are commonly 
understood to “belong to” their descendants regardless of the conception of property 
at work within the specific culture. Thus it is the question of descent that underlies 
this particular “difference”, and which will transform it into a ‘Value” that can be 
assigned to a possessor.
Finally, the fourth difference is how science is valued in each culture.573 
“Science” in the American commentaries refers to all sorts of disciplines and 
discoveries: anthropology, biology, archaeology, etc. There are two facets to the 
arguments made about science. The first regards “creationism”, or the value of 
science as regards its ability to give an adequate account of origin of peoples. The 
second is about the effect that scientific practices have had or may have on Native 
American life. Of course, both arguments merge in various ways when used 
instrumentally to allow or deny reburial. To begin with the second aspect, Native 
Americans do not accept that the benefits of science outweigh its cost in terms of 
human rights:
Whereas Anglo-Americans perceive science as an objective, important 
practice in a world where technology is the key to competing in a world 
economy, Native Americans are indifferent or even hostile toward science. If 
disputes such as Kennewick Man are to be resolved by a balancing of human 
rights versus scientific rights, Native Americans might view the science scale 
as well nigh empty: “I can’t imagine the kind of benefit we might get from
572 S. Webb, “Reburying Australian skeletons”, 61 Antiquity 292-6 (1987), p. 295. See also: L. J. 
Zimmerman, “Webb on reburial: a North American perspective”, 61 Antiquity 462-3 (1987), p. 462: 
“The parallels between attitudes expressed by Aborigines and by Native Americans about the 
treatment o f ancestral skeletons seem extraordinary”.
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research on human remains that can compensate for the negative impact that 
this longstanding violation of human rights has had on the mental health of 
our American Indian and Alaskan Native communities.”574
This is a question about utility more than it is about “truth”. The argument 
from utility is based not only on an assessment of harm done to community members, 
but also on a different set of (metaphysical) supports for what constitutes “reality”. 575 
Here, the two potentially-different kinds of objections to “science” merge. If 
“identity” is not founded in the sort of data that science provides, then why privilege 
that data? If a transvestite can live as a woman within her tribe and the world at 
large, secure in her female identity, then the meaning of the Y chromosome may be 
both unchallenged and irrelevant.576 The metaphysical supports for Native American 
identity and the rejection of scientists’ accounts of the peopling of North America 
here come together. Identity as guaranteed within the tribe was, in a sense, until quite 
recently, all.
The other facet of the distrust felt by some members of the Native American 
community for science is based in the belief that science does not (indeed cannot) 
give an adequate account of the origin of peoples in North America. Some Native 
Americans
adhere to what observers have labeled “Native American creationism”, a set 
of beliefs that rejects scientific theories on the origin of humanity, including
573 Generalizations are dangerous here -  the literature clearly states that some Native Americans do not 
mind DNA testing or scientific examination of human remains, whereas among Americans of all types 
there are individuals and groups that are adamantly opposed to “science”.
574 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 378, n. 182 quoting the statement of Dr. Emory Johnson in the 
Senate Hearings for NAGPRA.
575 “With the exception o f the religious transformations of Catholic initiates and women who change 
their names, family ties, and loyalties when they are married, no personal transformations are 
acceptable in the West. Yet, among primal peoples, there are numerous societal and personal 
ceremonies that make all types of drastic changes in identity and reality possible for virtually everyone. 
And these changes are considered actual transformations”. Jamake Highwater, The Primal Mind:
Vision and Reality in Indian America (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 181-2.
576 See account of We’wha in Highwater, The Primal Mind, pp. 183-7.
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both the theory of evolution and the Bering land bridge theory, and finds 
literal truth in Native American oral traditions on creation.577
The Native American scholar and activist Vine Deloria, Jr put this argument 
most strongly. Deloria argues against the scientific theories of origin based on a 
critique of the techniques used to generate knowledge in the realm of science. 
Scientific truth is not truth at all, as too often
scientists, instead of objectively criticizing each other, are quick to accept 
another academician’s theories so that their status within the university and 
profession is assured. ... Specialization within the sciences has led to 
“millions of irrefutable facts” which go unchallenged because scientists have 
no knowledge of related, though distinct, fields and because of doctrinal
578pressures.
In Deloria’s argument, authority and ignorance are constantly merging into 
“fact”. The effect of this practice on evolutionary theory is to transform the long­
standing explanations and arguments at the core of the theory into dogma. The older 
the theory, the less it can be challenged by scientific experiments that question the
cnQ
prevailing paradigm.
Furthermore, in the realm of science in modernity, authority and knowledge 
structures do not merge seamlessly. The techniques of “hard” science itself are open 
to criticism. Carbon dioxide dating, used throughout the anthropological sciences to 
date artifacts, depends upon carbon-dioxide levels, which fluctuate from century to 
century, and thus give no stable “ground” from which to determine age. Deloria finds 
that the theories that scientists have proposed to explain the peopling of America owe 
more to racism and political utility than to science. Both the Bering Strait theory and 
the newer Ice Bridge theory ensue
577 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits” p. 387.
578 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 379, quoting Vine Deloria, Jr. in Red Earth, White Lies: Native 
Americans and the Myth o f Scientific Fact, p. 58.
579 This is one of the arguments also made by Bemal in Black Athena.
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from an Anglo-American desire to deny Native Americans the argument that 
they were here a very long time, as opposed to a few thousand years, before 
Europeans arrived.580
Against this background, the reading of “scientific” to mean “correct” is 
seriously compromised. Deloria argues that scientists have become the new priests of 
modem society, and their “information” is correspondingly a matter of faith. Why 
not, then, turn to sources (such as priests) that have more, and more fundamental, 
authority of this kind?
Deloria thus looks to the oral traditions of Native American tribes to “explain” 
origin. Authority and truth are represented by tribal narratives:
“American Indians, as a general rule, have aggressively opposed the Bering 
Strait migration doctrine because it does not reflect any of the memories or 
traditions passed down by ancestors over many generations”. Deloria prefers 
explanations of creation in Native American oral traditions, which he believes 
are more reliable than Western Science because they are not based on 
fragmented, detached observations, but on collective human experience.581
These traditions are creationist rather than evolutionary, proposing an 
autochthonous origin for Native Americans in North America. For example, a 
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe repatriation officer stated that:
We know where we came from. We are the descendants of the Buffalo 
people. They came from inside the earth after supernatural spirits prepared 
this world for humankind to live here. If non-Indians choose to believe they 
evolved from an ape, so be it.582
Yet, they are not “creationist” in the sense that Christian orthodoxy has defined the 
concept. There is no one way, one path or one truth; the underlying premise of
580 Ackerman, “Kennewick Man”, p. 380.
581 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 387.
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‘science” and monotheism both is disregarded. As Deloria writes, “[m]ost tribal 
religions make no pretense as to their universality or exclusiveness”.583 Rather, the 
complex of religion, tradition, and memory that Deloria privileges over “Western 
Science” has a different aim.
In the early days of the furor over Kennewick Man, the Umatillas issued a
statement written by Armand Minthom, “a member of a new generation of Native
American activists, who see religious fundamentalism...as a road back to Native
American traditions and values”.584
Our elders have taught us that once a body goes into the ground, it is meant to
$
stay there until the end of time.... If this individual is truly over 9,000 years 
old, that only substantiates our belief that he is Native American. From our 
oral histories, we know that our people have been part of this land since the 
beginning of time. We do not believe that our people migrated here from 
another continent, as the scientists do.... Scientists believe that because the 
individual’s head measurement does not match ours, he is not Native 
American. Our elders have told us that Indian people did not always look the 
way they look today. Some scientists say that if this individual is not studied 
further, we, as Indians, will be destroying evidence of our history. It is passed 
on to us through our elders and through our religious practices.585
This response is in keeping with the statements made during the Senate and 
Congressional Hearings before NAGPRA became law. The legislative history of 
NAGPRA reflects the birth of the Indian Burial Rights movement in the 1970s and 
the increasing political sophistication of the groups involved in this movement.
Native American lawyers and activists raised the issues of ethics, the preservation of
582 Ibid. p. 388.
583 Vine Deloria, Jr., God Is Red (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1973), p. 217.
584 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 74.
585 Idem.
586 These groups were the American Indians Against Desecration, the National Congress of American 
Indians, the Association of American Indian Affairs, the American Indian Science and Engineering 
Society, and various coalitions o f tribes. In the 1980s, the group that achieved pre-eminence was the 
Native American Rights Fund. Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality”, p. 25.
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Indian religious freedom, and equality under the law to argue against the practice of 
treating Native American human remains as anthropological or archaeological 
artifacts.587 Long-standing anger regarding the methods of collecting and storing 
Native American human remains and the (possibly more recent) skepticism about the 
benefits of “science” merge in the question of what to do about Kennewick Man.
In this sense, the image of “Native American creationism” that one encounters 
(in the law review articles and elsewhere) is a very modem phenomenon. This of 
course is not true of Native American religion itself. However, within the debate 
regarding Kennewick Man, the claims made for and by Native American religion are 
arguments for an identity that cannot be shaken either by science or by politics. 
Writing about the European construction of the history of humanism, Sartre writes 
that the “settler”
leaves out of account the human memory and the ineffaceable marks left upon 
it; and then, above all there is something which perhaps he has never known: 
we only become what we are by the radical and deep-seated refusal of that
coo
which others have made of us.
This point applies equally to the argument made about anthropology, below.
It is possible that the various observations made about Native Americans by settlers 
and then scientists, which over time have been corrected or become uncontroversial 
through the operation of professionalism or professional standards, are here being 
rejected. The “truth” about Native Americans is for Native Americans to determine. 
Religion may be a form of self-knowledge on all sorts of levels; “creationism” in this 
context is a form of resistance to the various disciplines/”knowledges” that have 
defined the Native American self. As such, it is a sword not a shield. In the debate 
about scientific testing of ancient bones, some tribal representatives espouse 
“creationism” because studies of human remains are “not necessary to an
587 Ibid. pp. 25-6.
588 Sartre, “Preface” to The Wretched o f the Earth, p. 17.
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understanding of their tribes’ history”.589 The origin of relevant peoples is already 
known.
Against this background, religious practices are being used to deny the 
validity of the perceptual act that science demands. Thus,
[t]he insight has slowly dawned on the scholarly world that American Indian 
religions are not just a thing of the past, something we can look up in Catlin’s, 
Grinnell’s, Morgan’s, Fewkes’s, or Boas’s works. These religions.. .continue 
to flourish, sometimes in traditional forms, and sometimes in new 
appearances. .. .The common religious heritage from the past is strengthened 
at religious conferences.... In books published by Indian spokesmen for old 
traditional religions the inherited religious values are emphasized. In short, 
we meet an Indian population in growing religious self-consciousness and in 
rapid religious expansion. Whatever the forms, the past is nourishing the 
present.590
“Westerners” or “white men” or “Anglo-Americans” cannot see through 
Native American tribal or personal identity to the creature within. In the rejection of 
the values of science, one sees clearly the rejection of the disciplines of anthropology 
and archaeology, as well as the struggle to derive a cohesive history for Native 
American peoples that is free of interference and subjugation.
Assuming, for the moment, that the law review articles cited are correct in 
positing a “clash of values”, the foregoing analysis begs the question of which values 
are at stake. The questions of time, the relationship between humans and animals, 
individual and communal property and belief versus logic must be re-organized if 
they are to expose values that can “clash” over the “ownership or control” of human 
bones. Merely claiming that “science” (whatever that is) and “religion” (whatever 
that is) are in conflict, and that this conflict is well-known within the American
589 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits” p. 387.
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political landscape, is not enough. Why are these two realms in conflict, after years 
of “consensus-building”, in a country that prides itself on its religious tolerance? The 
only way to answer this question is by excavating the values that underlie the two 
faiths of science and religion. Each term has its meaning in the context of American 
history and the Native American experience. First, “science” must be considered 
through the linkages between science, education and progress. The emphasis on 
science, the factor that makes science a “value” rather than a discipline or perceptual 
methodology, derives from the American emphasis on the value of progress in all its 
incarnations. Progress is the value that informs “science”.
Second, “religion” must be considered through the linkages between religion, 
“individualism” and identity. The emphasis on religion, the factor that gives religion 
its content in this case is the American emphasis on identity. It is not Native 
American religion that problematizes the question of “ownership and control” of 
ancient bones, it is the fact that Native Americans are “speaking for” the dead, and for 
themselves, in the name of religion. These were “expert” positions, reserved for non- 
Indians. In “Native American creationism”, it is the “Native American” and not the 
“creationism” that generates the problems. The replacement of one sort of speaker 
with another has tremendous effect,591 even, and possibly most frighteningly, as 
regards the authority of science (and thus exposes authority itself, authority denuded 
of its mask of “truth”). What relevance does science have in a culture in which -  to 
stretch a point -- sex-change “operations” don’t need doctors?592 What relevance 
does science have if the identity of a Native American has nothing to do with whether 
they have Caucasoid or Mongoloid features? With whether their ancestors had 
Caucasoid or Mongoloid features? The values that are at stake in this conflict are not 
“science and religion” or “religion and equal protection”, although of course these 
formulations express facets of genuine cultural difference and ethical dissonance. 
Rather, the values that form the battleground on which the debate regarding
590 Ake Hultkrantz, The Study o f American Indian Religions (New York and Chico: The Crossroads 
Publishing Company and Scholars Press, 1983), p. 109.
591 As stated above, NAGPRA gives non-Native Americans no ownership rights in this situation.
592 Again, see account o f We’wha in Highwater, The Primal Mind, p. 183-7.
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Kennewick Man is being held are “progress” and “identity”. These values really do 
“clash”. An identity not dependent on progress is (as will be discussed below) anti- 
American. It also serves as a challenge to the value of progress itself. These values, 
when working in tandem rather than in opposition, have already defined the field of 
anthropology.
To trace the means by which “science” translates into “progress” and 
“religion” into “identity” in this debate, it is necessary to reformulate the four points 
of cultural difference listed above. Returning to the first point, the temporal 
difference is merged with the religious and the cultural. Native Americans speak of 
their “.. .responsibility to protect all human burials, regardless of race”.593 This 
responsibility is founded on respect for the tribe’s ancestors, on the link between the 
tribe and the land, and on the conception of time as a potentially-infinite present 
moment.594 Such a conceptualization undercuts the notion of “progress” while 
affirming “identity”. In one sense, the Native American image of time is in fact quite 
common, as personal or “sacred” time, within the context of modernity595:
[t]he aboriginal “dreamtime” is the solution to the Western question asked 
by.. .Hannah Arendt: “Where are we when we think?”596
However, the trans-cultural commonality of this kind of time does not necessarily 
require or call forth the other values that define modernity:
it is impossible to conceive of progress in the contemporary non-Indian lineal 
sense in Native American thought. We in the West refer to the cumulative 
process in which the more and the “new” automatically become identified 
with the better. Primal people do not conceive of such progressive and secular
593 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 389.
594 Ibid. p. 390, quoting Chief Joseph, leader o f the Nez Perce tribe, in a 1879 address to U.S. 
Congress: “’This country holds your father’s body. Never sell the bones o f your father and your 
mother.’” Also quoting Patrick Lefthand: ‘“go into our future hand in hand with the past...’”.
595 Highwater, The Primal Mind, p. 95.
596 Ibid. p. 89.
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The Native American conception of time also functions as an anti-commodification 
device of sorts, turning “the Western notions about things into propositions about 
events ”.598
Time, therefore, is a disruption in the expectation of shared uncontroversial 
“facts”, and thus in the assumption of possibly-shared values. Time itself is not a 
“fact” for Westerners and Native Americans in the same manner. Notions of cyclical 
as opposed to linear time affect the notion of the future and the past, as stated above, 
and the difference between the two also affects the metaphysics of reality. One 
cannot think Western science without the Western conception of time:
the phenomenon of time-experience is cmcial to that empirical and 
observational philosophy called science in the West. ...Together with 
language and mathematics, this linear construction of temporal experience 
constitutes the essence of the active Western mode of consciousness.599
Time here is a floating signifier, it can modify or stand for the conflict within the 
valuation of progress or within that of identity.600
The question of the “chain of being” also merges both with the religious and 
with the scientific. Such a notion postulates identity as a matter of placement within a 
divinely-ordered world, and progress as dependent upon increasing one’s 
comprehension regarding the demarcation between species. From the time of 
Linnaeus, there have been culturally-defended differences between not only species 
but their value, spatial organization corresponding with ethics and meaning in the 
realm of biology and the other classificatory disciplines. This remains obvious today. 
The claims of “knowledge” or “science” are ethically and morally tied to capacity as 
much as they are to meaning. The scientists in Bonnichsen are demanding the
597 Ibid. p. 90.
598 Ibid. p. 108.
599 Ibid. p. 95.
600 Ibid. p. 97: “The visionary images o f recent Western literature, like the syntax o f primal people 
such as the Hopi, provide a nonlinear perspective alien in the West ever since the rise of Aristotelian 
realism. It is a vantage as urgently needed in science as it is in art”.
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opportunity to study skeletons, genetic material and “morphological differences and 
similarities” as a right.601 The claim to this right is based on the effects of potential 
knowledge, to wit a better understanding of history and many practical advantages for 
modem society in the fields of paleopathology and epidemiology.602 Furthermore, 
and more importantly, the right is based on increased capability in the laboratory. Dr. 
Bonnichsen’s argument is that we have the technology to examine bones and residual 
tissue in such detail for the first time, “especially in molecular biology”.603 Because 
we have the technology, we have the imperative to use it. Progress must not be 
denied. Furthermore, to deny scientists this right -  the right to discovery -  is to deny 
all people knowledge in the broadest sense.604
In these three areas, it was a mark of savagery not to be able to distinguish 
properly between one thing and another; it was a mark of willful savagery to refuse to 
learn the true value of agriculture, animal husbandry, and “progress”. From the 
1830s, the true value of these skills was tied to American notions of individualism, 
personal freedom, and equal opportunity. The value of these skills constituted as 
values, and not merely knowledge, had to do with accepting American identity, 
joining in the American “project” in the grandest sense:
Equal opportunity became a significant condition of individualism as it was 
understood in America; and of all the accesses to equality the most valued was 
education. It was education... of a very special kind; for it envisioned that 
barbarism and all the other deviations that separated peoples could and should 
be obliterated by knowledge. Thus, it became mandatory to be an educated 
individual; and all good Americans were expected to take advantage of their 
opportunities to become the same as everyone else and therefore as good as
i 605everyone else.
601 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 391.
602 Idem
603 Ibid. p. 392.
604 Another plaintiff in the case, Dr. D. Gentry Steele, “echoed [Dr. Bonnichsen’s]... sentiment: “If it 
gets buried now, it would be the same as if  one or two people read a Shakespearean play and then 
someone burned the book, and those three people tried to tell the rest o f us what it was like”. Lannan, 
“Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 392.
605 Highwater, The Primal Mind, p. 171.
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Thus education, the middle term of the equation linking science and progress, 
and individualism, the middle term linking religion and identity, are themselves 
linked. Education and individualism are two sides of the same coin: the “civilized” 
American person. This person is defined in contrast to the savage. Native Americans 
have consistently refused to join in this currency.
As a last note to this section of the Chapter, before moving to a discussion of 
anthropology and “savagism”, it may be interesting to look at the scientists’ 
attorneys’ speculations regarding the Corps’ decision to side with the Indians. Part of 
what is at stake in the positioning of the legal and cultural questions in the 
commentaries on Kennewick Man is the attempt to avoid recognizing the values and 
issues that are in conflict with each other. Thus, the scientists’ attorneys commented 
that the Corps
constantly has a variety of issues it has to negotiate with Native American 
tribes...among others, land issues, water rights, dams, salmon fishing, 
hydroelectric projects, and toxic-waste dumps. The Corps apparently 
decided.. .that in this case its political issues would be better served by 
supporting the tribes than by supporting a disgruntled group of anthropologists 
with no institutional backing, no money, and no political power.606
This is of course a mixture of the accurate and the disingenuous.607 Preston then 
invokes the bogey-men of the American intellectual establishment:
There are large constituencies for the Indians’ point of view: fundamentalist 
Christians and liberal supporters of Indian rights. Fundamentalists of all 
varieties tend to object to scientific research into the origins of humankind 
because the results usually contradict their various creation myths. A novel
Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 74.
607 Although the plaintiffs in Bonnichsen are suing in their own names, without explicit institutional 
backing, an amendment to NAGPRA was immediately introduced that sought to protect the claims of 
science against precisely this, or even less “questionable” challenges from the Act.
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coalition of conservative Christians and liberal activists was important in 
getting NAGPRA through Congress.608
Again, this is not strictly true. It is rather a flattening of the political 
landscape in order to mirror (or partake in) a favourite trope of American social 
analysis: the oppositional extremes that meet at the same irrational point, somewhere 
well beyond the boundaries of desirable political (or academic) life.609 The same 
rights for all and religious fervour still seem to go hand-in-hand as harbingers of ruin 
and social decay. This can be seen from a different perspective, but as clearly, in the 
next section of this Chapter.
Anthropology and the “savage”
It is most unpleasant work to steal bones from a grave, but what is the use, 
someone has to do it. (Franz Boas)
The cultural differences so painstakingly excavated by legal commentators on 
NAGPRA and Kennewick Man are easily, if not fundamentally, irrelevant. These 
differences, constituted as “barriers” standing in the way of “resolution”, beg their 
opposites: conquerors versus the conquered, “pure” ownership versus compromised 
allotments of culture and (self-)identity. These opposites are not available. There is, 
in a sense, already too much difference.
The turbulence and velocity of change in the West which has epitomized the 
destiny of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was unknown among 
Indians.610
Native Americans were living in a world with entirely different parameters from that 
of the people who studied them, even before specific cultural differences became
608 Preston, “The Lost Man”, p. 74.
609 In the forum o f The New Yorker, which is where the commentary appeared, it is also to engage in a 
sort o f scare-mongering that is strangely familiar to the “liberal humanist” middle classes.
610 Highwater, The Primal Mind, p. 193.
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politically or legally relevant. The epistemological and place-oriented problems of 
modernity, and the discourses that now seek to resolve these problems through an 
appropriation of or engagement with “the past” are, to a great extent, problems that 
Native Americans do not share. This is the categorically different conceptual 
landscape that underlies the specific differences listed above. Without lapsing into 
essentialism, or into the error of defining Native Americans as “pre-modem” -  
indeed, without making any judgments as to how to best define the Native American 
world-view -  if one begins to assess the notions that underlie modernity itself, one 
can see where the analyses in the American commentaries miss the point of the 
conflict.
An example of this sort of analysis is to point out that the Western notion of 
“identity” did not exist in the Native American community until quite recently.
It is taboo among primal people like Indians for someone to depart from 
communal mentality. Traditional Indians reject this kind of behavior as 
antisocial and treasonous; and, what is more, most white people (even those 
strongly in favor of assimilation of Indians into the dominant culture) are 
quick to charge a culturally rebellious Indian with the exploitation of his 
heritage.611
Yet ignorance, like knowledge, is not value-neutral. In the case of Native 
Americans, this ignorance meant that the Native American community had to both 
discover its “own” voice, and learn how to make that voice heard, in order to fight a 
rear-action:
[they were] fighting brilliantly to retain the past that missionaries and 
government teachers were attempting to obliterate. Those tenacious Indians 
of the 1920s were not reaching for the future but striving for an identity 
almost stolen away from them.
611 Ibid. p. 195.
612 Ibid. p. 194.
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The arguments about “indigenous” and about “science” occur in a landscape 
in which concepts such as “individuality” or “individualism”, in the Western 
Romantic sense that is more or less taken for granted in America (and which 
modernity is just beginning to question), are themselves in flux.
An “indigenous person” is an observed entity, and thus an entity that must 
make the most of observation. The lines of sight, both outside-in and inside-out, are 
the raw material for the creation of the self. Against the specific characteristics 
assigned to modernity, the human sciences have resulted in intermixed categories 
and compromised or impossible dualities. Moreover, the attempt to fix identity, 
whether through science or through politics, founders on the very sort of knowledge 
that it requires:
“Our fascination with the native, the oppressed, the savage” masks “a desire to 
hold onto an unchanging certainty somewhere outside our own ‘fake’
|cn
experience. It is a...not-too-innocent desire to seize control.”
“Other”-referential knowledge, which is the hallmark of identity studies, 
arguably then has the same origin as classical anthropology. Does it have a different 
result? Is it the very presumption of knowledge, of self or of “the other”, that one has 
a “not-too-innocent desire to seize control”? Clearly, there is a great deal of 
scholarship regarding these questions.614 Nonetheless, “indigenous” remains a 
contested term, both substantively and formally. In the process of self-creation, the 
values that are assigned to “indigenous,” in turn defined as “pure” or as 
“conforming”, all-too-easily shape “identity” into “the identifiable”.
[G]ood Indians are supposed to remain pure -  which means that they are 
supposed to be static. So intense is the Western attitude toward Indian purity 
that sophisticated Indians are normally looked upon as not really being
613 Diana Fuss, Identification Papers (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 9, quoting Rey Chow in Writing 
Diaspora: Tactics o f Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies.
614 See, for example, Bill Ashcroft et al. eds, The Post-colonial Studies Reader (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995).
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Indians. And so intense is the Indian regard for conformity that psychologists 
working with urbanized Native people are always pointing out.. .that their 
individuated patients suffer.. .intense guilt toward their tribes.. ..615
The claim is easily sustained that “[p]rimal people and the people of the 
dominant cultures tend to understand themselves as persons in quite different 
ways”.616 How Native Americans became recognizable to others is seen in the 
history of anthropology. How they are currently recognizable to themselves forms 
one of the foundations of the conflict regarding the disposition of Kennewick Man.
A review of the history of anthropology within the context of Native American 
studies brings to light the field on which the “differences” between Native Americans 
and others are exposed, and also brings to light the impossibility of separating what is 
known from how it is known. Reading the claims of the plaintiffs in Bonnichsen 
against even the briefest history of Indian studies in the United States is an 
illuminating experience. The dynamics of identity and values discussed throughout 
this Chapter display the same relationships when read through even the briefest 
history of anthropology:
first, the only violence is the settler’s; but soon they will make it their own; 
that is to say, the same violence is thrown back upon us as when our reflection
£1  <7
comes forward to meet us when we go toward a mirror.
The violence of the anthropologist is absorbed and reflected back by the 
“indigenous” person. The institutions (of education and government) that express the 
anthropologist, that are the reflecting surface for both anthropologist and “native” or 
“Native”, are themselves expressions of violence. They are meant to be expressions 
of violence; they were created to conquer, to classify, to own.
615 Highwater, The Primal Mind, p. 196.
616 Ibid. p. 117.
617 Sartre, “Preface” to The Wretched o f the Earth, p. 17.
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This point is tangential to, yet supported by, the work of Roy H. Pearce in his 
brilliant Savagism and Civilization: A Study o f the Indian and the American Mind.61* 
Pearce argues for the equal and progressively-opposing (self-) identifications of the 
“American” in contradistinction to the “Indian”. He argues that “civilization” and 
“savagism” are counter-themes to each other, and explores the variations that arise 
from this central idea.
I have tried to recount how it was and what it meant for civilized men to 
believe that in the savage and his destiny there was manifest all that they had 
long grown away from and yet still had to overcome. .. .In America before the 
1850s that belief was most often defined negatively -  in terms of the savage 
Indians who, as stubborn obstacles to progress, forced Americans to consider 
and reconsider what it was to be civilized and what it took to build a 
civilization. Studying the savage, trying to civilize him, destroying him, in the 
end they had only studied themselves, strengthened their own civilization, and 
given those who were coming after them an enlarged certitude of another, 
even happier destiny -  that manifest in the progress of American civilization 
over all obstacles.619
Pearce states that he is writing the history of a belief, and as such, is working with 
language and human error.620 The Indian became the symbol of the idea of the 
savage, and savagism, in America:
[tjhere is here the whole complex of savagism: the picture of men who, living 
under wild circumstances apart from civilization, have developed specifically 
noncivilized virtues.621
Once again, the values of progress and of identity are discovered lurking 
within a foundational moment of American self-perception. Pearce’s materials are 
the texts of the period between 1609 and 1851. The belief that Pearce is tracing
618 Roy H. Pearce, Savagism and Civilization: A Study o f the Indian and the American Mind (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988).
619 Ibid. p. xvii.
620 Ibid. p. xx.
215
informed the science of anthropology and the popularization of the Indian in 
American art and literature for two and a half centuries, and continued to do so until 
quite recently. This belief required the habit of subsuming data to itself, a 
phenomenon that Pearce also exposes. The idea of the savage, the symbol of the 
Indian, and the mental habit of interpreting all sociological or anthropological data so 
as to support the belief in manifest destiny -  resulted in the Indian being defined as 
“the zero of human society”. The idea of the savage had colonized American thought 
about the indigenous people in America. The idea of the savage coloured the data 
collected about Indians. Yet the data supported the idea of the savage. If the notion 
of “savagism” required proof, then
[p]roof required first-hand observation and...close analysis, classification, and 
summing-up of what had been observed. Facts were collected first-hand, 
recorded, analysed, and conclusions come to.622
In short, “proof’ required science, and science delivered the desired result: “[i]n the 
end the hypothesis was proved in fact; the savage proved savagism; a symbol bodied 
forth an idea”.623
The hypothesis was the business of anthropology, as will be seen below, and 
the question that remains is whether the “Native” in “Native American” still exists as 
this sort of anthropological product. Pearce would argue not. He would argue that 
Americans, as scientists and scholars, have moved on from the moment in which 
Native American culture had to be “at once historically anterior and morally 
inferior.. .”.624 “But then,” Pearce continues, “the Indian is no great personal issue to 
us”.625 In the question raised by Kennewick Man, however, the Indian is in fact of 
great personal importance to many people, in fact, to all Americans (“Native” or not)
621 Ibid. p. 122.
622 Ibid. p. 105.
623 Idem
624 Idem
625 Idem
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who are committed to “progress” and to “identity”.626 As a result, when “the Indian” 
is of personal importance, do the ideas about savagism and civilization recur, burst 
through the rigourous separations between facts and judgments, knowledge and 
politics, that scholars in the human sciences have tried to construct? Must “the 
Indian” remain a (reversed) reflection of the American self in order to remain 
recognizable, thus visible, authentic and manageable at these times? Conversely, is 
the violence -  no matter how deserved or predictable -  done to the values of the 
American scientist by NAGPRA, or to the Smithsonian by NMAIA, a reflection of 
the violence that has shaped the “native”? “Laying claim to and denying the human 
condition at the same time: the contradiction is explosive”.627 The second part of the 
legislative history of NAGPRA consists of the mechanics of precisely this explosive, 
contradictory process. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the conflicts that 
make the problem of Kennewick Man potentially irresolvable are conflicts that are 
rooted in colonization and the role that “science” and education play in this process, 
and not in some innocently-discovered “difference” that must be accommodated by 
the law. At the end of the day, the questions of identity and cultural property have to 
do with what sorts of bailiwicks are being defended, or what battles are being fought, 
possibly long after the concept of being “at war” has fallen out of favour.
Congress enacted NMAIA and NAGPRA amid a “climate of reform”.628 
Indian graves, human remains, sacred sites, and artifacts of all kinds have been 
excavated, studied, and collected from the time the first Europeans landed in 
America. The “Indian” was an object of fascination, and as an object, was more 
accessible in death than in life:
Violations of Indian burials had occurred during the Colonial period, but the 
Revolutionary War era was a formative one in which white Americans 
assumed tacit ownership over dead American Indians. Although most
626 This thesis does not discuss the other ways in which these questions may be o f “great personal 
issue”, that is, that shifts in identity can force shifts in allocation of property rights in land itself. There 
is a recurrent fear in the American national consciousness that Native Americans will get “their” land 
back, which is the fear that “tribal lands” under NAGPRA or any other statute may one day include 
vast tracts of various American States.
627 Sartre, “Preface” to The Wretched o f the Earth, p. 20.
217
transplanted Europeans had little use for living Indians, many developed a 
fixation for dead ones.629
This “fixation” has had many effects, and an equal number of causes. The 
notions of savagism and primitivism interacted with the development of anthropology 
as a science, and the underlying values of anthropologists, to allow the fixation to 
grow into a series of disciplines and institutions. The originally-amateur excavations 
of burial sites and both private and government collections of human remains have in 
a sense generated the sciences of American anthropology, archaeology and 
paleontology. These sciences, and the “science” that animates them, in turn validated 
the claims of science regarding ancient human remains.
Native American artifacts of all kinds have always and obviously been part of 
the American intellectual landscape. The history of excavations begins with 
curiosity, continued (and continues) in the name of science, and latterly describes 
academic and commercial enterprises.630 Unfortunately, this history also exposes 
racism and colonizing practices in all these endeavours. The history of the United 
States shows that for each of these disciplines, the following statement is true:
Although now conceptualized as a disinterested science, archaeology in the 
United States developed in the context of colonialism. The process of 
European expansion into North America, which began in the late 1400s, set a 
tone of racial intolerance, injustice, and immorality that became integrated 
into and imbedded in white intellectual thought. Explorers, looters, and 
settlers (often one and the same)... by virtue of the “Doctrine of Discovery,” 
claimed a right based on the ethnocentric notion of Christian preeminence to
z i  i
the North American continent.
628 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 396.
629 Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality” p. 15.
630 Of course a museum is both an academic and a commercial enterprise.
631 Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality”.
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The disinterest or objectivity of archaeology, anthropology, and paleontology are in 
themselves arguments that need to be made, rather than facts that can be maintained.
Given the constraints of this Chapter, the development of the science of 
anthropology in America can only be sketched. In 1784, Thomas Jefferson excavated 
Native American burial mounds on his property. More importantly, it was 
Jefferson “who encouraged Americans to go systematically after the facts”.633 In 
1803, Jefferson, among others, set out the kinds of information that Lewis and Clark 
were to gather about Native Americans. Classification and categorization of data 
were as much tools of American expansion into Native American land as war, 
bargaining, treaties, or contracts for the sale of land. Information was needed in 
consideration of
the interest which every nation has in extending and strengthening the 
authority of reason and justice among the people around them.. .it may better 
enable those who may endeavour to civilize and instruct them, to adapt their 
measures to the existing notions and practices of those on whom they are to 
operate.634
Pearce makes the point that regardless of the complexity and specificity of the 
data collected, the explorers, whether private travelers or sent by the government, “all 
conclude that the Indian is everywhere, essentially the same, the savage of their idea 
of savagism”.635 European-Americans could observe specific differences, for 
example between hunting and agricultural tribes, but they couldn’t recognize them. 
All Indians were hunters, and hunters, whether or not they were admired, had to be 
pitied because they were not civilized.636 Only agricultural societies could give rise 
to civilization.
632 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 642.
633 Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, p. 106.
634 Ibid. p. 107.
635 Ibid. p. 109.
636 Ibid. p. 110.
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It is clear from Pearce’s analysis that the pendulum swung from honest 
admiration to necessary pity. Even when “civilization” was not admired by the early 
explorers, recorders, and collectors of Native American data and artifacts, it was seen 
as ..certain. Man’s increase, and the march of human improvements in this New 
World, are as true and irresistable [s/c] as the laws of nature.. .”637 The march of 
civilization certainly marched over the Native American. Data was gathered 
continuously, and each piece of data was interpreted to signify the inevitable and 
speedy end of the Indian. By 1815, prizes were being offered by state historical 
societies for essays on the Indian before he vanished forevermore. The “fact” that the 
Indian would cease to exist, as a “natural” man in his “natural” state, was considered 
inevitable as the Indian represented savagism ever more clearly to the American 
mind. Regardless of how contented, “noble”, or virtuous Indians were, they were not 
willing to accept the structure of values regarding property and commerce that would 
lead to “civilization” as the settlers and explorers understood the concept. Indians 
could hope for continuity but not greatness for their communities. They could not 
generate progress or permanence, and again, they unwilling to “give in”.
Moreover, the last pieces of information necessary to prove savagism -  
information about Indian moral character and feelings, thought processes, and 
mythologies and religions -  were forthcoming. It became clear to the early scholars 
and experts that Indians were deprived of even the potential for civilization because 
they were deprived of the Christian religion. This made some observers sad, and 
others philosophical:
“[t]he Indian, delighting in war and in glorious deeds, is yet ignorant of the 
greatest victory of which man is capable -  the conquering of one’s self. ...” 
The means to this victory would be, obviously enough, Christian 
civilization.638
637 Ibid. p. 112, quoting George Catlin, one of the first explorers of the West, in his Letters and Notes 
on the Manners, Customs, and Condition o f the North American Indians (1841).
638 Ibid. p. 118.
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Thus moving from admiration (and poorly-disguised envy in some cases) to pity to a 
preoccupation with the Indian “self’, American early anthropologists turned to the 
question of the structure of Indian thought and “savage mentality”.639 The question, 
to be answered by scientific means, was more or less no longer about “Indians” but 
about “savages”.
What holds the Indians to savagism is the wildness of their life; what makes 
that wildness meaningful to them are their myths and their religion; what 
makes these myths and that wildness possible is their “mental characteristics”; 
what makes for those mental characteristics is their savagism.640
From this point, the Native American became a problem to which science must 
provide a solution.
In the early 1830s, Samuel G. Morton and others turned to the new disciplines 
of craniology and phrenology to analyze Native Americans. To this end,
Morton measured several hundred human skulls belonging to members of 
different races, including American Indian, Hottentot, and Australian 
Aborigine. After pouring mustard seeds into and weighing the skulls, Morton 
postulated that the Anglo-Saxon had the largest brain capacity and, therefore, 
more intelligence than other peoples of the earth. Preoccupied with American 
natives, he eventually assembled a large collection of Indian crania.641
In 1868, the U.S. Surgeon General ordered troops to collect Native American crania, 
again for scientific purposes.642 The Surgeon General “ordered all U.S. Army field 
officers to send him Indian skulls so that studies could be performed comparing the
639 Ibid. p. 120.
640 Ibid. p. 121.
641 Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality”, p 17.
642 The Surgeon General’s memorandum to field surgeons in 1868 urging medical officers to send 
them skulls for their “niological collection”, o f which “The chief purpose... is to aid the progress of 
anthropological science by obtaining measurements of a large number of skulls of the aboriginal races 
of North America”. Ibid. p. 19, (n. 31, quoting from Memorandum from C. H. Crane, Assistant 
Surgeon General, United States Army, to Medical Officers, 1 September 1868))
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sizes of Indian and white crania”.643 This order resulted in mass decapitation of 
Native American dead: “over 4,000 heads were taken from battlefields, POW camps 
and hospitals, and fresh Indian graves or burial scaffolds across the country”.644 The 
crania collected by the Surgeon General were ultimately stored in the Smithsonian’s 
Museum of Natural History.645 The Smithsonian holds the single largest collection of 
Native American human remains in the United States (over 18,500 skeletons by its 
own estimate).646 Because the bodies were “savage” bodies, all were allowed to 
participate in these practices.
The public fascination with Indian burials and crania continued to fuel 
amateur collecting. Museums benefited greatly from the combination of amateur 
anthropology, science, and greed that resulted in other great collections of Native 
American human remains.
Mutilations and grave looting operations...during the 1700s and 1800s by 
intellectuals and the United States Army created an ambiance of legitimacy 
for such activities. Consequently, nonacademics also desecrated Indian 
graves... For example, white Americans entering California during the gold 
rush mania of the late 1840s and early 1850s ravaged tribal burial sites 
looking for fabled Indian treasure. Describing some three hundred skulls 
taken from a cave and placed on public display in San Francisco, one observer 
noted: “The cranial developments [of the remains on display] are very similar 
to those of the present Indians, though one of the skulls appear[s] to have a 
very intellectual character”. The “owner” later sold the collection...to 
Harvard University’s Peabody Museum.647
643 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits” p. 393.
644 Idem, quoting testimony of witness from the Native American Rights Fund during the House 
NAGPRA hearings.
645 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 643.
646 Idem
647 Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality”, p 20.
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Museum collections throughout the United States yield a total as high as 
600,000 skeletons; there are even Native American skeletons in Europe.648 If the 
number is adjusted to take into account the collections in educational institutions, 
then the estimates reach two million.649 As will be discussed at greater length below, 
these collections too often do not take the “humanity” of the “remains” into account, 
thus causing additional distress to some Native Americans. “Western Washington 
University has in basement storage over eighty Lumi remains. One tribe member 
who visited...stated, “There were our people stacked in little boxes like 
cordwood”.650
The relationship between anthropological collecting and universities is long­
standing.651 The same complex of curiosity, greed and fascination spurred academic 
research into the “truth” about Native Americans and the past more generally. The 
two results of this were that:
Universities established course work and offered degrees in archaeology. ... 
Moreover, parties of archaeologists from universities across the nation 
systematically surveyed and excavated numerous Indian ruins and burial 
sites.652
University programs largely ignored the question of ethics,653 at least until the 
anthropological profession began to determine its own code in 1967.654 University- 
trained anthropologists, archaeologists and paleontologists worked with the U.S.
648 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 643.
649 Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 393.
650 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 644.
651 “Following the tradition of Jefferson, researchers asserted that Indian remains and cemeteries 
contained a key for unraveling the mysteries of the past. Consequently, universities, state historical 
societies, and government agencies emerged as leading violators of Indian burial rights”. Riding In, 
“Without Ethics and Morality”, p. 21
652 Idem.
653 “Rather, college professors instilled the notion into their students that such activities were beneficial 
and necessary for understanding the past”. Riding In, “Without Ethics and Morality”, p. 22
654 Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban ed., Ethics and the profession o f anthropology: dialogue fo r  a new era 
(Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1991). The American Anthropological Association 
(AAA) developed its own code, the Principles of Professional Responsibility (PPR) in the second half 
of the twentieth century.
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government and military as agents both at home and abroad.655 The relationship 
between the nascent professions or disciplines of anthropology and paleontology on 
the one side, and the United States government and its policies on the other mutually- 
reinforced the (already) entitled, if not possessive, approach to Native American 
human remains.
that group of adventurers who clustered around .. .the Bureau of American 
Ethnology (BAE) was forging an identity for anthropology in the American 
landscape, but it had not yet consolidated a profession. Although these 
adventurers’ research was sponsored by the U.S. government, they had a high 
degree of freedom of inquiry that we are unaccustomed to associating with 
government employment in the later part of the twentieth century. Perhaps 
this is because their mission was to salvage the cultural remnants of already 
pacified Indian communities and not the more controversial work of later 
times involving non-Western, non-American populations.656
However, from the perspective of the Native American activists agitating for 
burial rights reform, the work these adventurers did was quite controversial. The 
United States government seemed more willing to return land to Indian tribes than 
rights to their dead.657 Within the American Anthropological Association, there was 
some examination of the Association’s relationship with the United States 
government’s practices abroad, even though that did not always yield critical insight 
into the practices of the profession closer to home.658 As the profession progressed in 
standing, the relationship with the government also deepened. Fanning out from the 
universities, anthropologists joined other federal institutions and continued the 
practices -  and the belief systems -  encouraged by their professors.
By the 1930s, not only had anthropology in the United States established a 
scientific identity but increasing numbers of trained students were entering the
655 Fluehr-Lobban ed., Ethics and the profession o f anthropology, p. 13.
656 Ibid. p. 16.
657 Raines, “One is Missing”, p. 649.
658 “Boas’ outrage against the wartime activities of four anthropologists who had combined 
intelligence-gathering with their research.. .resulted in the first clear-cut case wherein the issue of
224
new professional slots opening up in the academy and seeking professional 
opportunities in government service. With no impediments or even questions 
having been raised within the AAA regarding government employment, 
anthropologists took up government civilian jobs in significant numbers.... 
Agencies other than the traditional hiring places of anthropologists, such as 
the Bureau of American Ethnology, or National Museum, employed 
anthropologists in the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA), National Park Service, the Department of Agriculture, and the Soil 
Conservation Service.659
Throughout the 1930s, the sorts of practices that were encouraged by the Surgeon 
General in 1868 were still acceptable within the profession and its premier 
institutions.660 After the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 the AAA joined the war 
effort; post-World War II, “anthropologists continued in a pattern of employment by 
the U.S. government that was basically a continuation of the war effort”.661
There is a long-standing relationship between not only anthropological 
collecting and universities, but also between the American profession of anthropology 
and the practices of colonization and colonialism. University degrees were put to 
use in colonial administrative contexts both in the United States and in Britain. 
Practically,
the charge that anthropology is the handmaiden of colonialism is a powerful 
reality insofar as anthropologists have been willing to pursue their research 
within an environment constrained by governments. Academic freedom has
unprofessional behavior was raised in the AAA organizational framework”. Fluehr-Lobban ed., Ethics 
and the profession o f anthropology, pp. 16-17. See also p. 18.
659 Ibid. p. 18.
660 “In the 1930s, Smithsonian Institution archaeologists visited the Native Alaskan village of Karson 
Bay and, without permission, removed over eight hundred human remains and associated funerary 
objects from a burial site”. Lannan, “Anthropology and Restless Spirits”, p. 393.
661 Fluehr-Lobban, ed., Ethics and the profession o f anthropology, p. 20.
662 Comparisons are between U.S. overseas operations and the English imperial system, although in 
terms of relative scale, “perhaps the better comparison is with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and British 
colonial administration in Africa and Asia”. Ibid. p. 21.
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been cultivated in the academy, but for all our history since the 1930s, 
anthropologists have been seeking work outside the academy.663
In terms of theory, it is questionable how much of the colonial context 
remained separate from the classroom and the suppositions that directed academic 
research. It was only when the relationship between anthropologists and the U.S. 
Army became public in the Chilean press that the profession moved to promulgate 
ethical guidelines for its practices,664 the first “statement on Problems of 
Anthropological Research and Ethics”. At issue in this document were clandestine 
research665 and government contracts.
However, “[ujnaddressed in 1967 was the anthropologist’s proper relationship 
to people studied, to students, to clients, and to fellow human beings”.666 Within a 
year of the 1967 Statement, an advertisement appeared in American Anthropologist 
for a research anthropologist to work in Vietnam with the Psychological Operations
f s f i lHeadquarters. This touched off another crisis in the profession and led to the
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formation of the Principles of Professional Responsibility in 1971. Rather than
attempting to define anthropologists’ duties or loyalties, it attempted “to provide a 
framework within which disclosures of ethical problems and debate on ethical issues” 
could occur within the profession.669 It did not mention secret research, government 
contracts, or responsibility to the people studied. When the PPR was revised in 1990, 
the first principle remained “first responsibility to the people whose lives and cultures
663 Ibid. pp. 21-2.
664 A quasi-secret initiative called “Project Camelot” originated in the Department o f the Army’s 
Office o f the Chief of Research and Development, and was subsequently carried out under contract 
research to the American University in Washington, D.C. “T]he project was addressing the problem of 
counterinsurgency in Latin America and how increased knowledge, gained through social science 
research, would assist the army in coping with internal revolutions in the region”. When this plan, 
which was not classified, was “leaked” to the press in Chile, there were strong protests in Latin 
America and in Congress. Ibid. pp. 23.
665 “The principle enunciated was that clandestine research is wrong, that secret research is unethical, 
and...that both are unprofessional”. Ibid. p. 27.
Ibid. p. 26.
667 Ibid. p. 27.
668 Ibid. p. 29.
669 This code was revised unsatisfactorily in 1984. Ibid. pp. 31.
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anthropologists study...”.670 However, as always, this ethical requirement exists in a 
medium that includes “Responsibility to Employers, Clients and Sponsors”, and
(\ 71which again does not mention secret or clandestine research. It is ironic that this 
history is perceived as an account of the tension between “pure research” and 
“ethics”,672 given the early and continuing links between collectors, looters and 
government agents. Arguably, as these various identities fed into the identity of 
“scientist”, the underlying values and the nature of the original interconnecting ties 
between them did not truly shift. It is possible to become a much better “scientist” 
while retaining the same skill level as a collector, looter, or government agent.
It is against this background, and while claiming that only now do the 
techniques for “true” science exist, that the plaintiffs in Bonnichsen v. U.S. are 
staking their claim to Kennewick Man. Pearce provides an interesting summary of 
the results of the early years of study of Native Americans:
First the savage was put back in history; then he was put out of it. For the 
eighteenth-century Scots and the Americans who had followed them, 
savagism...was the first and lowest state of society;.... For [Americans in the 
mid-nineteenth century,] savagism has become simply noncivilization.... And
£  7*1
the Indian must die, since noncivilization is not life.
In light of the one hundred and fifty years of anthropology, one wonders whether the 
profession has become used to playing Lazarus, removing and reinstating “life” with 
a certain amount of impunity.
Conclusion: common ground
The conflicts at issue in this case are presented as conflicts between different 
notions of the world, or different notions of the origin of people -  American people.
670 Ibid. p. 32.
671 Idem
672 Ibid p. 34.
673 Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, p. 127.
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The idea that the law can address these competing visions was not part of the 
legislative purpose of NAGPRA. Rather, the court in Bonnichsen and the 
commentators in the American academy are attempting to half-generate and half- 
presuppose common ground on which these conflicts can be explored. Yet, as this 
thesis has argued throughout, the problems in this case are problems in which 
“cultural property” is doing the work of “fixing” modernity; and as a result, “common 
ground” (or “autochthonous identity”) is precisely what is being claimed by both 
sides. Common ground itself is precisely what is at issue. Certainly, the debate about 
Kennewick Man is not a debate that can be subsumed within a structure of law or 
society that can accommodate two sides. Rather, the better image or analogy for the 
competing considerations at issue is one of war, in a landscape that has the 
characteristics of a war-zone or a colonized territory more than those of a 
disagreement within a discipline. The replacements and identifications at stake in this 
different landscape require different tools than a straightforward exploration of 
“history” or “law”.
The issues presented by the possibly ahistorical and acultural bones of 
“Kennewick Man”, turn on questions of origin and culture that have a great deal in 
common with debates regarding (reverse) affirmative action, identity politics, and 
ethnic cleansing (and the jurisprudential approaches to both trans- and infra-national 
conflicts represented by The Hague and UNESCO conventions on cultural property.) 
The attempt to subsume the issues at stake in Kennewick Man into a landscape in 
which the conflict is “manageable” by and through the American cultural hegemony 
is a realpolitik sort of solution, tried and tested over the past two and a half centuries 
of American experience. The mechanisms of this process, as discussed above, 
require shifting definitions of the “values” implicit in the American totems of science, 
religion, and law. Therefore, “science” may well not be science, religion may well be 
politics, and law is a response to historical injustice rather than a guarantee of either 
“privileges” or “rights”. Science, religion, law: one could say that in this field of 
shifting identities, identifications, alliances and ends they intersect to form the field of
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analysis itself, that the “conflicts” or “struggles” exist as a matter of course, as 
definitional imperatives or evolutionary principles in these realms.
Therefore, we require a different field or realm in which to assess the idea of 
“indigenous”. Is there a moment in which “indigenous” does not mean “native” or 
“savage”? Can cultural property claims serve as one of the techniques by which 
“native” inverts itself into “person” or “individual” or “free man” in modernity? The 
work of Frantz Fanon might give some insight into this function of cultural property 
discourse. Fanon explains the process of creating a native. It is still an open 
question, needing more research, to determine whether creating a native also leads to 
creating a “Native”, and to what extent the Indian reburial movement and the conflict 
over the disposition of Kennewick Man is an attempt to invert or subvert the “native” 
lurking at the heart of “Native American”. The landscape of modernity is one that 
comports well with Fanon’s vision:
There is a crushing sociopsychological history among conservative Indians 
whose cultural tenacity somehow got confused with a sadly compromised 
grasp of their own heritage. A mixture of quasi-Christian morality, quasi- 
Indian activism, and a decline in their firsthand experience in Native 
American customs has resulted in a reactionary mentality that poses as 
traditionalism. ... The compromises typical o f middle Americans have left 
many Indians touched by a degraded and stereotypical “pow-wow” view of 
themselves.674
It remains to be seen if the same process that crushes -  examination, 
discourse, violence -  can liberate. If so, cultural property claims and discourse(s) 
(with all their flaws) will serve as one of the tools of this liberation. Possibly, this is 
the trajectory of “indigenous” peoples:
Decolonization never takes place unnoticed, for it influences individuals and 
modifies them fundamentally. It transforms spectators cmshed with their 
inessentiality into privileged actors, with the grandiose glare of history’s
674 Highwater, The Primal Mind, p. 196. (emphasis added)
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floodlights upon them. It brings a natural rhythm into existence introduced by 
new men, and with it a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is 
the veritable creation of new men. But this creation owes nothing of its 
legitimacy to any supernatural power; the “thing” which has been colonized
£.nc
becomes man during the same process by which it frees itself.
675 Fanon, The Wretched o f the Earth, pp. 36-7.
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Chapter Seven Conclusion
In this thesis, I have proposed a means of theorizing cultural property. I have 
addressed both the development and meaning of cultural property “discourses” (the 
increasing amounts of cases, legislation and commentaries) and “cultural property” 
itself (artifacts and knowledge). My argument in brief was that cultural property, and 
the increasing prevalence of the discourse regarding it, have been first a by-product 
and then an industry of modernity. This position is the result of research into why 
legal arguments so often fail adequately to resolve the cases brought before the law. 
Looking at the cultural property case that presents the most traditional set of legal and 
moral arguments used in this field, the case of the Parthenon (formerly “Elgin”) 
Marbles, and “Kennewick Man”, brought in the United States to settle ownership of a 
9,000-year-old skeleton, which presents the most novel sorts of legal and socio- 
theoretical arguments, I have demonstrated that when the law confronts claims made 
regarding the ownership of ancient objects, it is in fact confronting claims made 
regarding the ownership of pre- or anti-modem time.
The first premise of the argument (set out in the Introduction) is that 
modernity produces “the past” as it has come to irradiate and define cultural property, 
and also produces the problems that are being addressed in cases regarding the 
ownership of ancient objects. This premise is based in the work of Hannah Arendt, 
who, in The Human Condition, foresaw a radical shift in the conditions that 
produce(d) humanity. The human condition requires a certain kind of “grounding”: 
human beings must be tied to the earth as dirt and the earth as commonality, and they 
must be able to speak to each other about their values, actions and choices. For 
Arendt, the launch of Sputnik spoke of the end of common ground, the ground of the 
earth and the ground of possible speech. The love of the horizon also demonstrated 
the rejection of (past) earth. In broader terms, this moment of turning to the horizon 
accords perfectly with the very definition of “modernity”. In modernity, therefore, 
Arendt identified certain dangers. What of humanity in a world in which the
231
necessary foundations for the production of humanity were lacking? As human 
biological functioning is increasingly assured by technological means, humanity 
becomes less confident of its own survival. In terms of Arendt’s criteria for the 
human condition, which look to the production of humanity rather than biologically 
human beings, there is no guarantee, in any realm (fiction, history, law) of either 
continued human existence or human flourishing.
Therefore, as a first step, this thesis found that our existence on the horizon- 
line of modernity could be considered existence oriented towards future-time, 
although this existence is one that requires contemplating the possibility of stunning 
human losses. Here, we see the first intimation that the value of ancient objects is 
essentially tied to the temporal unease of the present/future dichotomy on which we 
are required to live. As humanity lives longer on the cusp of the future (that Arendt 
must have seen as the dark curve of space), it becomes increasingly and ironically 
reluctant to shed the past. Since the Enlightenment, the notion of increasing 
prosperity, knowledge, and health on the basis of rational investigation and 
technological advance has been almost unquestioned. The myth if not reality of 
progress cannot be denied. As a result, the future was the legally and historically 
valorized time necessary for human flourishing. When one looks to the prevalence 
and persistence of disputes regarding ancient objects, however, one sees that today, 
this “important” time is the past. Indeed, one can go further and postulate that for the 
first time since Antiquity the past takes on vivid cultural importance. Rather than 
looking to ensure the possibility of cultural change, the actors in these disputes look 
to ensure cultural continuity, and in so doing, confront the questions of authority, 
ownership and definition that attach to claiming particular historical (or ahistorical) 
times.
The question that arises, however, is what role the law plays in mediating this 
relationship with time in modernity. The actors in cultural property disputes look to 
the law for resolution. The mechanisms for claiming possession in the law are rooted 
in theories and structures of ownership. Logically, therefore, the claims for the past
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are oriented towards ownership claims (of these past times). If the past could be 
removed, or replaced within the future in order to make possible (at least the illusion 
of) solid future ground, facing the horizon would loses some of its horror. However, 
it is not clear that legal resolution is possible. What we see when we look at these 
kinds of cases is legal doctrine attempting to come to terms with arguments regarding 
something other or more than ownership of discrete objects.
In dealing with ancient objects of cultural significance, the fluctuation of 
meaning, use and origin that makes up historical narrative is immediately relevant. 
The law in this realm has two tasks: the first to define the objects, which requires 
(attempting to) fix or reify their significance to the participants in the dispute; and the 
second to allocate the objects, which requires creating a field in which justice is 
possible. As regards justice and time, however, justice cannot take place in the past. 
Therefore, law in this area also has to find a means to project its action into the future. 
The principles of original ownership and descent of title that settle property disputes 
where this particularly heightened element of time is lacking cannot serve either 
disputants or courts in these cases. Like the disputants, the law must take the past and 
reposition it; the past, as the subject of the dispute, must come to serve as an 
instrument of reconstituting the modem opening to the future. This requires a 
different methodology than the common law reliance upon precedent and the 
“seamless web” of the law. Instead, the law (the court, or legal commentators, or the 
framers of international statutes) must collude in acknowledging, and then disrupting, 
the diremptions that Arendt describes.
The case studies, therefore, set out what the law actually does when faced 
with these kinds of complex cases. The first of these, the debate regarding the 
ownership of the Parthenon Marbles, relies upon (and to some extent characterizes) 
the classical arguments in the field. The second dispute, regarding the determination 
of the ownership of “Kennewick Man”, provided the opportunity to look at different 
sorts of arguments. Rather than the classical legal approaches to cultural property per 
se, Kennewick Man turns on questions of law that could only be addressed by
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determining the meaning of “indigenous” under the relevant statute. This case, 
therefore, foregrounded the emerging discourses in cultural property argumentation 
and legislation.
Discussing these two particular case studies allowed me to set out the major 
schools of thought on the definition and allocation of cultural property, by looking to 
one of the most representative and one of the most novel cases available. In both 
cases, the object(s) at stake were extremely ancient, which in turn heightened the 
element of time, and allowed me to consider it at some length in the following 
Chapters. However, before thinking about the issue of time, these case studies 
presented the opportunity to define the ownership structures and to summarize the 
positions of the leading legal and sociohistorical commentators in the field. The most 
important and interesting results of this part of the research was the emergence of 
great swathes of similar values and purpose(s) within the traditional and non- 
traditional approaches to the comprehension and resolution of cultural property 
disputes. The lines between “Western” and “Indigenous” blurred, while it became 
clear instead that both the Parthenon Marbles case and that of Kennewick Man 
represented the attempt on the part of the disputants to claim the past and use it to 
anchor the future.
In both cases, the mechanisms of asserting ownership were very similar (for 
example, writing -  if not re-writing -  history in order to anchor claims of original 
legal and moral title). More importantly, however, it became obvious that both sets 
of claimants were in fact making arguments that turned on the assertion of their own 
autochthonous (rather than “indigenous”) rootedness to the ground that in turn 
supplied these objects. Yet, the “ground” was not political ground or “the State”. 
Although the arguments turned on “Ancient Greeks” and “Native Americans”, they 
did not follow the patterns and tropes of identity politics, in which the rights attaching 
to a particular “identity” are established or amplified. Instead, the development of a 
particular kind of discourse became evident through analyzing these cases. The 
acquisition of a particular identity was itself the legally-significant act. Acquiring
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(unremarkable) ownership rights over the objects was a means of establishing the 
desired cultural (rather than political) identity. I characterize this identity as 
“autochthonous” because the arguments sought to established linkages to ground and 
grounding (in the Arendtian sense, i.e., dirt and discourse both) through claiming 
rights and objects. For example, the arguments of the modem British to the 
Parthenon Marbles turned on establishing their claim to the ground from which the 
objects came: the cultural ground of Ancient Greece and the legal ground of the 
acquisition from the Ottomans. The arguments of the modem Greeks turned on 
establishing their claim to the cultural ground of Ancient Greece and to the dirt of the 
Acropolis. Similarly, the claimants in Kennewick Man all argued for the identities of 
“Native” and for “American”.
The claimants in these cases engaged in creative and proactive acts of self- 
naming in order to root themselves unshakeably in the ground that these objects 
represent. This is why the claimants took on the identities required by the objects 
rather than the other way around. As such, the legal assessment of these cases bore 
out my original hypothesis. The value of the objects turned on their use-value vis-a- 
vis the problems that accompany and define our habitation of modem time. My 
argument that all cultural property discourse occurs as a response to this condition, 
and that cultural property discourse is one of the discourses that animates modernity 
itself, is bom out by these disparate cases, and holds true regardless of whether the 
analysis follows “traditional” lines or not.
What sorts of objects could serve as “ground” in this (pre-modem) sense?
The question that perplexes most commentators regarding the definition of cultural 
property is not identification but delineation; any object can be cultural property but 
how do we know which objects are? Obviously, one interesting way of answering 
this question has been to look to the constitution of the cases themselves. In this view 
(and generally rightly) the claimants will define cultural property by bringing a claim 
for it. However, this approach does not provide any way of predicting what might 
become cultural property, or, put differently, how to recognize it before it is at issue
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(for example, how to distinguish between art or artifacts in museums that are not 
cultural property, and those that are). In contrast to the definitions of cultural 
property available in various international instruments, I have proposed a definition 
based on the values that occur at the cross-section of “culture” and “property”. On 
this analysis, it became immediately obvious that the statutes also partake of the 
dominant purpose of cultural property discourse, which is to preserve the “condition” 
for future generations to be “human”. These instruments seek to preserve objects that 
represent and ground human life itself, in most of its manifestations and with 
reference to many of its associated artifacts and objectives. However, this insight 
makes the task of defining cultural property almost impossible, given the possibly 
infinite number of such objects. Therefore, as specific descriptions are not the way 
forward, one must look the value(s) implicit in the value assigned to human life itself.
Here, I turned to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to evaluate the value of these 
objects and to question whether there is a formula that can act as a guide to further or 
future definition. I proposed that objects that are cultural property are accepted by the 
law as essentially fluid or unfinished. They require a particular kind of interpretation, 
one that completes them. As they speak to human life, the interpretation must speak 
to self-knowledge. These objects, themselves limited by their physical boundaries 
and often ancient enough to be quite silent as to their origin or purpose, are valued for 
their very silence and mutability. The claimant speaks through the object; the object 
itself, in giving the opportunity for this kind of speech, functions as a Nietzschean 
aphorism. The best definition of objects that can be or will become “cultural 
property” is that these objects must be useful as a Nietzschean aphorism is useful. 
They can be recognized by their utility rather than by their age, beauty, uniqueness, or 
commonality. The utility is precisely that which has been hypothesized throughout: 
these objects ground, and give ground for, human life in a modernity that may not 
have the tools for its continuation otherwise.
Turning to discourses rather than objects, I returned to the case of the 
Parthenon Marbles to propose that cultural property cases occur on a terrain mapped
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by the intersection of two lines of argument: narratives of attachment (or claims of 
ownership) and narratives of origin (or claims to ground). “Cultural property” 
consists of the objects that are constellated on this grid, and “cultural property 
discourse” consists of the interpretive and creative mechanisms by which each line of 
argumentation is developed. First, I considered the creation and meaning of 
narratives of attachment. Property rights are based in claiming ownership through 
time and by good title. In cultural property, particularly as regards ancient objects or 
practices, this is often impossible. Instead, what must happen is that lines of 
ownership and descent must be reconstituted. This is a creative act, and often an act 
of outright fictionalization. Yet, in order to prevail, the fiction must be or must 
become authoritative. Cultural property discourse requires a means of establishing 
narratives of attachment that are both fictional and authoritative; both available to 
speech and yet having the capacity to transcend archives, records, documents, and 
other sources that may not exist or may not serve the purpose(s) of the claimant.
One of the dominant epistemological modes of speaking authoritatively in 
modernity is memory and memorialization, and this is the mode accessed by the 
narratives of attachment used in cultural property discourse. Personal memory cannot 
span the reaches of time required, but cultural memory is not valid against the 
horizon-line of modernity, where “the past” is constantly shifting. Furthermore, how 
can memory serve as a foundation for the human condition given these constraints?
To grasp the trajectory of far past into the near future, what is required is a personal, 
fictional, yet entirely modem set of memorial techniques. These techniques include 
the rhetorical tropes of autobiography, the eulogy, the epitaph and prosopopeia. 
Narratives in these styles are personal, authoritative, unquestionable, and at the same 
time, intensely modem, as they depends upon the absence of the other, the 
incompleteness of the object, and most importantly, the silence of the audience. 
Western rationality can thus possibly reach beyond itself to dredge up a form of 
protection from its effects: modernity can be staved off by memorialization. Yet, as 
creatures of modernity, these narrative techniques are linked to mourning, sterility 
and loss, whereas the enactment of a cultural property claim must be, in order to
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remain true to the hypothesis of this work, an act of rescue, creation, and possibly 
escape. Once again, the argument turns to the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to provide 
a different reading of memory. The techniques of memorialization irradiate 
modernity; however, the meaning of memory can be (to some extent) redemptive, if it 
is seen as a form of inversion and complexity that forces humanity to evolve. 
Reaching for the past, in this sense, does not avoid or escape the future. If cultural 
property discourse uses tropes of memory to vault forward, as it does, then it avoids 
the sterility that would merely reproduce a given evolutionary moment without ever 
moving beyond it.
The creation and purpose of the narratives of origin that form the second axis 
of cultural property discourse were considered in Chapter Five, where, drawing again 
on the “facts” and narratives of the Parthenon Marbles case, I looked into a different 
sort of problem that arises in authoritatively claiming ground from the far past. If one 
dominant epistemological mode is memorialization, the other is genealogy. 
Genealogical endeavours do not maintain the integrity of their subjects; rather, they 
dissolve them into a shifting set of components that can be, at any given moment, 
constituted differently or assigned to an entirely different “history” or “owner”. 
Knowledge in modernity does not provide firm foundation for immutable certainty 
regarding anything at all, and much less origin -  neither origin of a thing nor origin of 
a people or race. The part of cultural property discourse that describes or ascribes 
origin, therefore, must be a narrative that can withstand the genealogical endeavour. 
Once again, the primary option is a form of fiction. Knowledge defined by “heritage” 
is again authoritative and fictional identity; supported by commodification and the 
tourism industry but also open to reinterpretation and fantasy. Most importantly, 
once maintained, it cannot be shaken by “truth”, as truth is emphatically not the point 
of narratives of origin understood as heritage. Thus, this second vector of cultural 
property discourse also responds to the problematics of time in modernity, and 
produces a means of owning both past and future. The two vectors together, 
narratives of attachment and narratives of origin, define the field on which cultural 
property claims occur because they provide the means to solve the problem of living
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on the horizon-line of modernity. Instead of being transfixed by, and rootless within, 
space, humanity attempts to avoid the consequences of its rationality and claim a 
realm that guarantees a more benign past and more human future.
The relevance of Kennewick Man to the argument of the thesis overall is as a 
test case for the accuracy and utility of the theory of cultural property herein 
proposed. For the theory to be useful to other scholars or commentators, it must 
apply to more cases than the Parthenon Marbles. The case of Kennewick Man does 
indeed support this theorization of cultural property overall. First, as in the case of 
the Parthenon Marbles, the claimants on both sides of the Kennewick Man case used 
historical narrative, scientific data, and arguments of cultural identity to claim 
ownership. Although the discourses of colonialism and postcolonialism that are used 
by the Kennewick Man claimants are not openly referenced by the claimants to the 
Parthenon Marbles, they are discourses that arguably could be used with equal 
validity by both the British and the Greeks. Again, although unlike the claimants in 
the Parthenon Marbles case, the claimants in Kennewick Man openly claimed 
autochthony as a foundation for their ownership, lodging “truth” firmly within the 
bailiwick of cultural existence rather than any objectively ascertainable system, the 
foregoing analysis has shown that autochthony is precisely what is at stake in the 
Parthenon Marbles case.
The differences, therefore, are at most differences between the sources of the 
arguments in the two cases, not the substance. Indeed, they only serve to highlight 
the similarities in the two arguments’ structure. Both sides in Kennewick Man made 
arguments on the axes of narratives of memory and of origin. Indeed, these two 
strands of arguments folded into each other: as the skeleton had just recently 
appeared, and thus had no “objective” history whatsoever, the arguments used 
memorial techniques to establish origin and claims of (the skeleton’s) origin to 
underwrite the validity of the memorial techniques. Most importantly, both claimed 
present ground and future time -  place and time to be Native Americans or scientists 
on the substrate of this object -  as the necessary good that the law could award them.
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The “white-ness” and the “native-ness” of the dead man opened new ground in 
America, and it was this ground (and future time) that became the real “cultural 
property” that was being claimed. One can see a reflection of exactly this issue in 
the cleaning of the patina of the Parthenon Marbles. Ground, colour, nativity are as at 
stake in one case as they are in the other.
The final conclusion that can be drawn from my hypothesis and the research 
that supports it is that although cultural property is defined by its utility, that utility 
itself needs to be further theorized. Thus far, the utility of cultural property (objects 
and discourse) is its function as a protection against modernity. But is this merely the 
attempt to find something that protects us from ourselves? We are all “autochthonous 
peoples” now; we are no longer content with mere indigeneity, the shifting sands of 
“identity” or the secondary securities of ownership and rationality to anchor us on the 
horizon-line that we’ve created for ourselves. The result of our making our slice of 
time in the world un-home-like or uncanny to ourselves, however, is that we become 
cut-rate versions of Walter Benjamin’s “angel of history”: looking forever backwards 
we nonetheless fail to see our ethical responsibility or accept the horror that has 
brought us to this position. We do not feel empathy with the vanquished, instead we 
identify ever more strongly with the victors. On the edge of the abyss, we 
contemplate new forms of rationalization and domination. We continue to collect 
“cultural treasures” instead of building no more museums and letting shrines and 
cemeteries remain full. It is possible that what we would find, if we looked further at 
the subject, is that being “modems” is the least of our problems. Quite possibly, 
whether or not we have been modem is not as important as the other question -  have 
we been humanl
The “frightening monsters” vanquished by the ancient Greeks are the same as 
the aliens that (now) terrify us, or the memories that (have always) frightened and 
grieved us. Certainly, it is the conclusion of this thesis that the past escapes 
ownership. It is the future that is relentlessly at stake. Claims made regarding the 
ownership of ancient objects are claims that attempt to constitute an endlessly-
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recreated past and a radically-open future. This is the endeavour that animates the 
attempted ownership of time, as well as the often-futile recourse to the discourse of 
law in this area. As such, they are claims that attempt to swing the mass of history on 
a fulcrum that opens the horizon to justice.
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